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I
INTRODUCTION
A. The Current Status of the Public Accommodations Laws
The civil rights movement in the United States has made enormous ad-
vances since Lester Maddox used a gun to eject three black students who en-
tered his Atlanta restaurant in 1964.' As progress has been made, the objec-
tives of civil rights agitators and the character of their activities have changed.
There is no longer a single "movement" composed of large numbers of people
I. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 551-52 (A. Blaustelin
& R. Zangrando eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEORO).
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united around common issues. 2 As the most egregious forms of racial discrimi-
nation have been eliminated, numerous smaller movements have arisen focus-
ing on discrimination against women, handicapped people, and homosexuals. 3
The most substantial development during the last decade has been the amend-
ment of most state public accommodations laws to prohibit sex discrimination.
A conspicuous gap remaining in the federal law is the absence of any prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination. Also, state and federal legislation has been enacted
to prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons and to bar discrimina-
tion by credit institutions. These, however, have not been adequately imple-
mented.
Although explicit racial segregation in places which are clearly public is
now rare, the eradication of all types of discrimination in public accommoda-
tions is far from complete. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the basic
federal public accommodations statute, is extremely narrow and provides only
minimal assistance where it is most needed-in the twelve states which have no
public accommodations laws. Of the states which do have public accommoda-
tions statutes, some do not prohibit discrimination in places which are obvi-
ously public, such as cemeteries, barber shops, bars, hospitals, and retail
stores. Other statutes offer little or no protection against discrimination on the
basis of handicap, sex, marital status, or sexual preference.
Most states offer criminal and/or civil remedies for violation of the public
accommodations statutes. However, in many cases, the remedies offered are
insubstantial, and public accommodations issues rarely reach the courts. The
majority of the states have organized civil rights agencies with substantial en-
forcement powers to augment existing civil and criminal remedies. The respon-
sibility for enforcement of the public accommodations statutes now rests
primarily with these agencies.
The purpose of this Project is to chart recent developments in public ac-
commodations law, including the expansion of access rights to places not pre-
viously regarded as public, the proscription of discrimination against groups
other than racial minorities, and the increasing role of the state civil rights
commissions in enforcing discrimination law. This survey provides a basis for
assessing the adequacy of existing remedies and suggests changes in state and
federal law. The Project conducts a mechanical examination of the statutes on
the books. It does not discuss how those laws came into existence4 or the ac-
tual workings of the agencies which enforce them.
B. The Concept of Public Accommodations
"Public accommodations" is a term of art which was developed by the
drafters of discrimination laws to refer to places other than schools, work
places, and homes. Specific sections of these laws cover housing, education,
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1978, § E, at 5. col. 1.
3. Id.
4. See generally M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: THE REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RiGHTs 206
(1967).
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and employment; the public accommodations sections deal with all other
places. 5
Proscription of discrimination in public accommodations is premised on the
notion that many privately-owned establishments are to some extent public.
Citizens' rights of access to public places must, therefore, be balanced against
the right of the owner to control his or her property. With the enactment of
public accommodations statutes during the past fifteen years, and of legislation
prohibiting discrimination by credit institutions and against disabled persons,
the emphasis of the law has shifted dramatically toward protection of the ac-
cess rights of the public.
The scope of traditional public accommodations laws is defined by a nar-
row concept of what places would be open to the public, based on the common
law obligation of innkeepers and "common carriers" to admit all travellers. 6
The current view is so much broader, however, that the use of the word "ac-
commodations" is a misnomer; any establishment which offers goods and ser-
vices of any kind to the public may now be covered. 7 The modern concept is
limited to coverage of establishments which operate from a particular place, but
the laws could be expanded to include services which are performed at the
home or office of the buyer, or goods which are sold in the street. 8
Traditional public accommodations laws were drafted under the assump-
tion that the proprietor of an establishment could not be required to take af-
firmative action to avoid discrimination. The newly enacted laws protecting
handicapped persons have diverged from this model by prescribing building
specifications to eliminate architectural barriers to access. 9 Other public ac-
commodations laws might be similarly extended to require other affirmative
acts, such as solicitation of business from all groups or delivery of services to
all groups. Though this Project reflects an expansive view of public accommo-
dations, it only examines coverage of those places which are designated as
public accommodations in the civil rights statutes. General references to public
accommodations laws are, therefore, only to these provisions. There is no dis-
cussion of laws which protect access rights to certain goods and services, such
as those which prohibit discrimination by employment agencies, real estate
agencies, or schools. Discussion of discrimination in these areas is best left to
articles dealing with education, housing, or employment discrimination. In ex-
amining recent developments in access laws, this Project will focus on the
scope of the state statutes, and the extent and manner in which they are en-
forced. Particular attention will be given to how public accommodations is de-
fined, and to what classifications of persons are protected. The remedies pro-
vided by the public accommodations laws will then be explained and evaluated.
5. J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAw 79 (1959).
6. See note 211 infra.
7. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978).
8. Garbage collectors, milkmen, and housepainters do business in the private homes of their
customers; the absence of a "place" of business provides no conceptual basis for exempting these
public services from coverage under the discrimination laws.
9. See note 376 infra.
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Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 is the basic federal statute guaran-
teeing equal access to public accommodations. Title II, however, does not
touch significant areas of discrimination in public accommodations; the Civil
Rights Act of 186611 and the fourteenth amendment extend beyond its scope.
The following discussion examines the current status and application of federal
public accommodations legislation and the remedies available under each provi-
sion.
A. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
At the time of its passage, Title II was perceived as prohibiting acts of
discrimination in privately-owned facilities to the extent that this goal was con-
stitutionally permissible. Congress was constrained by the Supreme Court's in-
validation in 1883 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,12 which had contained pro-
visions similar to but broader than those of the 1964 Act. Justice Bradley's
majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases13 held that the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause restricts only state action. An individual wrong-
ful act, unsupported by state authority in the form of law, custom, or judicial
or executive proceedings was "simply a private wrong, or a crime of the indi-
vidual"; 14 the person wronged had recourse only in the laws of the state.
Because the Warren Court had given hints of a willingness to expand
Bradley's antiquated construction, the fourteenth amendment was used as a par-
tial basis for Title H.Is In light of the 1883 precedent, however, Congress endeav-
ored to lay additional constitutional foundations. 16 The scope of the commerce
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 is divided into seven
sections. The first three describe the substantive rights protected, and the remaining sections de-
scribe the remedial provisions. Title III of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which provides for the de-
segregation of all public facilities owned, operated, or managed by the state or any subdivision
thereof, is an aspect of federal public accommodations law which will not be discussed in this
Note.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970).
12. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided in part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public
conveyances, on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only
to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. Id. at 17.
15. See Lomard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). In
both of these cases, the majority avoided the question whether the fourteenth amendment pro-
hibited discrimination in public accommodations by voiding the defendants' arrests for trespassing,
but Justice Douglas, writing concurring opinions in both cases, endorsed expansion of the four-
teenth amendment.
16. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
26-28 (1963) (statement of Senator Robert Byrd) [hereinafter cited as Commerce Hearings]. See
also 110 CONG. REC. 12,700 (1964).
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power had been tested and found to be enormous.' 7 Also, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had established a policy of desegregation in interstate
transportation in the 1950's which had withstood challenges under the In-
terstate Commerce Act.' 8 As a result, Title II was drafted to draw upon both
fourteenth amendment and commerce clause authority; establishments whose
operations "affect commerce" or are "supported by State Action" were cov-
ered.' 9
The Supreme Court upheld Title II in two test cases presented soon after
its passage, sustaining it under Congress' plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce. 20 Although Justices Douglas and Goldberg further argued that Title
II could rest on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 21 the
initial judicial reliance on the commerce clause by the majority established a
pattern for all subsequent litigation. The basic question of fact thus became
whether the particular accommodation "affected commerce." 22
1. Prohibited Discrimination
Title II not only prohibits denial of services but guarantees "full and equal
access" to accommodations covered by the statute. 23 Under this formulation,
Title II prohibits disparate service or treatment and bans facilities segregated
under "Jim Crow" laws or customs, 24 but the Act does not proscribe selective
admissions standards or ejection of unruly patrons, so long as those standards
are applied without regard to race, creed, color, religion, or national origin.25
17. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
18. The Interstate Commerce Commission ordered cessation of segregation on buses and trains
in NAACP v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 297 I.C.C. 335, 1 Race Rel. Rep. 263 (1955) and Keys v.
S.C. Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769, 1 Race Rel. Rep. 272 (1955). Following these decisions, the
Interstate Commerce Act was amended to concur with this policy. 49 U.S.C. § 43 (1970). By 1962,
the policy was extended to cover intrastate transportation. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33
(1962).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1970).
20. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964). In Katzenbach, the Court was willing to extend the scope of the commerce power
to bring under the Act a restaurant that served primarily local residents but received $70,000 worth
of food which had moved in interstate commerce.
21. Justice Douglas highlighted the appropriateness of reliance on the fourteenth amendment:
It is rather my belief that the right of people to be free of state action that discriminates against
them because of race ..."occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system
than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines." (citations omitted).
Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. Ur.ited States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (concurring opinion).
Justice Goldberg agreed. Id. at 291.
22. The courts have applied conventional commerce rationale to bring various accommodations
under the Act, straining to find the requisite effect. For examples of the application of the -ag-
gregate burden" effect, see Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1970).
24. For a discussion of Jim Crow laws, see M. KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 125-35
(1961).
25. See, e.g., Rosado Maysonet v. Solis, 409 F. Supp. 576 (D.P.R. 1975).
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Section 2000a-2 defines more precisely the elements of a discriminatory
act:
No person shall (a) withhold, deny or attempt to withhold or deny, or
deprive or attempt to deprive any person of any right or privilege secured
by Title II, or (b) intimidate, threaten or coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with any
right secured by Title II, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person for
exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by Title
11.26
This section, the "punishment clause," may be enforced not only against the
proprietor of a covered establishment and his agents, but also against third
parties who prevent entrance into an establishment.2 7
The most significant consequence of the "punishment clause" has been to
undermine the use of state criminal trespass and disorderly conduct statutes
against persons seeking to exercise their Title II rights. Immediately after the
passage of the Act, the Supreme Court held that state criminal prosecutions
against those merely seeking entry were unlawful,28 thus calling a halt to "sit-
in" arrests. The Court has further frustrated state reprisals and delaying tactics by
authorizing removal to a federal forum of state criminal actions stemming from
the defendant's assertion of Title II rights. 29
2. Accommodations Covered by Title II
The accommodations covered by Title II fall into five categories: (1) lodg-
ings for transients; (2) facilities selling food for consumption on the premises;
(3) gasoline stations; (4) places of exhibition or entertainment; and (5) "captive
establishments," i.e. those which house or are located within a covered estab-
lishment and which hold themselves out as serving the patrons of the covered
establishment.30 Since 1964, federal courts have pushed the commerce clause
analysis to its logical extreme in order to draw particular accommodations into
these categories. Virtually every lodging place or restaurant has been deemed
to fit under Title 1l31 The commerce clause has been applied so liberally that
the courts have rarely had to rely on a finding of state action to reach dis-
criminatory accommodations; for those few establishments which have no con-
ceivable effect on commerce, very small degrees of state action have been
found sufficient to trigger the application of the statute.
32
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1970).
27. United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968).
28. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
29. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a~b)(l)-(4) (1970). Title II includes the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption for
small, proprietor-occupied lodgings, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (1970), and a private club exemption.
id. § 2000a(e) (1970). See text accompanying notes 48-59 infra.
31. See, e.g., Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Fla. 1965) (barbershop with predomi-
nently local trade covered by the Act because located within hotel); Willis v. Piekrick Restaurant,
231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ga. 1964). appeal dismissed sub. non. Maddox v. Willis. 382 U.S. 18
(1965) (small restaurant covered).
32. See Auerbach v. African American Teachers Ass'n, 356 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
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Since the passage of Title II, interpretation of the phrase "place of enter-
tainment and exhibition" has been broadened by the courts. The drafters of the
Act intended it to cover only spectator-oriented and not participatory forms of
entertainment. 33 No doubt Congress was reluctant to breach the strong barriers
of custom and tradition which restricted intimate social contact between races.
Some early cases did distinguish "places of entertainment" from "places of
enjoyment," 34 thus limiting the application of Title II to places where the pub-
lic merely watched performances. This distinction began to erode in Miller v.
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 35 where the Fifth Circuit held an amusement
park to be a place of entertainment because it presented the "performance" of
children riding merry-go-rounds and ferris wheels. The court, in effect, took
judicial notice of the fine art of people-watching. 36 Recently, courts have made
further inroads into this highly academic distinction and have prohibited dis-
crimination in recreational facilities where customers come into considerable
personal contact with one another. Now, beauty parlors and health spas, pool-
rooms, community swimming pools, and even youth football programs are
considered places of entertainment. 37 Bars which neither serve food nor pro-
vide entertainment are still beyond the scope of Title II; perhaps the neighbor-
hood tavern is accorded respect as a "blue collar private club." ' 3 If, however,
the tavern offers any relatively meager form of amusement such as a juke
box, television, pinball machine, or piano, it is brought under the sway of the
statute. 39
Title II is directed primarily toward eliminating restrictions on freedom of
movement, i.e., interference with travel and the right to spend leisure time as
one sees fit. Within this framework Title II has been effective; virtually no
hotel, motel, restaurant, theater, or gas station is outside its purview. Never-
theless, a great many establishments are not covered, including retail stores,
many establishments offering services (professional and other), private hospi-
tals, and proprietary schools. The captive establishment clause 40 has reached
some of these places: barber shops located within a hotel, 41 a bowling alley
(exclusion of white faculty members from meeting in school auditorium violated Title II). But see
National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973).
33. Commerce Hearings, supra note 16, at 107.
34. Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Daniel v. Paul, 395 F.2d
118 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Robertson v. Johnston, 249 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 376 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967).
35. 394 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1968).
36. Id. at 349.
37. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Rousseve v. Shape Spa
for Health and Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); United
States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974); United States v.
Williams, 376 F. Supp. 750 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
38. Selden v. Topaz 1-2-3 Lounge, Inc., 447 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. United States v. Deyorio, 473 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Deeten, 356 F.
Supp. 688, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
41. Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
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with a snack bar on the premises 42 and, in a more sweeping application of this
clause, retail stores which contain restaurants. 43 The scope of the captive es-
tablishment clause is potentially vast. Any office within a large hotel or build-
ing containing a restaurant might be covered. Such an approach was suggested
by the plaintiffs in Dombrowski v. Dowling,"4 who argued that the presence of
a restaurant in the lobby of an office building placed the entire building within
the scope of Title II.4s The Donbrowski court, however, rejected this expan-
sive reading and found that the restaurant must do more than merely serve
some patrons of the building; a substantial symbiotic relationship must exist
between the covered and captive establishments. 46
The captive establishment clause has been a tool of uneven reliability for
parties seeking the protection of Title II. The clause could nevertheless em-
brace a broad range of personal services frequently offered by large hotels and
recreation complexes, including ticket services, car rentals, barber and beauty
shops, and shoeshine parlors. The spillover effect of the clause reaches beyond
the captive establishments found to be covered. Once an establishment is cov-
ered in this context, the courts have been willing to apply Title II to the same
sort of accommodation standing alone. 47
The single major exemption from coverage under Title II is the "private
club or other establishment not in fact open to the public." ' 48 Such a club,
however, must be truly private and not simply a sham designed to circumvent
the law. Congress feared evasion of the Act via the private club exemption, 49
and the federal courts have been intolerant of any such attempts at subter-
fuge.50
A private club defense has never been successfully asserted before the
Supreme Court, but the Court has discussed the requisite features of the pri-
vate club in cases where an alleged club was adjudged a public accommoda-
tion. The existence of a profit motive invariably marks the "'club" as a public
accommodation. 51 A club must follow some "plan or purpose of exclusive-
ness;" if membership is granted solely on the basis of race, the defense will
fail.52 Elaborating on these pronouncements, a number of lower courts have
outlined the indicia of the private club. One of the most thoughful analyses is
42. Fazzio Real Estate Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1968).
43. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
44. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 197-98.
47. Courts often have sought to bring a recreational facility within the scope of Title II by
holding that an eating establishment within the facility was covered. See. e.g., Fazzio Real Estate
Co. v. Adams, 396 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1968). Such holdings, while avoiding the question of the
coverage of the recreational facility itself, may have forged a path for an expanded definition of
"place of amusement."
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
49. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13,697-98 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
50. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969); United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967).
51. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
52. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1968).
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found in Wright v. Cork Club,53 in which the court developed the following
guidelines to distinguish the truly private club from the disguised accommoda-
tion. A private club must: (1) have machinery to carefully screen applicants for
membership; (2) limit the use of its facilities to members and bona fide guests;
(3) be controlled by the membership through meetings and elections; (4) be
operated on a non-profit basis solely for the benefit and pleasure of its mem-
bers; and (5) direct any publicity solely to its members, 4 In Cornelius v. Be-
nevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 5  a rare case upholding the private club
defense, the court also questioned the substantiality of dues and the history of
the organization's formation. Inquiry into formation necessarily conflicts with
the privacy interest protected by the private club exemption and such informa-
tion should be relevant only as evidence that a club was organized to circum-
vent Title II. If a club is truly private-a selective organization, controlled by
and for its members on a non-profit basis-the motive for formation should not
be grounds for denying the defense.5 6
Courts have severely restricted the private club exemption. The defense
has been successful when the organization has a primarly social function and
can be described as an extension of the home rather than business.57 The
exemption is at present strictly a statutory requirement, not a constitutional
one. Certainly the exemption safeguards the freedoms of association and pri-
vacy; both Congress and the courts have acknowledged that intention." Con-
currently, however, the exemption seems to grant the bona fide private club
the right to use race as one criteria of membership. However, the degree to
which this "right to discriminate" is constitutionally protected has yet to be
established. 59
3. Classifications Covered by Title II
Although Title II prohibits discrimination on account of race, color, reli-
gion, and national origin, 60 litigation under the statute has focused almost ex-
clusively on racial discrimination. This was the great evil sought to be cor-
rected by Title II; the Senate hearings and debates dealt extensively with the
problems and humiliation faced by blacks living and traveling in a segregated
society. 6I The statute has also been applied to whites who have been denied
access because of their association with blacks or their participation in the civil
53. 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
54. Id. at 1153.
55. 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974). Other cases where a club was found to be private
include Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 872
(1976), and Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973). In Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Supreme Court assumed the facility was a private club.
56. See Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
57. 382 F. Supp. at 1204.
58. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1971); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp.
1143, 1157 (S.D. Tex. 1970); 110 CONG. REC. 13,697-98 (1964).
59. See generally Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Cot!flici,
5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460 (1970).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-I (1970).
61. See Commerce Hearings, supra note 16, at 692-97.
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rights movement. 62 Religious discrimination is prohibited by Title II but public
concern over this issue, particularly anti-Semitic advertising by hotels and re-
sorts, had dissipated before its enactment. 63 Title II does not cover sex dis-
crimination; all attempts to invoke the statute toward that end have failed. 64 In
this respect, federal law is far behind the law in most states.6s
Although federal coverage is narrow, when a charge of discrimination
violative of Title II is made, the courts will tolerate few defenses. Proprietors'
arguments that their religious belief in the separation of the races required them
to refuse service to black customers, 66 that they would be unable to adequately
serve black clients, 67 or that business would suffer because whites would not
patronize integrated establishments 68 have met with summary rejection.
4. Remedies and Enforcement
Title II only provides for injunctive relief against present or proposed dis-
crimination.69 A civil suit may be initiated by the aggrieved party suing on his
own behalf or on behalf of a class. 70 In addition, the Attorney General may
initiate a suit or intervene in private actions certified to be of "general public
importance. '" 71 There is no mechanism for agency enforcement of the Act or
for criminal prosecution. Plaintiffs cannot obtain monetary damages, but the
prevailing party may recover reasonable attorneys' fees. 72 The attorneys' fees
provision has been liberally interpreted and may serve to counteract in part the
lack of a damages remedy. 73 The expense of bringing suit would normally out-
weigh any out-of-pocket costs incurred as a result of the discriminatory act. A
private plaintiff is therefore not obliged to personally finance the vindication of
his right of equal access.
If a violation of Title II occurs in a state with its own public accommoda-
tions laws, no private action may commence until thirty days after the appro-
priate state official has been notified of the alleged act or practice.7 4 This has
generally been interpreted as requiring exhaustion of state remedies. 7" If the
62. Reprisals against civil rights workers are treated as punishments or attempts to punish per-
sons for exercising or attempting to exercise Title II rights under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2(c) (1970). See
Offner v. Shell's City, Inc., 376 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1967).
63. Camp of Pines v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389. 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1945). There has
been little litigation in this area and that has been under state statutes. See M. KoNvrrz. suipra
note 24, at 168-70.
64. Seidenberg v. McSorely's Old Ale House, 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970): DeCrow v.
Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
65. See text accompanying notes 353-66 iifra.
66. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400. 402 n.5 (1969) modifying and affg
377 F.2d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 1967) (Winter, J., concurring).
67. Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
68. United States v. Gulf-State Theaters, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 549, 552 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3, 2000b(a) (1970); Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
73. See Newmann v. Piggie-Park Enterprises, Inc.. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c) (1970).
75. Harris v. Ericson, 457 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1972).
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violation occurs in a state with no applicable law, and the federal court believes
voluntary compliance is a reasonable possibility, it may refer the matter to the
Community Relations Service, established by Title X of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, for conciliation of the grievance. 76 If there is cause to believe that a
"pattern or practice of resistance" to Title II exists, the Attorney General may
seek judicial relief without first giving notice and attempting settlement. 77
Section 2000a-5 confers jurisdiction for Title II proceedings on the federal
courts. Suits by the Attorney General must proceed in federal court, 78 but no
such express limitation applies to private suits. Although most state courts will
take jurisdiction over private Title II claims, at least one has implied that it will
not accept claims brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.79
B. Alternative Federal Remedies
Section 2000a-6 provides that the remedies described in the Act are the
exclusive means of enforcing the rights guaranteed in Title 11.80 The legislative
history indicates the Congress did not wish proprietors to "fear a jail sentence
or a damage action if his judgment as to coverage of Title II is wrong." 8' But
Title II states explicitly that its existence does not preclude the assertion of
rights or the pursuit of remedies available under any other state or federal stat-
ute which prohibits discrimination. 8 2 On the basis of this language, and because
Title II is limited in its coverage and the remedies it authorizes, other federal
provisions have frequently been invoked to protect the right of access. Criminal
penalties have been imposed on non-proprietors breaching Title II, although
Title II on its own terms prohibits third party interference.83 Other statutes
cover accommodations and services and protect classes not included in Title II.
Because no damage remedy has evolved from Title II, a plaintiff may super-
impose other federal provisions, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the
fourteenth amendment, onto a Title II claim to supplement Title II injunctive
relief.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1866: Sections 1981 and 1982
After a century of lying dormant, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,84 guaran-
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200oa-3(d), 2000g (1970).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) (1970).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (1970).
79. Compare Dudley v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 678, 213 N.W.2d 805 (1973) with State Comm'n for
Human Rights v. Kennelly, 59 Misc. 2d 278, 299 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1969).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (1970).
81. 110 CONG. REC. 9767 (1964).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (1970).
83. United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970)).
84. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 comprises 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
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teeing equality of the right to contract and to hold property, has been re-
vitalized. Prior to 1968, it was generally accepted that this act was directed
only toward governmental action.85 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,"6 how-
ever, the Supreme Court declared that section 1982 barred racial discrimination
in the sale and rental of real and personal property by both public and private
individuals. The authority to reach private acts derived not from the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but from the thirteenth amend-
ment's power to eradicate slavery:
[A]t the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure
under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a
white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If
Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then
the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep.87
Thus, Section 1982 may guarantee access to accommodations not covered by
Title II. Combining section 1982 with Title II has been most successful when
the question of access is incidental to a purchase of some real property inter-
est, such as a burial plot88 or use of a private recreational facility which has a
residency requirement.8 9 But section 1982 has also protected such personal
property interests as the purchase of life insurance. 90
The extension of section 1982 to prohibit wholly private acts of discrimina-
tion in the sale and purchase of property is mirrored in the expanded interpre-
tation of section 1981 to prohibit discrimination in the right to make and en-
force contracts. 9 1 Protection of contractual rights under section 1981 overlaps
with coverage under Title II in many respects and exceeds it in others. For
example, the purchase of an admission ticket to an amusement park has been
termed a contract, 92 and accommodations such as taverns 93 and proprietary
schools,94 which are not covered by Title II, have been brought under the pur-
view of section 1981. Arguably, any business which opens its doors to the
public makes a general offer to contract; thus, denial of access to the goods
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
Section 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
85. Seldin, Eradicating Racial Discrimination at Public Accommodations not Covered by Title
11, 28 RUTGERs L. REV. 1, 6-12 (1974).
86. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
87. Id. at 443.
88. Terry v. Elmwood Cemetery, 307 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
89. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1968).
90. Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (1972).
91. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), cited with approval in Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
92. Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
93. Hemandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D. Or. 1973).
94. Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856, 862 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
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and services therein may trigger a 1981 action. Operating in tandem, sections
1981 and 1982 may embrace the right of access to any accommodation open to
the public, thereby eclipsing Title II.
Another advantage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 over Title II is that
claims for damages are permitted under the former. 9s Until recently, attorneys'
fees were not awarded in section 1981 or 1982 actions. In order to recover both
monetary damages and attorneys' fees, plaintiffs had to sue simultaneously
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Title II. Parties using this strategy had
been granted the whole spectrum of remedies-injunctive relief and attorneys'
fees under Title II and compensatory and punitive damages under section 1981
or 1982.96 The Attorneys' Fees Act, 97 however, may make such dual actions un-
necessary. Passed in 1977, the Act authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees in
addition to monetary damages in suits brought under various Reconstruction-
era statutes, including the Civil Rights Act of 1866.98
Although sections 1981 and 1982 cover a greater variety of accommoda-
tions and allow more substantial remedies than does Title II, all three of the
provisions suffer a common limitation. Each has been construed to apply only
to racial and ethnic discrimination. 99 As with Title II, the courts have consis-
tently held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 cannot be construed to proscribe
sex discrimination.100
95. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975); Olzman v.
Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp.
752, 756 (D. Or. 1973). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1978), which authorizes damages for
violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1987.
96. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
97. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1978).
98. Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the pro-
visions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but
in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions ncces-
sary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court havingjurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts
in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any
civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or
charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1978).
99. Fitzgerald v. United Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972). Sec-
tion 1981 was held to apply to ethnic discrimination in Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752
(D. Or. 1973). But see National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 413 F. Supp. 1224, 1228
(D.D.C. 1976), which held that section 1981 applies solely to racial and not ethnic discrimination.
100. Wisconsin Nat'l Organization for Women v. Wisconsin, 417 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis.
1976); Fitzgerald v. United Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972).
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The private club exemption is not explicit in sections 1981 and 1982, and
the Supreme Court has not decided whether an exemption similar to the one
contained in Title H should be implied.101 The district courts which have faced
the issue have concluded that excluded persons may not avail themselves of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to obtain membership in a private organization. 02
Moreover, these courts have applied the same tests which are employed in
Title II cases for determining the validity of a private club.
The recent decision in Runyon v. McCrary °0 3 casts new light on the private
club question. Runyon held that section 1981 precludes a private, non-sectarian
elementary school from denying admission to prospective students on the basis
of race. No state action was involved; the school did not receive state or fed-
eral aid and did not claim tax-exempt status. The Court found that the admis-
sion of minority students to the school did not violate the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of free association, privacy, or the right of parents to direct the
education of their children. Although the Court avoided the question of
whether section 1981 applies to private clubs, it made two points which may
have significant bearing on the constitutional underpinnings of the club exemp-
tion. First, the Court cast aside the argument that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
repealed by implication the 1866 Act, reaffirming that an implied repeal occurs
only when two acts are in irreconcilable conflict. 0 4 In doing so, the Court
refused to analogize a "private school" exemption in the context of section
1981 to the "private club" exemption of Title II. Although the desirability of
statutory harmony between the two statutes may be greater in the case of
clubs, the Court has acknowledged that section 1981 regulates certain private
actions which are not only beyond the limits of Title II but beyond those in-
tended by the Congress which originally enacted section 1981.10s Second, the
Court distinguished between the right of a private school to promulgate a phi-
losophy of racial segregation and the right to practice its philosophy by exclud-
ing racial minorities. A similar distinction could honor the right of clubs to
promote belief in racial discrimination, yet prohibit discriminatory membership
policies.
The Court made clear its intent to distinguish the private club issue from
the one facing it, particularly with regard to the contractual rights involved.
The educational program of the private school in Runyon was widely advertised
and the admissions requirements were negligible. A private club with equally
lax entrance requirements and which advertised just as broadly would not have
passed muster under Title II. Although the Court did not find the rights of
association and privacy to be violated by their decision, 0 6 those concerns may
101. This question was patently left open in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410
U.S. 431, 438-39 (1973).
102. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla. 1975). re'd. 530 F.2d
16 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 872 (1976); Cornelius v. B.P.O.E.. 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D.
Conn. 1974); Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
103. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
104. Id. at 172-73 & n.10 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.. 426 U.S. 148. 154-55 (1976)).
105. Id. at 189-90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 175-79.
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be more pressing in a case involving a discriminatory private club. Government
intervention in the latter instance might seriously impinge on the right to fash-
ion one's personal life as one wishes and to choose one's friends and personal
associates. Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion offered an especially strong
defense for the position that certain contractual relationships should be shielded
from governmental scrutiny: "[O]ur holding does not imply the intrusive
investigation into the motives of every refusal to contract by a private citizen.
... [S]ome contracts are so personal 'as to have a discernible rule of exclusiv-
ity which is inoffensive to § 1981.' "107
As the privacy interest increases, and as the club moves farther out of the
public domain and becomes more an extension of the home, the constitutional
interests supporting section 1981 become less pertinent. The individual denied
access to a private club is not denied a right to which the rest of the public is
entitled, but is denied something granted only to a specific group of social inti-
mates. The exclusionary practice in such a situation represents a personal
whim of the club members rather than one of the "badges of slavery" which
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 sought to abolish. 108
If the Court does find, as seems likely, that a private club exemption is
constitutionally mandated, the scope of that exemption could be narrower than
the one developed in Title II litigation. If a certain level of intimacy is to be
protected from government regulation, then organizations whose goals are not
purely social and whose members are chosen on the basis of objective, imper-
sonal criteria, may be prevented from practicing exclusionary policies. Thus
national organizations, in which members need not be personal acquaintances,
or civic-minded associations which have a purpose beyond membership convi-
viality, might not be private enough to warrant constitutional protection.
2. The State Action Doctrine: Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1983109 is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a Reconstruc-
tion enforcement statute which permits the recovery of damages for violation of
the equal protection clause. Although the fourteenth amendment is effective
against governmental, not private, behavior, "state action" may be inferred if
private discriminatory conduct is supported or compelled by state law, usage, or
custom.
The point at which state involvement becomes sufficient to constitute a
violation of the fourteenth amendment has been a matter of considerable con-
107. Id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring).
108. See Note, supra note 59, at 461.
109. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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troversy. The traditional restrictive approach exemplified by the Civil Rights
Cases'" required some affirmative action by the state adversely affecting the
rights of citizens. The doctrine was expanded to reach private discrimination
condoned by the state in Shelley v. Kraemer. 1 Later, in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,11 2 the Court held that where the state has "insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence with [the defendant] it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be
considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.""13 Further expansion occurred when the Court found
that more oblique forms of state encouragement, enforcement, and control war-
ranted a finding of state action.11 4 As a result, some commentators had con-
cluded that the doctrine had been judicially buried. 1 5 This liberal trend began
to reverse in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,116 followed by Jackson %'. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co. 117 In both cases, the Court articulated the same restrictive
"nexus" test, requiring state involvement with the particular act challenged,
not merely generalized regulation and support.
The nexus requirement has blocked findings of state action in suits against
public facilities over which the state has typically exercised extensive control,
including hospitals " s and public utilities.119 Lower courts have elaborated the
Jackson holding into~-three-pronged test: state involvement must be signifi-
cant, must relate to the specific policy or decision which caused the injury, and
must aid, encourage, or tacitly approve the challenged activity.120
Attacks made against clubs deemed private under Title II or the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, on the grounds that the clubs have received benefits from
the state sufficient to constitute state action, have met with even less success.
Neither a lease for nominal rent from a municipality to the club, -'2 nor the
receipt of state funds where those funds have been used in a non-
discriminatory fashion,122 nor the possession of a state liquor license 23 have
triggered application of the state action doctrine. The barriers to a finding of
state involvement in cases of truly private organizations appear insurmounta-
ble, for once the clubs are placed outside the public sphere, the nexus require-
110. 109 U.S. at 11 (1883).
111. 334 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1948).
112. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
113. Id. at 725.
114. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See
generally Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
115. See Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TFX. L. REv. 347, 389-90 (1963).
116. 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972).
117. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
118. See, e.g., Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center. 520 F.2d 894 (91h Cir. 1975).
119. See, e.g., Srack v. Northern Natural Gas Co.. 391 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
120. See Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363. 367 (D. Or. 1975). aff'd, 142 F.2d
792 (9th Cir. 1976).
121. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 872
(1976); Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
122. New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees. Inc.. 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975).
123. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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ment is necessarily more difficult to meet. Findings of state action must rest on
the state's involvement in the particular activity challenged and can draw no
support from other signs of state control. The Court in Moose Lodge implied
that a symbiotic relationship between the state and the privately-run facility
would be especially difficult to find if the facility were not in fact open to the
public. 2 4
The factual concerns relevant to clubs and non-profit organizations have
been more clearly outlined by at least one lower court: (1) the degree of and
dependence on governmental aid; (2) the extent of governmental regulation; (3)
any implication of governmental approval of the challenged act; (4) the extent
to which the organization serves a public function; and (5) the claims of mem-
bers of the organization to protection of their rights of privacy and free associa-
tion.12S Most of these factors must be considered in order to determine whether
the organization is by nature truly private, so it is unlikely that a club, once
past the hurdle of the privacy determination, will find itself subject to the state
action doctrine.
After Jackson and Irvis, lower court opinions noted that the sufficiency of
state action is inextricably grafted to the nature of the right vitiated. Thus, the
type of discrimination and the nature of the public accommodation are consid-
ered along with the degree of state involvement. 26 For example, the Second
and Fifth Circuits have applied less rigorous standards to cases involving
charges of racial discrimination 27 than those involving other forms of discrimi-
nation. Also, the degree of state action necessary to invoke the state action
doctrine will vary with the type of accommodation. A liquor license, which
represents insufficient state involvement to trigger the state action doctrine in
the private club context, has been relied upon to prohibit discriminatory prac-
tices in public restaurants. The court in Bennet v. Dyer's Chop House, Inc.12 8
distinguished Moose Lodge on its facts as a case concerning a private club and
pointed out that the defendant restaurant was more dependent on a liquor
license for economic survival than was a club not operating for profit.
Although the standards for applying the state action doctrine have become
more stringent, once they are met, the equal protection clause may reach all
forms of arbitrary discrimination, even if the conduct or accommodations under
attack are not subject to Title II or sections 1981 and 1982. For instance, sex
discrimination has been successfully attacked in this manner by finding state
action in agreements with local police 29 and in the exclusion of women by
accommodations which are dependent on a state authorized liquor license.130
124. Id. at 175.
125. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975).
126. See, e.g., Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Va. 1976).
127. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975); Greco v. Orange Memorial
Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975).
128. 350 F. Supp. 153, 155 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
129. Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Co., 402 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
130. Bennett v. Dyer's Chop House, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Seidenberg v.
McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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3. The State Action Doctrine anzd its Application to the States
Without Public Accommodations Statutes
At present, twelve states have no affirmative public accommodations legis-
lation.131 A few states not only lack affirmative statutes but have laws which
authorize discrimination.13 2 Some of these statutes are patently unconstitu-
tional, but have not been repealed or judicially invalidated. 133 All states, includ-
ing those discussed herein, have laws protecting the rights of the visually and
physically handicapped, as well as architectual barriers legislation which re-
quires certain buildings to comply with accessibility standards. These statutes
are often vague, lack enforcement provisions, and impose meager penalties
upon violators.134
In the absence of any meaningful state remedy, an aggrieved party may
gain access to places of public accommodation only by bringing suit under a
federal statute. Federal law offers limited protection of the right of access, but
its scope, in terms of covered establishments, protected classes, and available
remedies, is limited. However, in states where discrimination is affirmatively
permitted by statute, federal law may be useful. Statutes which encourage dis-
crimination may represent sufficient state involvement with the challenged pri-
vate behavior to trigger the state action doctrine. The Mississippi statute pro-
vides an example:
Every person, firm or corporation engaged in any public business, trade or
profession of any kind whatsoever in the State of Mississippi... is hereby
authorized and empowered to choose or select the person or persons he or
it desires to do business with, and is further authorized and empowered to
refuse to sell to, wait upon, or serve any persons that the owner, manager
or employee of such public place of business does not desire to sell to,
wait upon or serve. 135
Under this statute a proprietor may discriminate on any grounds whatever, in-
cluding race, ethnicity, or religion. Such statutes are commonly interpreted to
apply only to accommodations outside the ambit of federal law. Federal courts
have been reluctant to tamper with state statutes, as the posture of Clark v.
131. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina.
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia have no public accommodations legislation except
minor provisions for the handicapped.
132. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-17 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-710 (1976); TEX. CiV. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 178 (Vernon 1969). The Florida Statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.092 (West 1972).
permits proprietors to exclude any customer on a variety of grounds, but refusal may not be based
on grounds of race, creed, color, or national origin. Since this statute neither offers enforcement
provisions nor proscribes behavior, it will not be considered as a civil rights statute.
133. Alabama and South Carolina have statutes mandating segregation on their books. e.g..
ALA. CODE tit. 48, § 196 (1973); S.C. CODE § 24-1-140 (1977). As of 1966, "there were 44 sections
of the Alabama Code devoted to the maintenance of segregation in various state and privately
owned facilities." United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ala. 1966). Few of these
statutes have since been repealed.
134. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 79-601 (1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1952 (West Supp. 1977);
S.C. CODE § 41-29-10 (1977).
135. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-17(1) (1972).
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Dodge136 indicates. Rather than enjoin enforcement of the Mississippi statute,
the federal district court simply ordered the facility, which had relied on the
statute in defense of its exclusionary policies, to open its doors to the plain-
tiff.
13 7
A majority of the Supreme Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.13 8 fol-
lowed the same approach. Without invalidating the statute itself, the Court held
that the arrest of plaintiff for loitering was a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, argued that the mere exis-
tence of a state law supporting racial discrimination established state involve-
ment in any act of private discrimination. Whether the proprietor were actually
influenced by the statute would be irrelevant: "When private action conforms
with state policy it becomes a manifestation of that policy and is thereby drawn
within the ambit of state action." 139 Under Justice Brennan's analysis, any evi-
dence of state support, whether legislative or executive, by policy or practice,
for private acts of discrimination would warrant the application of section 1983
to reach the private act. Therefore, if a state switched from a neutral policy on
discrimination, i.e., if it had no statute on point, to one hostile to federal statu-
tory or constitutional law, acts which conformed to that hostile policy, even
though not directly supported by the state, could be subject to section 1983.
The same acts occurring in a state with an affirmative public accommodations
law would not be unlawful. Adickes concerned racial discrimination, but sec-
tion 1983 applies as well to all other forms of arbitrary discrimination. Although
federal legislation contains no specific prohibition against discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations on the basis of sex, age, or disability, such discrimination
in states with Mississippi-type statutes could be prohibited under the Brennan
analysis. For example, a tavern-keeper in Mississippi who refused service to
female customers might be subject to a section 1983 suit, whereas the same
tavern-keeper in Missouri, 140 a state which has remained silent on the issue of
sex discrimination in public accommodations, would not. The Mississippi stat-
ute would be deemed an endorsement by the state of the discrimination prac-
ticed by the individual proprietor, and thus, state action.
The state action doctrine has not yet been pushed to this extreme. The
Mississippi statute can realistically be read only as countenancing exclusionary
practices, but it does not blatantly encourage discrimination. Instead it em-
phasizes proprietors' free choice in selecting patrons. Furthermore, the statute,
standing alone, without further support or enforcement, would not satisfy the
nexus requirement of Jackson and Moose Lodge. 141 The recent ruling of Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks 142 has more thoroughly undermined the notion that
state endorsement via statutory encouragement constitutes state action. There,
the Court upheld a New York warehouseman's lien statute which permitted the
136. 206 F. Supp. 539, aff'd per curiam, 313 F.2d 637, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
137. Id. at 543.
138. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
139. Id. at 203 (Brennan, J., concurring).
140. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 314.030(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
141. See text accompanying notes 118-24 supra.
142. 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978).
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warehouseman, by self-help measures, to sell goods stored with him in the
event that storage fees were not paid. The Court rejected respondent's argu-
ment that the sale by the individual warehouseman was attributable to the state
because the state had authorized and encouraged the sale via the statute: "This
Court, has never held that a State's mere acquiesence in a private action con-
verts that action into that of the State." 1 43 When a statute offers no rewards or
sanctions to the proprietor who discriminates and promises no support or other
form of concrete state approval, an argument seeking to invalidate the statute
or the private action taken in accordance with that statute, will not succeed un-
der the existing state action doctrine.
4. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Traditionally, credit has not been thought to fit into the category of public
accommodations. Since special rules and problems apart from those associated
with traditional accommodations are involved in any detailed discussion of
equal credit, the subject will be discussed only briefly herein. Nonetheless,
access to lending institutions and the services they provide is most assuredly an
access right of as great significance as admission to restaurants, hotels, and
theaters. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act offers a viable remedy for discrim-
inatory denials of credit. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA)14 4
was added to the Consumer Credit Protection Act to require financial institutions
to make credit available to all customers regardless of sex or marital status. 14S
The 1976 amendment to the ECOA extended protection to all persons regard-
less of race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance
benefits, or exercise by the applicant of any right under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act. 146
The Federal Reserve Board Regulations, promulgated after the 1974 Act,
specify a number of practices which may not be used in making a determina-
tion of the applicant's credit-worthiness. Creditors may not discount income on
the basis of sex or marital status or inquire into the applicant's birth control
methods or childbearing plans. 147 All inquiries about marital status, change of
name, alimony, child support, or maintenance obligations, and requests for in-
formation about a spouse are limited. 148 The regulations adopted after the 1976
amendments refine and update the prior regulations to reflect the expansion in
143. Id. at 1741.
144. Equal Credit Opportunity Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 503, 88 Stat. 1521
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976)).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976).
146. Equal Credit Opportunity Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239. § 701. 90 Stat. 251
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V 1975) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976)).
147. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4-7 (1977). The Federal Reserve Board, as part of its rule-making power,
was granted authority to exempt from the Act certain types of credit transactions, including trans-
actions not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. In its regulations, the Board has
afforded special treatment to credit for business, incidental (credit extended as a service by trades-
people), securities, and utilities transactions.
148. Id. § 202.7 (1977). For a more detailed discussion of prohibited credit practices and the
Board's regulations, see Comment, Equal Credit: Promise or Reality?, II HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REv.
186 (1976).
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coverage. 149 The creditor may inquire into an applicant's marital status to as-
certain the rights and remedies available to the creditor.150 Creditors may also
inquire about the applicant's age or whether the applicant derives any portion
of income from public assistance for "the purpose of determining the amount
and probable continuance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent
elements of credit-worthiness." Is The permissible extent and manner of use of
information gained from inquiries into applicants' public assistance benefits is
unclear. While applicants cannot be denied credit solely because they receive
public assistance, that information could easily be used for discriminatory pur-
poses, and proof of such discrimination would be difficult to establish. Never-
theless, information on the receipt of public assistance does have a direct bear-
ing on the amount and source of the applicant's income, which are matters of
justifiable concern to the credit grantor.
The ECOA provides for both administrative and civil enforcement. The
Federal Trade Commission has the general power to enforce the Act, including
the power to enforce any pertinent regulations of the Federal Reserve Board. s2
The Attorney General may bring suit upon referral from any federal agency or
on his own initiative in cases of serious or multiple violations of the Act.'5 3
The ECOA also permits aggrieved parties to bring individual or class actions
for injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief.'5 4 Punitive damages of up to
$10,000 may be awarded to individuals, and in class actions the ceiling is
$500,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth, whichever is less. ss
The most effective policing mechanism may prove to be the notice provi-
sion, which focuses on initial compliance rather than subsequent enforcement.
All applicants who are denied credit or whose present credit arrangement is
changed or revoked are entitled to a statement from the lending institution.
Lenders are given a choice either to provide the statement as a matter of
course or to inform applicants of their right to such a statement when notified
of an adverse action. 156
The Act also provides that when a denial of credit violates both state and
federal law, the aggrieved party is entitled to only one recovery for monetary
damages, whether suing under the federal credit law or a state statute.15 7
Therefore, state laws with similar or stronger protections will not be preempted
by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, but state laws inconsistent with the Act
will be displaced by the possibility of a federal recovery.
5. Federal Law and the Handicapped
Protecting the access rights of the handicapped presents special problems.
The handicapped have often faced outright refusals of access by proprietors, but
149. 42 Fed. Reg. 1254-56 (1977).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(1) (1976).
151. Id. § 1691(b)(2) (1976).
152. Id. § 1691(c) (1976).
153. Id. § 1691(d) (1976).
154. Id. § 1691(e) (1976).
155. Id.
156. Id. § 1691(d) (1976).
157. Id. § 1691(d), (e) (1976).
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even more often such persons, particularly those confined to wheelchairs, have
been physically unable to enter public establishments. Three federal statutes
offer some protection to the access rights of the disabled. The Vocational Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 provides in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.1S8
The Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 mandates that:
[E]Iderly and handicapped persons have the same right as other persons to
utilize mass transportation facilities and services; that special efforts shall
be made in the planning and design of mass transportation facilities and
services so that the availability to elderly and handicapped persons of mass
transportation which they can effectively utilize will be assured; and that
all Federal programs offering assistance in the field of mass transportation
... should contain provisions implementing this policy.1S9
Finally, the Architectural Barriers Act imposes an affirmative duty on all reci-
pients of federal funds to conform to building standards which assure accomo-
dation of the disabled.160
Courts have required that the rights of the handicapped be considered be-
fore beginning construction of federally-funded facilities or during the planning
of mass transit systems. In Bartels v. Biernat,161 the court enjoined the Mil-
waukee Transit Authority from executing contracts for the construction of pub-
lic passenger buses until the needs of the mobility handicapped were given
greater consideration. A similar order was issued to the Washington Metropoli-
tan Area Transit Authority to adhere to the Architectural Barriers Act by con-
structing an elevator in a subway station which would otherwise have been
inaccessible to the disabled.1 62
Although federal law establishes an affirmative duty on the part of those
receiving federal funds to accommodate the handicapped and creates a private
cause of action for those denied the use of public transportation systems,1 63 the
extent of this duty remains unclear. In the past, the affirmative action duty has
been construed narrowly. Some courts have held that when technical difficul-
ties made accessibility impossible or impractical, a transit system which failed
to promise assistance to the handicapped would not be denied federal funds.164
With the issuance of stricter regulations under the Urban Mass Transit Author-
158. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (Supp. 1977).
159. 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1970).
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 41514156 (1970). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 100a.189, 100b.189 (1976).
161. 405 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
162. Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically
Disabled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501, 1507 n.47 (1973).
163. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
164. United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F. Supp. 1297 (D.C. Minn. 1976), vacated, 558
F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp.
394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977).
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ity Act, these earlier findings of technological impossibility have been seriously
undermined. The affirmative action requirement has been reshaped into a man-
date that federally-funded mass transit authorities exhibit satisfactory "special
efforts" in planning facilities that can be utilized by the elderly and handicap-
ped. 165 To further strengthen the mandate, transit authorities were required to
demonstrate concrete progress in implementing their accessibility projects by
September 30, 1977.166 Other regulations offer specific guidelines to insure that
the handicapped will be able to utilize public transportation by requiring, for
example, transit authorities to purchase a substantial percentage of wheelchair
accessible vehicles or that they guarantee substitute transportation to the
mobility handicapped. 167
Recent suits brought by handicapped individuals and representative organi-
zations seek stricter enforcement of these guidelines in an effort to assure ac-
cessible public transportation. 168 The courts, guided for the first time by spe-
cific and extensive administrative directives, are beginning to impose a meaning-
ful obligation of affirmative action upon urban transit authorities and to direct
that relief be granted to those currently denied access to public buses and
trains. 169
III
STATE STATUTES: THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
A. The History of the State Statutes
Discrimination in public accommodations was recognized and prohibited
by many states long before Congress passed Title II. The earliest legal recogni-
tion of the right of access was a statute1 70 passed by the Massachusetts state
legislature in 1865, in the wake of the Civil War. The law prohibited discrimina-
tion based on race and color in places which provided certain essential goods
and services. Nine years later, two other Northern states, New York I17 and
Kansas,1 72 passed public accommodations statutes. During the decade following
the Civil War, many Southern states, while under the military rule of the Re-
construction Acts, passed similar laws. 173 In 1875, Congress passed a civil rights
165. 49 C.F.R. § 613.204(a) (1977).
166. Id. § 613.204(c) (1977).
167. 49 C.F.R. Part 613, Subpart B (Appendix 1977).
168. Leary v. Cropsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558
F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'g 409 F. Supp. 1297 (D.C. Minn. 1977).
169. Id.
170. Act of May 16, 1865, ch. 277, § 1, 1865 Mass. Stat. (1864-1865 Mass. Laws 650) (version
no longer in force), reprinted in M. KONVITZ, supra note 24, at 156.
171. IX N.Y. Stat. at Large 583-84 (1884) (version no longer in force), noted in M. KONVITZ,
supra note 24, at 156.
172. Act of April 25, 1874, ch. 49, § 1, 1874 Kan. Laws (version no longer in force), noted in
M. KoNVlTZ, supra note 24, at 156.
173. See, e.g., THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE LAW 1849-1970, at
72-74 (R. Bardolph ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD], which includes refer-
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act,174 but in 1883, the Supreme Court invalidated the public accommodations
section of the act, 175 leaving the protection of the civil rights of blacks to the
state legislatures.1 76 Congress was not to enact another statute guaranteeing
rights to blacks until 1957.177 Of the Southern states, only Tennessee enacted a
public accommodations law to fill the statutory gap left by the Supreme Court
decisions. 178 Between 1883 and 1885, however, eleven Northern and Western
states passed public accommodations statutes. 179 By 1910, eight others were
added to the list. 180 In contrast to the trend in Northern legislatures of replicat-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, most Southern states and Delaware passed
laws during the last quarter of the nineteenth century which permitted or re-
quired separation of blacks and whites.18' Some of these laws banned racial
intermarriage; others prescribed segregation of the races in public conveyances,
schools, and jails.1 82 The statutes did not change the behavior of whites toward
blacks in the South,183 but merely codified existing social conventions.
During the first quarter of the twentieth century some new state public
accommodations laws were passed, both in Northern and Southern states, but
enforcement was apathetic.1 84 State legislatures in the South may have been
motivated to enact civil rights laws by a fear that continued inaction would lead
to greater federal intervention in racial matters.18 Until the end of the Depres-
sion, there was a lull in civil rights activity in the United States. Litigation was
rare, and statutory development was comparatively limited.18 6 Access to public
accommodations was not regarded as a state or federal contitutional right, so
denial of access only could be challenged where state legislation had been
passed.1 87
The economic and political position of blacks was boosted by the end of
the Depression and by the economic boom which accompanied World War II,
but the changing social structure generated very little civil rights legislation. A
1949 study listed eighteen states as having public accommodations legisla-
ences to ch. 1947, §§ 1-4, 1873 Fla. Laws 25 (version no longer in force), and §§ 1-3. 1869 La.
Laws 57 (version no longer in force).
174. See note 12supra.
175. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
176. CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 173, at 126-27.
177. Id. at 99.
178. Sections 1-5, ch. 68, 1885 Tenn. Acts 124-25 (version no longer in force), reprinted in
CIVIL RiG'rs RECORD, supra note 173, at 126-27.
179. M. KoNvrrz, supra note 24, at 157, lists Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey. Ohio, Col-
orado, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Rhode Island.
180. CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 173, at 128.
181. Id. at 75-76, 82.
182. Id. at 130-37.
183. Id. at 130. The intensity of racial hostility is visible in the enormous number of lynchings
which occurred in the South during this period. In 1892 alone, 235 black people were lynched; near-
ly a thousand were lynched between 1900 and 1910. Id. at 99, 167.
184. Id. at 188.
185. Id.
186. E.g., § 1, ch. 265, 1913 N.Y. Laws 481-82 (version no longer in force), reprinted in CIVIL
RIGHTs RECORD, supra note 173, at 192.
187. See, e.g., Warley v. Bd. of Park Comm'rs, 233 Ky. 688.26 S.W.2d 554 (1930).
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tion.188 These laws generally prohibited a short list of places from excluding
blacks because of their race. The places most commonly covered were inns,
taverns, hotels, public conveyances, restaurants, theaters, and barber shops. 189
The study found that thirty-five states had laws authorizing or requiring some
form of discrimination.190 Fourteen states required segregation on trains, thir-
teen required separate mental hospitals, and ten required that blacks and whites
be placed in separate prisons. 191
During the 1940's and 1950's the federal executive and judicial departments
began to give more serious attention to racial problems.' 92 The increasing in-
volvement by federal officials in issues which had previously been regarded as
local was a product of growing recognition of the need to integrate American
society. 193 The state civil rights laws increased in number during the 1950's, and
some of the older laws were amended to expand their coverage. Enforcement
was, however, still largely ineffective.1 94 Even in the South, some progress was
made; ordinances requiring segregation were repealed in several cities. 19s
The integration controversy came to a head in the 1960's when demand for
civil rights by activist groups met violent resistance by white Southerners; 96
the desegregation drive led to thousands of arrests and many deaths.1 97 As a
result of this period of controversy over civil rights, much state and federal
legislation was passed prohibiting discrimination. In each city the activists pub-
licized the integration issue and consolidated their support by conducting
marches and sit-ins. These actions led to meetings with city officials where civil
rights ordinances were drawn up in exchange for promises to stop the demon-
strations. When enough cities in a state had passed ordinances, the groundwork
was laid for passage of a state law. 198 Similarly, the existence of numerous
state laws facilitated Congress' acceptance of Title II.
B. The Drafting of a Definition of "Public Accommodations"
The definition of "public accommodations" is controversial. Limits im-
posed on the concept by the Supreme Court are based on statutory rather than
constitutional interpretation. The states are, therefore, free to adopt a broader
definition of what is public than that used in Title I.199 Establishments com-
188. CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 173, at 251.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 259.
191. Id. at 260.
192. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 1, at 355. Murroe Berger notes that
"[s]ince 1937 the Supreme Court has [given] to civil rights the same preferred position which
earlier Courts had given the property rights." M. BERGER, supra note 4, at 88. See generally Id. at
88-159.
193. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 1, at 356.
194. CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 173, at 367-68.
195. Id. at 367.
196. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 1, at 477.
197. See CIVIL RIGHTS 1960-1966, at 6-19, 60-74 (1967).
198. Id.
199. See Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 294
A.2d 594, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court
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monly covered are hotels, restaurants, transport facilities, places of entertain-
ment, retail stores, lodgings, and state facilities.
A comparison of the scope of the definition of public accommodations
under the state statutes, and of the different ways that the statutes are drafted,
is useful for three reasons. First, it shows the advantages and disadvantages of
the various statutory forms. Second, it makes clear the narrow limits of federal
law and indicates in which states a plaintiff in a discrimination case would be
better advised to use the state statute than to base a claim solely on Title II.
Third, it demonstrates the lack of any valid conceptual basis for the failure of
many statutes to protect the rights of groups other than racial minorities.
Rights of access to places of public accommodation are protected by sev-
eral different types of statutes. Most states have a single civil rights act with a
section on public accommodations and, in some cases, sections on credit and
disability. (The parts of these laws which deal with discrimination in housing,
employment, and education will not be discussed). Some states have enacted a
separate public accommodations act. Other states protect particular access
rights by specific statutes prohibiting credit discrimination or protecting dis-
abled persons.
The definitions of public accommodations stated in the civil rights laws
take three forms: 200 some provide a long and specific list of covered accommo-
dations, others employ a long specific list but specify that coverage is not lim-
ited to the establishments listed, and still others use a general characterization
of what constitutes a public place. There is no necessary correlation between
the drafting form chosen and the breadth or narrowness of the statutes. For
example, those which use a long specific list may be narrower than the others
unless frequent amendments have added new places to the list. But it should
not be assumed that any particular category of accommodations is covered be-
cause a statute is drafted in a certain form.
The statutes of only three states define public accommodations using a
long specific list without any qualification. 20 1 There is no typical list of places
included because coverage is idiosyncratic. Even so, an example of this type of
listed definition is instructive. The New York Human Rights Law lists in its
definition of public accommodations:
inns, taverns, road houses, hotels, motels, whether conducted for the en-
tertainment of transient guests or for the accommodation of those seeking
health, recreation, or rest, or restaurants, or eating houses, or any place
where food is sold for consumption on the premises; buffets, saloons, bar-
rooms, or any store; park or enclosure where spiritous or malt liquors are
affirmed the decision of a state court that a fraternal organization was a public accommodation
under the state law despite its own prior holding that the same establishment was a private club
under Title II.
200. These categories are a variation of those used in a 1965 article surveying the state public
accommodations statutes. Caldwell, State Public Accommodations Law. Fundamental Liberties.
and Enforcement Programs, 40 WASH. L. REv. 841, 843-44 (1965).
201. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(7) (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B. § 11 (Supp. 1977); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(9) (1966).
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sold; ice cream parlors, confectionaries, soda fountains, and all stores
where ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, or where
beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the premises;
wholesale and retail stores and establishments dealing with goods or ser-
vices of any kind, dispensaries pools, laundries, and all other cleaning es-
tablishments, barber shops, beauty parlors, theatres, motion picture
houses, airdomes, roof gardens, music halls, race courses, skating rinks,
amusement and recreation parks, trailer camps, resort camps, fairs, bowl-
ing alleys, golf courses, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiard and pool
parlors; garages, all public conveyances operated on land or water or in
the air, as well as the stations and terminals thereof; travel or tour advi-
sory services, agencies or bureaus; public halls and public elevators of
buildings occupied by two or more tenants, or by the owner and one or
more tenants. 20
2
This long list was the earliest form used in state public accommodations stat-
utes. The New York law is unusual in the length of its list. The early public
accommodations laws were regarded simply as restatements of the common
law; they were and still are strictly interpreted. Court decisions which interpret
these statutes narrowly can be reversed only by legislative amendment.203
More recent public accommodations statutes are drafted in a different
manner to avoid this problem. About one-third of the laws use a general defini-
tion of public accommodations.2 0 4 The use of general language has the effect of
extensive coverage: the civil rights commissions and the courts have little dis-
cretion to narrow such laws. The most broadly interpreted general definition of
public accommodations is California's: "All persons within the jurisdiction of
this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, or national origin are entitled to full and equal accommodations, ad-
vantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever. ' 20 5 More typical of the general definitions of public
accommodations is the New Mexico Human Rights Act, 20 6 which covers "any
establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations, or
goods to the general public." °20 7 Some statutes add to this basic formula such
202. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1972). This statute does not fall within the category
of statutes using a long unqualified list, because it does contain some qualifying language. It is
given here as an example, because its list is particularly comprehensive.
203. M. KONVITZ, supra note 24, at 164.
204. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West Supp.
1978); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4501 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-3(m) (Bums Supp. 1977); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 601A.2(10) (West 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.130 (1977); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2301 (Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
4-33-2(G) (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1401 (Supp. 1977);
OR. REv. STAT. § 30.675(1) (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-1(12) (Supp. 1977); UTAnI
CODE ANN. § 13-7-2 (1973 & Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(j) (Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. §
6-83.1 (1975).
205. CAL. CiV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978).
206. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33A-2 (Supp. 1975).
207. Id. at § 4-33-2(G). Other statutes which use language very similar to this one include, OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.675(l) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1451(c) (Supp. 1978).
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language as "or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general
public." 20 8
The statutes which use general definitions are assumed to cover places
offering food and drink, lodgings and entertainment, as well as retail establish-
ments and state facilities. 20 9 Although the intention of legislatures which use
general definitions is to broaden their public accommodations statutes, ques-
tions arise as to precisely how far they are meant to extend when enforcement
is sought against "private" clubs and other such establishments. More specific
statutes are less ambiguous.210
Most state legislatures have dealt with the problems of a "list" definition
by stating at the end of the list that coverage "includes but is not limited to"
the listed establishments211 or by using other qualifying language.212 A long list
qualified in this manner demonstrates by example the types of places intended
to be covered, without confining coverage to the examples given. Under a long
qualified list, coverage is more precise than under a statute which uses a gen-
eral definition and less arbitrary than under a statute with an unqualified list.
The owner of an arguably public place is alerted to the possibility that his or
her establishment may be covered. A person discriminated against is better
able to predict whether a claim is likely to succeed. The long qualified list is a
compromise between the vagueness of a general definition and the rigidity of an
unqualified list. It offers both flexibility and guidance.
C. Discrimination: The Elements of the Offense
Definitions of discrimination in public accommodations statutes take two
forms: broad and fragmented. The former gives a general statement of purpose,
specifying application to all persons, and not merely to the owner or proprie-
tor of the covered establishment, and generally includes a broad construction
clause. 213 The latter itemizes the particular practices the act is designed to pre-
208. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1401(1) (1971). See DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4501 (1974).
209. These general statutes probably cover many other places than those listed, but because the
language could be interpreted not to reach those other places, they may be assumed to cover only
places which have been clearly defined as open to the public.
210. Some of the statutes which use general language to define public accommodations exempt
particular places. The Delaware law, for example, expressly excludes barber shops from coverage.
DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4501(2) (1974). The District of Columbia law allows political organizations to
discriminate on the basis of political beliefs. D.C. CODE § 6-2203(b) (Supp. 1978).
211. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-1441 (1974); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501 (1973); IDAHO CODE §
18-730 (Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-1 (1973); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (Supp.
1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West Supp. 1978-1979); Mo. REV. STAT. § 314.020
(1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-305(14) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-133 (1977);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-50) (Vest Supp. 1978-1979); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 9540) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (1969); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 9.42.04(2) (1975).
212. D.C. CODE 4 6-2202(x) (Supp. 1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1972); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(1) (Page 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1451(c) (Supp. 1978).
213. E.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978) in pertinent part provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accom-
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2 14
The basic violation of a public accommodations law is denial of full and
equal services at a covered establishment. Such a denial occurs when there is
discriminatory or abusive treatment, service, or charges. At present, com-
plaints of insulting or discriminatory treatment intended to discourage certain
customers are as common as complaints of outright refusals of entry. 21 5 Exclu-
sion and unequal treatment form the core of any public accommodations viola-
tion and are covered by all statutes.
Most states prohibit discriminatory advertising, i.e., the circulation of any
written or printed communication to the effect that patronage by any protected
class will be discouraged or access refused. A few states exempt from punish-
ment private communications sent in response to specific inquiries. 21 6 Though
such a policy may protect the right of privacy, it effectively permits sub rosa
exclusivity. By contrast, a few states find production of any discriminatory
communication to be presumptive evidence of authorization by the propri-
etor21 7 and, therefore, a per se violation.
Reprisals against persons who attempt to gain access or aid others in the
exercise of their rights constitute a separate violation under many statutes. 21 8
Such provisions are potentially useful to protect employees who flout their em-
ployers' discriminatory policies and to prevent further acts of discrimination
against persons who may have assisted others in gaining entrance.
The great majority of statutes prohibit third-party interference in the en-
joyment of access to public accommodations. This guarantee is included in
broad statutes which describe the basic violation as denial of equal access by
any person. Those statutes which describe the primary violation as one by per-
sons engaged in the operation of any place of public accommodation as a rule
provide that aiding, abetting, or coercing a denial of access is a separate of-
fense. Only Vermont and Delaware have no aiding and abetting provision;
these jurisdictions prohibit discrimination only by owners, managers and
agents. 219 California, on the other hand, prescribes separate and severe penal-
modations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever.
See also IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2(a), (b), (e) (Bums Supp. 1977).
214. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 344.120, 344.140, 344.280, 344.290 (1977); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§
296(3-b), 296(6), 296(7), 296(8) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1977).
215. During 1975 and 1976, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
processed 25 charges of unequal service in public accommodations and 27 complaints of denial of
service. [1976] CONN. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ANN. REP. 8. For
additional examples of charges of unequal service see State Div. of Human Rights v. Varsity Inn of
Rochester, Inc., 49 A.D.2d 698, 373 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (4th Dep't 1975); [1977] ALASKA ST. COMM'N
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 28; [1975-1976] PA. HUMAN REL. CoMM'N ANN. REP. 23.
216. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-604 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-2(b) (1973).
217. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-4 (West 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (1969).
218. E.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(7) (McKinney 1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-136 (1977). Con-
tra, IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-6(i) (Bums Supp. 1977). The Indiana Civil Rights Commission is au-
thorized to prevent retaliation in lieu of a statutory bar to retaliation.
219. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4504(a) (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1451(a) (Supp. 1978).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
(Vol. VII:215
SURVEY OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
ties for the use of violence and intimidation as a means of restricting access.220
States with regulatory civil rights agencies frequently categorize willful interfer-
ence with or violation of a Commission order as a separate offense, often ac-
companied by special penalities. 221
Many public accommodations statutes have undergone frequent amend-
ments and additions since their original appearance on the statute books. As
legislative awareness of and hostility toward discrimination has grown, more
accommodations were added, additional groups protected, and definitions of
the offense expanded. Over the years, clauses and sub-clauses have accreted
around many statutes, inhibiting the creation of an orderly and comprehensive
body of civil rights law. When a statute omits one or more aspects of the
discriminatory offense--aiding and abetting, retaliation, or discriminatory
advertising-the explanation often lies in poor drafting rather than in an intent
to narrow the scope of the offense.
D. Places Covered by the State Statutes
It is useful to divide the places covered under the public accommodations
statutes into categories representing the various spheres of activity. These di-
visions serve three functions. First, the range of coverage is more clearly de-
lineated by functional categories than by long lists of specific places. Second,
the use of categories illustrates the recent expansion of the concept of public
accommodations to include certain types of places which were not covered
under the earlier statutes. Third, the use of categories facilitates analysis of
conceptual distinctions traditionally drawn between covered and uncovered
places.
Places covered by the public accommodations statutes have been divided
into four categories. The first is those affecting freedom of movement, which
encompasses all places used by travellers. The second group is those places
which are used for leisure time activities, which includes any places to which a
person might go for entertainment, amusement, cultural or religious contact, or
for any activity related to an interest or hobby. The third is transactional free-
dom, which includes places offering goods and services not covered above.
State facilities, which includes any place owned, operated, or funded by the
state government, is the last category.
1. Freedom of Movement
The right to move freely in one's own community or within one's country
is the principal basis of laws guaranteeing access to places which are privately
owned. This notion was cogently described by Jacobus tenBroek:
Movement, we are told, is a law of animal life. As to man, in any event,
nothing could be more essential to personality, social existence, economic
opportunity-in short, to individual well-being and integration in to the life
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West Supp. 1978).
221. See statutes cited note 480 infra.
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of the community-than the physical capacity, the public approval, and the
legal right to be abroad in the land. 222
Prior to the passage of public accommodations laws, travellers were guaranteed
access to transport facilitites and temporary lodgings by a common law rule
prohibiting "common carriers" from refusing any passengers. 223 This was so
because access to food and shelter may be unavailable to travellers unless
they are guaranteed entry to restaurants and hotels. The right of access was
originally considered more fundamental for travellers than for non-travellers, 22 4
but the public accommodations statutes, with the exception of Title II, no
longer give travellers greater rights of access than non-travellers.
a. Transport Facilities
Many public accommodations statutes make no mention of access to
transport facilities, 225 perhaps because the common carrier rule has been
codified in the Federal Interstate Commerce Act since 1887.226 Statutes which
explicitly cover transport facilities typically list in the definition of public ac-
commodations language similar to the following: "any public conveyance
operating on land or water, or in the air, [any] stations and terminals
thereof."'2 27 Some public accommodations statutes mention equal access to
transport facilities only in provisions protecting blind and disabled persons. 221
A few states have abrogated the common law rule and passed statutes allowing
222. ten Broek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 841 (1966).
223. Rex v. Ivens, 32 E.C.L. 495, 7 C. & P. 213 (1835). See Malot, The Duty of Business to
Serve the Public: Analogy to the Innkeeper's Obligation, 46 CAN. B. REV. 612, 614-21 (1968); M.
KONVITZ, supra note 24, at 159-60.
224. The public nature of places used by travellers is likewise fundamental to Title II. The
primary constitutional basis for Title II is the commerce clause, which permits regulation of in-
terstate activity. Congress relied on the commerce clause, however, for political rather than princi-
pled reasons. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman James Eastland (D. Miss.) had little sympathy
with any move to expand the equal protection clause. Supporters of the bill were able to obtain
Judiciary Committee approval only by using the commerce clause as a foundation. See Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., parts I & 2 (1963).
225. These include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
226. 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970).
227. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1978-1979). The following public accom-
modations laws also cover transport facilities: ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(7) (1974 & Supp. 1977);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501 (1973 & Supp. 1976); D.C.
CODE § 6-2202 (Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-7302(e) (Supp. 1977); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §
13-1(a) (1973); KAN. STAT. § 44-1002(10) (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (Supp.
1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West Supp. 1978-79); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.2301 (Supp. 1978-79); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
64-305(14) (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(9) (1966); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9)
(McKinney 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(I) (Page 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954
(Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.60.040 (Supp. 1977).
228. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-28-1 (1973).
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operators of conveyances to discriminate in their acceptance of passengers.
These state laws, however, are limited by federal law.22 9
b. Restaurants
Access to restaurants is guaranteed by all thirty-eight state public accom-
modations statutes, and has been the subject of much litigation.2 30 Statutes
which cover restaurants frequently do so in language similar to that used by the
New York law, 231 or, more simply, by including "restaurant, eating house, or
place where food is sold for consumption on the premises." 232 Eating estab-
lishments are justified in excluding patrons only on grounds of improper dress,
disorderly conduct, or other criteria not mentioned in the statutes23a 3 Bars and
dining rooms of private clubs, however, are not treated as restaurants by most
state courts.
c. Lodgings
All state statutes prohibit discrimination by such establishments as "inns,
taverns, roadhouses, hotels, motels, whether conducted for the entertainment
of transient guests or for the accommodation of those seeking health, recre-
ation, or rest." 234 Covered lodgings may exclude neither persons who fall in
one of the classifications protected under the statutes, nor, at least in Illinois,
persons who entertain guests who fall within the protected classifications.23s
Many statutes which prohibit sex discrimination generally allow segregation of
sleeping, dressing, and bathing facilities based on sex. -36 A spiritual center may
229. 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970).
230. E.g., Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108 P.2d 942 (1941) (bars found covered as
restaurants under the public accommodations statute and prohibited from racial discrimination);
People ex rel. Clark v. McCurdie, 75 Ill. App. 2d 217, 220 N.E.2d 318 (1966) (restaurant found in
violation of public accommodations statute for refusal to serve blacks); Ferguson v. Windsor Court
Restaurant, Inc., 38 Mass. App. Dec. 120 (1967) (fine levied and punitive damages awarded against
a restaurant which charged higher prices to black customers than to white customers); Braun v.
Swiston, 72 Misc. 2d 661, 340 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1972) (restaurant which admitted women but not men
with long hair was found to have committed sex discrimination); McKinnie v. State, 214 Tenn. 195,
379 S.W.2d 214 (1964) (blacks who blocked the entrance of a cafeteria after being refused service
were fined fifty dollars; the court held that illegal action was not justified as an attempt to obtain
constitutional rights).
231. See text accompanying note 202 supra.
232. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West Supp. 1978-1979).
233: Feldt v. Marriott Corp., 322 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1974) (public accommodations statute not
violated by arrest of a shoeless woman after she refused to leave a restaurant); City of Chicago v.
Corney, 13 III. App. 2d 396, 142 N.E.2d 160 (1957) (racially mixed group ejected from restaurant:
the disorderly behavior of certain members was found to justify their exclusion, but exclusion of
non-disruptive persons was found to violate the public accommodations statute).
234. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
235. McGill v. 830 S. Michigan Hotel, 68 I1. App. 2d 351, 216 N.E.2d 273 (1966).
236. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501(3) (1973 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35(a)
(Vest Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.145 (1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49b, § II (Supp. 1977);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West Supp. 1978-1979): Mlici. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
37.2301 (Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02(4) (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 64-305(14) (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
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also be allowed to deny accommodations to someone on the basis of creed
under a statute like that of New York, which permits religious organizations to
discriminate in favor of members or in a manner designed to promote their
beliefs. 237 Lodging may also be denied by a private club to a non-member in a
state where private clubs are exempt from coverage. In most states a hotel may
eject guests for boisterous behavior and may select guests by other criteria than
those proscribed by the statute. Apart from these exceptions, there is no con-
troversy over coverage of lodgings by the public accommodations statutes.
2. Leisure Time Activities
At common law there was no right of access to places of public amuse-
ment. One California judge noted that "the common law right appears to have
been one of exclusion." ' 238 In contrast, all current public accommodations stat-
utes apply to some recreational facilities. Coverage is based on the rationale
that these places hold themselves out to the public as offering some form of
entertainment, amusement, cultural, or religious activity and, therefore, have no
right to refuse any comers.
a. The Passive/Participatory Distinction
Statutory coverage of places of entertainment is less comprehesive than
coverage of places affecting freedom of movement. A distinction is frequently
drawn between "places of entertainment," which are covered by nearly every
statute, and "places of amusement," which are frequently given carte blanche
to select their clientele. A place of entertainment includes any establishment
which offers a performance such as a movie, a play, a concert, or a horse race,
at which the customer is a passive observer. The Missouri statute, which cov-
ers "any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or
other place of exhibition or entertainment," 239 is typical. This language is used
in Title 11.240 A "place of amusement" is one where the customer participates
in some activity, such as a sport, a game, or a hobby. Some laws do not distin-
guish between passive and participatory activity, but cover both. 241 These laws
generally prohibit discrimination in any public place where people go to satisfy
4-33-2(G) (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-
9(g) (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 942.04(5) (1975).
237. Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly, 44 A.D.2d 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1974). See Hobson v.
York Studios, 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1955).
238. Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d 736, 742, 361 P.2d 921, 924, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 204 (1961).
239. Mo. REV. STAT. § 314.020(4) (1969). See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-133(4) (1977); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(9) (1966).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1970).
241. These include Alaska, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and
the District of Columbia. See Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d
161 (1966) (swimming club covered); Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 210 A.2d 208
(1965) (day camp, although not specifically mentioned in the statute, found covered as a place of
education and recreation); State v. Rosecliff Realty Co., 1 N.J. Super. 94, 62 A.2d 488 (1948)
(Palisades Amusement Park swimming pool found covered).
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an interest or to enjoy themselves. The New Jersey statute, for example,
states:
A place of public accommodation shall include, but not be limited to: any
. . . summer camp, day camp, or resort camp . . . any bathhouse,
boardwalk, or seashore accommodation; any auditorium, meeting place, or
hall; any theater, motion picture house, music hall, roof garden, skating
rink, swimming pool, amusement and recreation park, fair, bowling alley,
gymnasium, shooting gallery, billiard and pool parlor, or other place of
amusement. 242
The test for coverage used by the New Jersey courts is that "an establishment
which caters to the public, and by advertising and other forms of invitation
induces patronage generally cannot refuse to deal with members of the pub-
lic."' 243 One decision under the New Jersey public accommodations law prohib-
ited the Little League from discriminating against girls. 2" The court held that
"a ball field at which tryouts are arranged, instructions given, practices held,
and games played is a place of public accommodation. ' I24S
The distinction drawn in some state statutes between passive and
paticipatory establishments has been defended by the assertion that a stronger
invitation is extended by a theater or other place in which the audience is
passive than that extended by a skating rink or a pool parlor, perhaps because
of more extensive advertising. The absence of any stronger conceptual basis
suggests that the distinction is based primarily on policy concerns. Legislators
who drafted the narrower statutes, and judges who interpreted them may have
sought to avoid the social unrest that might accompany desegregation of bars
and other places where the customer engages in some activity. The distinction
may reflect compromises between factions in the state legislatures favoring and
opposing integration, or may be merely a product of legislative conservatism.
With increasing opposition to racial discrimination and more frequent applica-
tion of the statutes to protect other classifications than racial minorities, non-
coverage of places offering participatory entertainment is now rare.
b. Controversial Recreational Facilities
Certain recreational facilities, such as bars, private clubs, and religious or-
ganizations, are included in some statutes and expressly exempted from others.
Statutes that include these places generate much administrative and court ac-
tion. Therefore, each facility warrants separate treatment.
242. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West Supp. 1978,1979).
243. Evans v. Ross, 57 N.J. Super. 223, 231, 154 A.2d 441, 445, cert. denied, 31 NJ. 292, 157
A.2d 362 (1959).
244. Natl Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522,318 A.2d
33, aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974).
245. Id.
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(i) Bars
Thirteen states and the District of Columbia specifically prohibit discrimi-
nation in public bars. 246 The relatively small number of statutes which mention
bars may, as discussed above, reflect a concern that forced integration might gen-
erate violence. Prohibition of race and sex discrimination by bars requires the
overturning of deeply rooted social traditions. Therefore, progress has been
slower in this area than in other places of entertainment. 247 The statutes which
define public accommodations in general terms may or may not include bars.
The matter is often left to judicial interpretation. 248 Laws which define public
accommodations using a long unqualified list prohibit bars from discriminating
only if bars are listed.249 Where "including but not limited to" is added to a list
definition, the statute may cover bars even if they are not listed.2s0 The only
bars which are expressly exempted from the statutes are bars connected with
private clubs. These are exempt in states which exempt private clubs from
coverage.
(ii) Private Clubs
The public accommodations statutes of twenty-one states and the District
of Columbia exempt private clubs from coverage.251 Although the private club
246. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(7) (1974); D.C. CODE § 6-2202(x) (Supp. 1978). ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 13-1 (1973); KAN. STAT. § 44-1002(i) (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (Supp.
1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11 (Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 314.020 (1969); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 64-305(14) (Supp. 1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 651.050 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-5(1) (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 954(1) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (1969); Wis. STAT. § 942.04(2)
(1975). The absence of explicit statutory coverage of bars does not necessarily reflect non-
coverage.
247. A bar in New York which refused to serve unescorted women standing at the bar, but
served them at tables, was found not to have violated the public accommodations statute. Decrow
v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 383, 298 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1969). The court found no actionable
discrimination because the proprietor did not "refuse to receive or entertain the plaintiff but simply
conditioned their reception and entertainment of her by requiring that she be escorted to the bar or
be seated at a table removed therefrom." Id. at 386, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 862-63. The DeCrow court's
statement was dicta; the decision was based on the noncoverage of sex under the statute. See also
Rosenberg v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 45 A.D.2d 929, 357 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1974).
248. See note 204 supra.
249. Therefore, bars are not covered, for example, by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(1) (Page
1973).
250. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-133 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1976).
251. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441 (1974); D.C. CODE § 6-2202(x) (Supp. 1978); IDAHO
CODE § 18.7302(e) (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(10) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. §§
44-1002, 44-1018 (1973 & Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.130 (1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 4913,
§ 11 (Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2303 (Supp. 1978-1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
314.040 (Vernon Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-138 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West
Supp. 1978-1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-2(G) (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney
1972); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1401(1) (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.675(2) (1977); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954-55 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (1969); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-1(12) (Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-2 (1973 & Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(j) (Supp. 1978); Wis.
STAT. § 942.04(2) (1975).
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exemption is partially based on the customer's constitutional right to free as-
sociation, 25 2 the Constitution does not require states to exempt private clubs
from coverage. Generally, federal law establishes a minimum right of access
but does not guarantee a minimum right to discriminate. Title II does not pre-
empt state law, but instead defers to state action.25 3 This means that the states
may enforce their discrimination laws against private clubs despite the exemp-
tion of clubs from federal law.
Private club exemptions appear in state statutes either as part of the defini-
tion of public accommodations or as a separate provision of the statute. 2 4 A
typical exemption states that "The provision [of this act] shall not apply to a
private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the
extent that the facilities of such establishments are made available to the cus-
tomers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of [the statute]."' ' "
The exemption of private clubs from a state statute is not dispositive of the
issue of coverage. The question which clubs are "private" is subject to dispa-
rate interpretation among the states. The determination whether a place falls
within a private club exemption turns on such criteria as advertising, profit
orientation, openness to the public, and the general purpose of the facility. In
New Jersey, for example, the private club exemption 2S6 was interpreted to
permit discrimination by a fraternal organization whose "bar and grill and other
facilities are available only to its members and their invited guests, and not to
the public generally." ' 25 7 In the same state, a swimming club was held not
exempted from coverage. 2S8 The court found that the club held itself out to the
public because it was organized for profit, controlled by its stockholders, and
solicited members. 2S9 The court rejected the argument that because the club did
no advertising, referred to itself as a private club, and had a limited number of
members, it was a private club. 260 In New York, the exemption for private
clubs261 was held not to shelter a fraternal organization which refused to serve,
252. This right might be invoked either by a customer or by a proprietor. See H. ABRAHAM,
FREEDOM AND THE COURT 439 (3d ed. 1977), which states, "Rights of liberty and property, or
privacy and voluntary association must be balanced, in close cases, against the right not to have the
state enforce discrimination against the victim."
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c), (d) (1974) provide for notice to the state civil rights commissions of
complaints brought under Title II and for opportunity for action by state commissions. If a state
commission chooses to act, the federal court must abstain.
254. This variation is similar to the different drafting forms which are used to include state
facilities as covered accommodations. See text accompanying notes 314-16 infra.
255. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-138 (1977).
256. "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution,
bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private." NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West Supp. 1978-1979).
257. Brunson v. Rutherford Lodge No. 547, 128 N.J. Super. 66, 79, 319 A.2d 80, 87 (1971).
258. Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966). A black
person was found to have been denied membership based on race.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. "Such term shall not include ... any institution, club, or place of accommodation which
is in its nature distinctly private." N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 292(9) 01cKinney 1972).
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and verbally abused, blacks invited to a fashion show. 262 In a decision not
based on the public accommodations provision, another New York court re-
fused to apply the private club exemption to the Kiwannis International and
thus prohibited the organization from ordering its Great Neck chapter to
exclude women. 263 Litigation regarding private clubs has been similarly com-
plex in Pennsylvania. Two fraternal organizations were found not exempt as
private clubs because one had opened its dining room and bar to guests of
members, 264 and the other had opened its bantam bowling facilities to the pub-
lic.265
Since no state statute expressly covers private clubs, many courts in states
whose statutes contain no exemption have found that clubs are included within
express provisions covering places of entertainment, restaurants, or bars. Other
courts have found a private club exemption to be implied in the statute. The
absence of any mention of private clubs in a statute places the proprietor in an
awkward position, since the status of the establishment cannot be determined.
In two cases proprietors requested declaratory judgments that their clubs were
exempt from the statute. 266 In California, whose statute lacks a private club
exemption, a gymnasium was held to be private because it had a limited
number of members and was not open to the public, even though it advertised
its physical education courses on television. 267
(iii) Religious Organizations
The public accommodations statutes of thirteen states and the District of
Columbia allow religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of creed or
religion. 268 Some, like the New Hampshire law, do so explicitly:
262. Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 316 N.E.2d
318, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1974) ($250 compensatory damages awarded; proof of out-of-pocket loss not
required).
263. Kiwannis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Kiwannis International, 52 A.D.2d 906, 383
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1976). The ambiguous decision states that the club is not "in its nature distinctly
private"; it is not, then, exempted from the public accommodations law, but neither is it found to
be covered by that section. The denial of membership to women was found to violate the prohibi-
tion on employment discrimination. The club was covered as an establishment which aimed to raise
"business and professional standards." Id. at 916, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
264. Human Relations Comm'n v. Moose Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972).
265. Moose Lodge No. 145 v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 433, 328
A.2d 180 (1974).
266. A tennis club was refused relief because the administrative remedies had not been
exhausted. East Chop Tennis Club v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 305
N.E.2d 507 (1973). A Playboy Club was declared to be exempt from the statute because its admis-
sions policy was not racially discriminatory but was conditioned on payment of a fifty dollar mem-
bership fee. Watton Playboy Clubs, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 37 II1. App. 2d 425, 185 N.E.2d 719
(1962).
267. Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1960). Al-
though it is a matter of opinion whether attending a church or a synagogue is a leisure time ac-
tivity, it is considered as such because religious activity is more appropriately classified as a
leisure time activity than as an exercise of freedom of movement, transactional freedom, or as a
state facility.
268. D.C. CODE § 6-2203(b) (Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 18.7302(e) (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE
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Nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any religious or de-
nominational institution, or any organization operated for charitable or
educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in
connection with a religious organization, from limiting admission to or giv-
ing preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from
making such selection as is calculated by such organization to promote the
religious principles for which it is established or maintained.2 69
Although litigation regarding the exemption of religious organizations has been
sparse, it is arguable that an exemption for religious organizations may be
mandated by the Constitution. In New York, the Appellate Division held that a
religious organization with hotel accommodations was justified in excluding the
plaintiff on the basis of creed, because the organization had a right, guaranteed
by the first amendment, to select its guests in a manner calculated to promote
its religious principles.2 70 It is not clear whether a statutory exemption of reli-
gious organizations could be applied to a sect which incorporates race or sex
discrimination into its credo.2 71 The New Mexico public accommodations law
is clear on this point. Although a religious organization may select members on
other grounds, it may not discriminate "on account of race, color, national
origin, or ancestry." 272
3. Transactional Freedom
Statutes which guarantee "transactional freedom" prohibit discrimination
in access to goods and services other than those included within the categories
of freedom of movement or leisure time activities. Of the places that fall within
this category, retail stores are the most commonly covered. Other places such
as cemeteries, hospitals, credit institutions, barber shops, and wholesalers are
included in some statutes and excluded from others.
a. The Scope of Coverage
The extent to which state public accommodations laws guarantee transac-
tional freedom depends largely on the way that the statutes define public ac-
commodations. 273 Statutes which use broad definitions have the broadest po-
ANN. § 601A.7(2)(a) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. § 44-1018 (1973); MO. ANN. STAT. § 314.040 (Ver-
non Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-137 (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(IV) (Supp.
1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (Vest Supp. 1978-1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-8(B) (Supp.
1975); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296(11) (McKinney 1972); OKLA. STAT. it. 25, § 1307 (Supp. 1977); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(1) (Purdon 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-2 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. j 49.60.040 (Supp. 1977).
269. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(IV) (Supp. 1977). Almost identical language appears in
D.C. CODE § 6-2203(b) (Supp. 1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(11) (McKinney 1972); N.M. STAT.
ANN § 4-33-8(B) (1974 & Supp. 1975).
270. Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly, 44 A.D.2d 772,773, 354 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271-72 (1974).
271. This exemption might be tested in a suit by a black person to gain entry to a white church,
or by an orthodox Jewish woman filing a complaint regarding the sequestration of women behind a
screen in a synagogue.
272. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-8(B) (1979 & Supp. 1975).
273. See text accompanying notes 200-211 supra.
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tential coverage. The Minnesota statute, for example, states that a "place of
public accommodation" means a "business, accommodation, refreshment, en-
tertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed
or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions, are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the pub-
lic.''274 Such a clause may cover any business. The California statute defines
public accommodations so broadly that the supreme court of that state had no
doubt that all transactional freedoms were guaranteed. The court stated that
[t]he legislature used the words "all" and "of every kind whatsoever" in
referring to business establishments covered by the Unruh Act (Civ. Code
§ 51), and the inclusion of these words without any exception and without
specification of particular kinds of enterprises, leaves no doubt that the
term "business establishments" was used in the broadest sense reasonably
possible. The word "business" embraces everything about which one can
be employed, and it is often synonymous with "calling, occupation, or
trade, engaged in for the purpose of obtaining a livelihood or gain." '2 "s
The statutes which use a list to define public accommodations vary in their
coverage of businesses. The New Hampshire statute makes no reference to
coverage of stores or services; the only explicit guarantee of transactional free-
dom is access to barber shops. 276 Similarly, the drafters of the Kansas statute
neglected to mention any businesses except barber shops, beauty parlors, and
cemeteries. 277 New York, on the other hand, has a long and comprehesive list,
which includes, among other places, "wholesale and retail stores and estab-
lishments dealing with goods and services of any kind, dispensaries, clinics,
hospitals . . . laundries and all other cleaning establishments, barber shops
[and] beauty parlors. '278
The state statutes which add "including but not limited to" a list definition
frequently cover any place offering goods or services to the public. In the Ne-
braska statute, the only place listed which falls within this category is gasoline
stations. 279 That list, however, is introduced by an explanation that "places of
public accommodation shall mean all places or businesses offering or holding
out to the general public goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages, and
accommodations. ' 28 0 The New Jersey statute affords perhaps the broadest
listed guarantee of transactional freedom; it specifically includes "any pro-
ducer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, establishment,
or concession dealing with goods or services of any kind.' ' 28, Statutes generally
do not indicate precisely how far they mean to go in covering business estab-
274. MINN. STAT. § 363.01(18) (Supp. 1978).
275. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468, 370 P.2d 313, 315-16, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609,
611-12 (1962).
276. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(9) (1966).
277. KAN. STAT. § 44-1002(i) (1973).
278. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1972).
279. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-133 (1977).
280. Id.
281. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
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lishments. Some fail to specify which retail and service establishments are cov-
ered; others do not state whether they reach manufacturers and distributors, in
addition to retailers.
A peripheral problem in this area is that regulation of some businesses may
be within the exclusive jurisdiction of some other agency than the state civil
rights commission, and thus be exempt from nondiscrimination requirements.
In Pennsylvania, for example, a state court held that the rates charged and the
services provided by utility companies are regulated solely by the Public Utility
Commission. Blacks charging race discrimination in delivery of services were
found not to have an actionable claim before the Human Relations Commis-
sion.282
Public accommodations statutes have not traditionally prohibited discrimi-
nation by professionals or by businesses rendering services which are delivered
to the home of the customer rather than at some particular place of business.
Milk delivery companies, house painters, and laundry services may select neigh-
borhoods in which to work based on race, nationality, or any other character-
istic of the residents, without fear of challenge under a state discrimination law. It
is common practice for cab drivers in New York City to refuse to stop for
blacks, and except for gypsy cabs, black neighborhoods receive almost no cab
service. 28 3 According to established criteria defining public places as those which
hold themselves out to the public, operate for profit, and use advertising, pro-
fessionals and delivery services should logically be subject to the same prohibi-
tion of discrimination as retail stores. But policy in the area of public accom-
modations is bound by tradition. Although statutory coverage has expanded
substantially in recent years, no state has yet developed the concept of access
to prohibit discrimination by delivered services.
b. Controversial Transactional Freedoms
(i) Barber Shops and Beauty Parlors
In thirteen states and the District of Columbia, barber shops are covered
under the public accommodations statutes. 2 4 In two states they are expressly
exempted. 285 Coverage of barber shops and beauty parlors is particularly con-
troversial with regard to race discrimination, because different skills are needed
to cut black people's hair than to cut white people's hair. Resistance to integra-
tion of barber shops and beauty parlors also arises because cutting hair is a per-
sonal service involving physical contact.
282. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 329, 290 A.2d
699, 700 (1972).
283. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1978, at BI, cal. 1.
284. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300 (1974 & Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501 (1973);
D.C. CODE § 6-2202(x) (Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 13.1 (1973); KAN. STAT. § 44-1002
(1973); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A
(West Supp. 1978-1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-305(14) (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:3(9) (1966); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1972); Oitio REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.01 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1978-1979);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 (1969); Wis. STAT. § 942.04(2) (1975).
285. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4501 (1974); OKLa. STAT. tit. 25. § 1401 (1971).
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Litigation regarding desegregation of barber shops has occurred only in
states whose public accommodations statutes expressly cover barber shops.
Most of these cases result in the issuance of cease and desist orders prohibiting
discriminatory practices.286
A recent New Jersey case held that the prohibition against sex discrimina-
tion in the public accommodations statute invalidates neither an ordinance regu-
lating the hours of barber shops but not beauty shops, nor a statute requiring
that hairdressing establishments obtain separate licenses before serving both
men and women. 287
(ii) Professional Services
Most public accommodations statutes do not specifically prohibit discrimi-
nation by private doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, and other profession-
als. 288 Many of the statutes indicate coverage of "services" generally; this
might or might not be found to apply to professional services. Some public
accommodations statutes do prohibit discrimination in the delivery of certain
medical services. Those which list hospitals, for example, prohibit discrimina-
tion by doctors who work in hospitals. 289 A unique provision in the Washington
state public accommodations statute bars discrimination by doctors, regardless
whether they work in hospitals or practice privately.2 90 The Connecticut statute
disallows discriminatory selection of members by professional and occupational
organizations. 291
Statutory ambiguity regarding coverage of professional services has been
clarified in a few states by court decisions. For example, the California District
Court of Appeals held that the Civil Rights Act covered professional ser-
vices. 292 The court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging race dis-
crimination by a doctor. 293 This decision was a departure from the precedent
set in a 1957 case in which damages were denied to a black person who was
286. E.g., Sellers v. Phillip's Barber Shop, 46 N.J. 340, 344, 217 A.2d 121, 125 (1966); In re
Johnson, 71 Wash.2d 245, 247, 427 P.2d 968, 970 (1967); Gegner v. Graham, I Ohio App.2d 442,
446-47, 205 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1964).
287. State v. Schwarcz, 123 N.J. Super. 482, 494, 303 A.2d 610, 617 (1973).
288. Prohibitions on advertising might be interpreted as evidence that professionals do not hold
themselves out to the public. The prohibition of advertising, however, is based on professional
propriety and is not meant to limit access to professional services.
289. These include the laws of Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. In
Connecticut one plaintiff successfully sued a private hospital for accepting a gift of a trust which
could be used to assist in the treatment only of white patients. The court found that compliance
with the trust provisions would subject the hospital to criminal penalties for violation of the public
accommodations law. The trust was, therefore, awarded to the residuary estate. Connecticut Bank &
T. Co. v. Johnson Memorial Hosp., 30 Conn. Supp. 1, 12-13, 294 A.2d 586, 593 (1972). In a New
Jersey case not brought under the public accommodations law, the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared private hospitals to be "quasi-public" places and to have no right to refuse service to a
woman requesting a first-trimester abortion. Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 71 N.J. 478, 487,
491, 366 A.2d 641, 645-47 (1976).
290. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1977).
291. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West Supp. 1978).
292. Washington v. Blampin, 226 Cal. App. 2d 604, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1964).
293. Id.
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refused service by a dentist. 294 The court reasoned in that case that "no estab-
lished public policy . . . compels a dentist to treat anyone who comes to
him." 2 95
(iii) Cemeteries
Burial of the dead is a highly emotional issue. Consequently, cemeteries
are the last bastion of protected discrimination. At one time many state laws
mandated racial segregation in cemeteries. 296 To date, eight states have passed
laws prohibiting discrimination by proprietors of cemeteries. 2"7 The statutes of
Oklahoma and Washington expressly exempt cemeteries. 298 However, most
state laws make no mention of burial grounds. The Pennsylvania statute ex-
pressly guarantees access to non-sectarian cemeteries, and exempts those af-
filiated with churches. 299 In Kansas and Washington, cemeteries are covered,
but religious organizations are permitted to select members based on their reli-
gious affiliation.300 The interaction of these provisions has not been interpreted
by the courts.
Only a few lawsuits in recent years have challenged discriminatory prac-
tices by proprietors of cemeteries. In 1973, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed a nondiscrimination order issued to a cemetery by the Human Rights
Commission. 301 Under this order, the cemetery was required to keep records of
all persons refused a plot and to send letters stating the reasons for rejection to
the families of rejected applicants. 302
(iv) Credit Institutions
The extension of credit is a service offered to the public. Therefore, some
states treat discrimination by banks and credit institutions as a denial of access
294. Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d 833, 836, 305 P.2d 1020. 1022 (1957).
295. Id.
296. E.g., Act of April 4, 1947, ch. 821, § 2, 1947 N.C. Sess. Laws 1115-16, quoted in CIVIL
RIGHTS REcoRD, supra note 173, at 263, which stated:
Racial restrictions as to use of cemeteries for burial of the dead. In the event said property
municipal cemeteries has been heretofore used exclusively for burial of members of the negro
race, then said cemetery or burial ground so established shall remain and be established as a
burial ground for the negro race. In the event said property has been heretofore used exclu-
sively for burial of members of the white race, then said cemetery ground so established shall
remain and be established as a burial ground for the white race.
297. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-1 (1973); KAN. STAT.
§ 44-1002 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-21.1-08 (1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(1) (Page
1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(I) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); VASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.60.040 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 924.04(7) (1975).
298. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1401 (1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1977). The
Washington statute exempts only cemeteries affiliated with religious institutions.
299. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 9540) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
300. KAN. STAT. § 44-1018 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (Supp. 1977).
301. Pennsylvania Human Rights Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124.
139, 306 A.2d 881, 890 (1973).
302. Id. at 135, 306 A.2d at 888. An order to write a public letter of apology to the family of the
person refused a burial plot was struck down as improper. Id. at 139, 306 A.2d at 890.
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to public accommodations. Most victims of credit discrimination are women,
particularly married, divorced, and black women. 303 Many credit institutions
assume that women are oriented solely toward marriage and family and are not
financially responsible. 304 Legislators have in the last few years recognized that
this assumption makes it impossible for many responsible persons to obtain
loans.
Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting dis-
crimination in the extension of credit and loans. 30S Sixteen of these provisions
have been enacted since 1976.306 Twelve are separate credit acts which include
prohibitions on discrimination. 30 7 The civil rights acts of nineteen states and the
District of Columbia contain sections on credit discrimination, either in the
public accommodations provision or in a separate section. 308 Five states speci-
fically prohibit credit discrimination by lenders who finance the acquisition of
housing,309 and one state statute bars discrimination in the distribution of credit
cards.
31 0
A 1968 decision rendered by a Massachussetts court foreshadowed the
rapid spread of credit discrimination laws across the country. 31 The court held
303. Gates, Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND. L. Ruv.
409, 410 (1974).
304. Id. at 409.
305. The statutes are cited below, divided into categories based on their coverage. The states
without credit laws are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Neb-
raska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyom-
ing.
306. According to Gates, supra note 303, as of 1974, the states without credit discrimination
laws were Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, and Wyoming.
307. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.30 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-109 to 5-1-201
(1973 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-436 to 36-439 (West Supp. 1978); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3583 (West Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 128(e) (1972); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(14) (West Supp. 1978-1979); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.147a
(Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4.1 (Supp. 1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-2.07 (Vernon Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 59.1-21.21
(Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. § 138.20 (1975).
308. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.250 (Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE § 6-2202(x) (Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 601A.9 (West 1975); KAN. STAT. § 44-1017 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.400 (1977); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4596 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(8) (Supp. 1978); Mo. Rvv.
STAT. § 314.100 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-306(7) (Supp. 1977); NEa. REv.
STAT. §§ 20-129, 20-148 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.070 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12
(West 1976 & Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977); OHIiO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(B) (Page Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1977); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 954(l) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-21 (Supp.
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 175, 176 (Supp. 1977);
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(f) (Supp. 1977).
309. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.250 (1974 & Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 69-75 (1973); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 23(a) (1972 & Supp. 1977).
310. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 385.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
311. Local Finance Co. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 355 Mass. 10, 242 N.E.2d
536 (1968).
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that credit discrimination was prohibited by the public accommodations stat-
utes, even though the law made no specific reference to credit at that time. 3t2
The statutes have, however, been the subject of little litigation, both because
the credit laws are relatively new, and because many complaints are handled
by administrative agencies rather than by courts.
4. State Facilities
Most of the state public accommodations statutes prohibit discrimination in
places owned, operated, or partly or wholly funded by the state govern-
ment. Places included in this category are government buildings, public parks,
public hospitals, clinics, libraries, museums, and transport facilities. 313 Coverage
of state facilities can be indicated in one of three different sections of a public
accommodations law. The most common means of covering places belonging to
or funded by the state is to define a "person" who is prohibited from dis-
criminating as including "the state, and all political subdivisions, authorities,
agencies, boards, and commissions thereof." 3 4 Other statutes indicate cover-
age by adding to the definition of unlawful discriminatory practices a provision
guaranteeing equal access to, and equal treatment in, places belonging to or
funded by the state. 315 Yet another way of covering state facilities is to define
"place of public accommodations" as including "any public facility owned,
operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state or any agency or subdivision
thereof, or any public corporation, and such facility supported in whole or in
part by public funds."131 6 This last alternative is clearest because one looks first
to the definition of public accommodations to see what places are covered.
State public accommodations statutes have rarely been enforced against
state facilities. Most discrimination suits brought against state officials are
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,317 because there is a more substantial body of pre-
cedent under section 1983 than under the state statutes. The state law might be
used to cover a facility which received sufficient funding from the state to bring
it under the state statute but not enough to render the action "under color of
state law" for purposes of section 1983.318 State laws prohibiting discrimination
in state facilities might be used to challenge unequal distribution of public trans-
port, sewers, police protection, medical care, or street repairs when those ser-
312. Id. at 14-15, 242 N.E.2d at 539.
313. The term state facilities might also include publicly-assisted housing and public schools;
these are not within the scope of this Project.
314. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(A) (Page 1973). See D.C. CODE § 6-2202(u) (Supp. 1978);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-2(A) (Supp. 1975).
315. KAN. STAT. § 44-1002(1) (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(A) (Supp. 1978).
316. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 314.020(5) (Vernon Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-133(5) (1977).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
318. Some attempts at enforcement have failed. The Connecticut Civil Rights Commission, for
example, tried without success to initiate hearings under the public accommodations statute regard-
ing discriminatory police action; the court denied jurisdiction to the Commission because the
Commission did not first follow procedures described for investigation and conciliation, and be-
cause the complaint in question asserted no violation of any constitutional right. City of Waterbury
v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 160 Conn. 226. 278 A.2d 771 (1971).
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vices are more generously provided in white or native American, than in black or
immigrant neighborhoods.
Streets and sidewalks are technically state facilities, but they are expressly
covered only under certain of the statutes which protect blind and disabled
persons. 319 Free access to the streets is implicit in the common law rule barring
discrimination by common carriers 320 and in the statutes which cover transport
facilities. 321 Either may be used to combat the two primary forms of discrimi-
nation which occur in the streets. One is the discriminatory enforcement of
loitering and vagrancy ordinances by the police. Ever since vagrancy was outlawed
by the Black Codes in 1865, these laws and their successors have been used as a
means of harrassing blacks and others regarded as undesirables. a2 2 Only one state
public accommodations law has been successfully used to challenge this form
of harassment.3 23 The other common form of discrimination in access to the
streets affects blind and disabled person. Their access is limited unless curbs
are constructed to accommodate wheelchairs and unless auditory traffic sig-
nals are installed. Both state and federal laws have been passed which require the
elimination of certain architectural barriers to access, 324 but these laws are in-
adequately enforced. A few state laws provide that no higher degree of care
or modification of property is required to accommodate blind or disabled per-
sons than to provide access to others. 325 This means that the proprietor has no
affirmative duty to provide access.
E. Classifications Covered by the State Statutes
The primary thrust of the first public accommodations statutes enacted
after the Civil War was to guarantee freedom of movement to black people.
326
These statutes prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
319. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 54 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501(c) (1973);
LA. REV. STAT. § 46:1952(A) (West Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 72, § 92A (West
Supp. 1978-1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-127(1) (1977); S.C. CODE § 43-33-20(a) (1976); UTAH CoDE
ANN. § 26-28-I(1) (1974).
320. M. KONVITZ, supra note 24, at 160.
321. See text accompanying notes 225-29 supra.
322. CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO, supra note 1, at 224-25.
323. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970). This was a habeas corpus
action challenging the validity of an arrest under a loitering statute. The court found the public
accommodations statute to be incorporated in the loitering statute; the latter was therefore held not
to allow exclusion from a shopping mall for any arbitrary reason such as long hair, unconventional
dress, or membership in a political group. Justifiable grounds for exclusion would be property
damage, injury to others, and disruption of business. Id. at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr.
at 31.
324. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4593 (Supp. 1978). All of the states and the District of
Columbia have statutes which require that certain new buildings be constructed to accommodate
the disabled and that some pre-existing buildings be modified to provide access. Achtenberg, Law
and the Physically Disabled: An Update with Constitutional Implications, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 847,
852-53 (1976).
325. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35(b) (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 79-
601(c)(2) (Supp. 1977).
326. See Indritz, Post Civil War Ordinances Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in the District of
Columbia, 42 GEO. L.J. 179 (1954).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. VII:215
SURVEY OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
origin, religion, or creed alone. 327 Only during the past decade have state legis-
latures begun to recognize that access rights are denied to many other groups.
Statutes have been amended to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex,
marital status, handicap, and age.328 The most innovative laws include
classifications such as sexual preference, pregnancy, parenthood, political af-
filiation, and personal appearance. 329 These classifications are more complex
than those developed earlier, because some forms of different treatment within
these groups are prohibited, while others are not. For example, it is considered
reasonable to provide separate bathroom facilities for men and women. 330
An examination of which classifications are covered by which statutes
proves useful for several reasons. Comparison of federal and state laws high-
lights the relative narrowness of the federal law, and points out the need for
amendment of Title II. The broad range of classifications covered by the pro-
gressive laws shows the potential for development in this area. In addition, the
extension of so many laws beyond the limits of Title II demonstrates the mag-
nitude of the social change that has occurred since 1964.
The classifications covered by the public accommodations statutes can be
divided into three categories. The first consists of those classifications which
are covered by Title II, which are included in almost all of the state laws. 33t
The second category includes classifications recently added to many state laws
but not covered by Title II, which are sex, age, marital status, and disabili-
ty. The third category includes the more innovative and controversial classifi-
cations mentioned in only a few statutes. Those are personal appearance, sexual
orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, source
of income, place of business or residence, pregnancy, parenthood, change in
marital status, class, and status.
1. Race and Color
Race and color are prohibited bases of discrimination under all of the pub-
lic accommodations statutes. The protection of the rights of black people to
access to public places has been the primary subject of administrative and
court action implementing the statutes. 332 It is now rare that a public place is
penalized for wholly refusing to admit blacks. "Modern" discrimination is
more subtle, because it is designed to circumvent the laws. Many proprietors of
bars and restaurants recognize their obligation to admit blacks, but use a quota
system to insure that their clientele will remain largely white.333 Bouncers are
hired to keep an eye on the number of blacks present in the establishment and
327. The inclusion of religion may have been based on long-standing tradition rather than on the
demands of a particular group.
328. See text accompanying notes 353-93 infra.
329. See text accompanying notes 394-416 infra.
330. See text accompanying notes 363-66 infra.
331. Creed and ancestry are not mentioned by Title II but are more or less synonymous with
religion and national origin respectively.
332. See text accompanying notes 170-98 supra.
333. Interview with Eugene Murphy, New York State Human Rights Commission, Buffalo,
New York, August 30, 1978.
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to turn away black customers once the quota has been filled.33 4 Some estab-
lishments limit the number of black customers by charging entrance fees to
blacks but not to whites. 335
The large volume of litigation generated under these laws prior to Title II
indicates that they were actively enforced. Although the courts in many early
cases found in favor of blacks alleging race discrimination.3 36 However, it was
not uncommon for a challenged practice to be found non-discriminatory a37 or
for an offending establishment not to be deemed a place of public accommoda-
tion. 3 38 Since the passage of Title II, many states have broadened their cover-
age of businesses and increased the available remedies. The state courts have
also become more receptive to claims of race discrimination. 339 Only rarely are
such claims now rejected by state courts. 340
The extensive development of the prohibition against race discrimination in
public accommodations has served to integrate most public places, and in some
substantial part, to eliminate denial of goods and services to blacks and other
minorities. It has also laid the groundwork for the development of law prohibit-
ing discrimination against other groups.
2. National Origin and Ancestry
Discrimination based on national origin or ancestry is prohibited by every
state public accommodations statute. It is not clear, however, whether the
legislatures meant for these terms to merely restate the prohibition against race
discrimination, to cover minority groups such as Puerto Ricans or Mexican-
Americans (who may or may not be deemed to be protected by proscription
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. E.g., Central Amusement Co. v. District of Columbia, 121 A.2d 865 (1956); City of
Chicago v. Corney, 13 Ill. App. 2d 396, 142 N.E.2d 160 (1957); Crawford v. Kent, 341 Mass. 125,
167 N.E.2d 620 (1960); State v. Rosecliff Realty Co., I N.J. Super. 94, 62 A.2d 488 (1949).
337. E.g., McClain v. City of South Pasadena, 155 Cal. App. 2d 423, 318 P.2d 199 (1957) (re-
striction of admission to swimming pool to town residents found not to be racially discriminatory).
338. E.g., Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (1957) (dentist held not
to offer a public service and, therefore, to have no obligation to treat all patients who come to him);
Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 278 P.2d 945 (1955) (cemetery not
covered by the public accommodations statute and, therefore, permitted to exclude blacks from
mausoleum).
339. E.g., Washington v. Blampin, 226 Cal. App. 2d 604, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1964); Clark v.
McCurdie, 75 I11. App. 2d 318 (1966); McGill v. 830 S. Michigan Hotel, 68 Ill. App. 2d 351, 216
N.E.2d 273 (1966); Local Finance Co. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discriminaton, 355 Mass. 10, 242
N.E.2d 536 (1968); Ferguson v. Windsor Court Restaurant, 38 Mass. App. Dec. 120 (1967); Clover
Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966); Sellers v. Phillip's Barber
Shop, 46 N.J. 340, 217 A.2d 121 (1966); Fraser v. Robin Dce Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 210 A.2d 208
(1965); Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 316 N.E.2d
318, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1974); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery
Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973); Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order of Moose,
Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972).
340. E.g., In re James, 247 Ind. 339, 215 N.E.2d 863 (1966) (no evidence to support allegation
that blacks had been excluded from a jury; public defender found justified in refusing to represent
petitioner on a writ of coram nobis); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 5 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 329, 290 A.2d 699 (1972).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. VII:215
SURVEY OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
of race discrimination), or to prohibit discrimination against white immigrants.
There has been no litigation under these sections of the laws. Whatever com-
plaints have been filed on these grounds have been handled administratively.
3. Creed and Religion
All of the statutes prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations in-
clude in their list of covered classifications either religion, 34' or creed, 342 or
both. 343 Courts have interpreted creed to refer strictly to religious beliefs, 344 so
the terms are used interchangeably. Two statutes explicitly prohibit discrimina-
tion based on political affiliation, 345 but attempts to expand the interpretation of
creed to cover political beliefs have failed. 346 In one case, a gas station owner
successfully defended a charge that he had violated the public accommodations
law by refusing to service a car bearing a peace symbol. 347 In another, a land-
lord was found within his rights in refusing to rent a storefront to pacifists. 3a4
The Colorado Court of Appeals suggested that "creed" did not even protect
freedom of religion, reversing a commission finding that a school hair length
regulation was discriminatory as applied to an American Indian. 349 Even
though the public accommodations statute included creed, 3s0 the court declared
that the commission had exceeded its authority.3 s1 The prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on creed or religion is further limited in thirteen states and the
341. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (Supp. 1977); CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978); D.C.
CODE § 6-2241(a) (Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-2(a) (1973); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2(a)
(1976); KAN. STAT. § 44-1001 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.120 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
5, § 4592 (Supp. 1978); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2302 (Supp. 1978-1979); NEv. REv. STAr. §
651.070 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1402 (1971); OI. REV.
STAT. § 30.670 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (Supp. 1977);
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(f)(1) (Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 6-83.1 (1975).
342. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-1442 (1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501(2) (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 6. § 4503 (1974); IDAHO CODE § 18-7301
(Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354A:8-IV
(Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(0 (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1972-1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1451(a) (Supp. 1978); WASHI. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.030(1) (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 942.04(a) (1975).
343. IOWNA CODE ANN. § 601A.7(1)(a) (West 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272. §§ 92A,
98 (West Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (Supp. 1978); Mo. REv. STAT. § 314.030
(Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-306(3)(a) (Supp. 1977); NED. REV. STAT. § 20-134
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(1) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); S.D. CoItLED LAWS ANN. §
20-13-23 (Supp. 1977).
344. Streeter v. Bogan, 113 N.J. Super. 486, 490, 274 A.2d 312, 315 (Ch. Div. 1971); Schuchter
v. Div. on Civ. Rights, 117 N.J. Super. 405, 407-08, 285 A.2d 42, 43 (App. Div. 1971).
345. D.C. CODE § 6-2241(a) (Supp. 1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 64-318 (Supp. 1977).
346. 113 N.J. Super. at 490, 274 A.2d at 315. Although not liable under the public accommoda-
tions statute, the gas station owner was found obliged to serve all customers under the common
carrier rule. Id. at 491, 274 A.2d at 315.
347. Id. at 490, 274 A.2d at 315.
348. 117 N.J. Super. at 408, 285 A.2d at 43.
349. School Dist. No. 114 v. Howell, 33 Colo. App. 57, 517 P.2d 422, 424 (1973).
350. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501(2) (1973).
351. 517 P.2d at 424.
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District of Columbia, which allow religious organizations to discriminate in any
manner designed to promote their religious principles. 352
4. Sex
During the last decade, women have begun to challenge their exclusion
from bars, restaurants, hotels, men's clubs, and athletic facilities. Exclusion of
women is variously defended on grounds of custom, safety, and moral-
ity. Proprietors of some restaurants and bars claim that their atmosphere would
be destroyed by the admission of women. Others claim that unless women
are excluded, prostitutes will solicit in their establishments. Owners of hotels
which admit only women justify their policy on grounds that it protects the
safety of their guests. 3- 3
With the resurgence of the women's movement, attention to the issue of
sex discrimination has increased. Twenty-six of the thirty-nine state public ac-
commodations laws have been amended to prohibit discrimination based on
sex. 35 4 Exceptions include Arizona, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and
Wyoming, as well as those states which have no public accommodations stat-
utes. 355 The rapid advance of coverage of sex discrimination is in part a re-
sponse by state legislators to countless complaints from women excluded from
establishments which hold themselves as open to the public.35 6 Congress, by
contrast, has been unresponsive to such pressure. 35 7
The state courts have read the prohibition of sex discrimination in the pub-
lic accommodations statutes quite broadly. A New York court issued an in-junction ordering a restaurant to admit long-haired men and held that the ad-
mission of women, but not men, with long hair was a discriminatory act within
the meaning of the statute. 358 In another case, the New York Court of Appeals
found that a newspaper which maintained separate "help wanted" ads for men
and women was aiding and abetting sex discrimination.35 9 In 1974 a New Jer-
352. See text accompanying notes 267-71 supra.
353. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 1037 (1975).
354. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978) (amended to include sex in 1974); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West Supp. 1978-1979) (in 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03
(Supp. 1978) (in 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1976) (in 1970).
355. Limited protection against sex discrimination is provided by a few statutes, e.g., MD.
ANN. CODE art. 49B, § II (Supp. 1977) (licensed establishments and state facilities only).
356. Harkins, Sex and the City Council, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, April 27, 1970, at 10-11. Carol
Greitzer, the sponsor of the amendment to the New York public accommodations statute, for ex-
ample, received eighty letters from lawyers protesting the sexual segregation of many Wall Street
restaurants. Similarly, an Assistant Attorney General in New York in charge of the state's Civil
Rights Bureau stated in 1970, before the amendment was passed, "We've had dozens of calls from
women complaining about the renting problem and the restaurant problem." Id.
357. The apathy of Congress toward sex discrimination is very different from the approach
taken toward school desegregation, where the federal government initiated action which was not
well received by the states, and used coercive measures to enforce the law.
358. Braun v. Swiston, 72 Misc. 2d 661, 662, 340 N.Y.S.2d 468, 469 (1972).
359. Nat'l Organization for Women v. State Division of Human Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 421,
314 N.E.2d 867, 870, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124, 128 (1974). The issue was not declared to be moot, even
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sey court declared that the refusal of the Little League to admit girls consti-
tuted sex discrimination.360 This landmark decision may lead to the opening of
other traditionally male activities to women. In a few cases women who were
refused goods and services have brought suit in states whose public accommo-
dations statutes do not prohibit sex discrimination. In 1969, before sex was
included in the New York public accommodations law, a woman denied service
in a bar was found not to be protected by either the state law or by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(a). 361 A year later, a similar claim against a bar brought in federal court
under section 1983 succeeded. 362
Eleven of the twenty-six states whose civil rights laws cover sex discrimi-
nation qualify the prohibition against gender discrimination by an exemption
which allows certain reasonable forms of discrimination.363 Some of these
exemptions specify particular places in which discrimination is acceptable. The
New Mexico statute, for example, provides that "nothing contained in the
Human Rights Act shall:... apply to public rest rooms, public showers, public
dressing facilities, or sleeping quarters in public institutions, where the prefer-
ence or limitation is based on sex." ' 364 Some statutes allow an establishment
wishing to be exempted to apply to the civil rights commission for individual
consideration. 365 The District of Columbia law exempts any action which is
discriminatory in effect if it is "not intentionally devised or operated to con-
travene the prohibitions of this chapter and can be justified by business neces-
sity."' 366 Certain forms of sex discrimination would be allowed by this exemp-
tion.
5. Handicap
Prohibition of discrimination against handicapped persons is a long-
neglected and rapidly developing area of law. Because the disabled have been
largely excluded from society, recognition of this form of discrimination is par-
ticularly important. Until recently, most laws dealing with handicapped persons
required segregation rather than access. A good example of these "ugly laws"
was a Chicago city ordinance, repealed in 1974,367 which stated that:
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so
as to be an unsightly or disgusting object or improper person to be allowed
though the newspaper had dropped the classification by the time the case was appealed. because the
problem was found capable of repetition. Id. at 419, 314 N.E.2d at 869, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
360. Natl Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 534
(App. Div. 1974).
361. DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 383. 386. 298 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861-62 (1969).
362. Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
363. Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
364. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-8(D) (Supp. 1975); see, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 344.145 (1977);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West Supp. 1978-1979).
365. D.C. CODE § 6-2203(a) (Supp. 1978).
366. The exemption in this statute is very narrow, allowing discrimination only in places where
people customarily undress. B. BABCOCK, supra note 353, at 1070.
367. Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 851 n.9.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
Spring 1978]
REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
in or on the public ways or other public places in this city, shall therein or
thereon expose himself on public view, under a penalty of not less than
one dollar nor more than fifty dollars for each offense. a68
Similar laws are still in effect in Columbus, Ohio, Omaha, Nebraska, and
elsewhere. 369 Disabled persons, who number in the millions, 370 are subject to
more extreme denials of access than any other disadvantaged group. Handi-
capped persons are frequently refused admission to a panoply of establishments
because of their disabilities. More serious than such overt discrimination is
covert discrimination based on the widespread attitude that the rights of handi-
capped persons are simply not important enough to warrant serious attention.
Most buses, streets, and sidewalks are constructed without any thought to the
needs of disabled persons. 371 Persons whose mobility is impaired are further
hindered from free movement by the absence of ramps, elevators, wide doors
in rest rooms, and Braille numbers on offices. By necessity they are often con-
fined to institutions or sequestered in private homes. 372
During the 1960's many disabled persons, perhaps motivated by the suc-
cess of the civil rights movement, 373 "came out of the closet" and asserted
their right to participate in public life. 374 They have since become one of the
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Only limited statistics are available on the number of handicapped persons in the United
States. According to the New York Times, the disabled population totals 30 million. N.Y. Times,
June 18, 1978, § A, at 16, col. 1. The U.S. Department of Labor issued a fact sheet which listed
statistics on employable handicapped persons titled "Who Are the Handicapped":









Achtenberg, supra note 324 at 851 n. 11.
371. One example of the lack of consciousness of the needs of disabled persons in the recent
enactment of numerous laws allowing motorists to turn right on a red light. Blind persons are
trained to cross streets when they hear the traffic begin to move in the direction they are going.
Right turn on red eliminates any time period when a blind person can safely cross the street. The
Washington Star, July 11, 1978, § A, at 7, col. i.
372. The exclusion of the handicapped from normal life is evidenced by the fact that 22 percent
of handicapped children receive an eighth grade education or less. Furthermore, the proportion of
handicapped persons who earn less than subsistence wages is twice that of the general population.
N.Y. Times, June 18, 1978, § A, at 16, col. 1.
373. Many disabled persons strongly identify with black civil rights advocates. Mrs. Leslie
Milk, executive director of Mainstream, Inc., a group which advocates the rights of the disabled.
said that "to be beautiful in America is to be blond, blue-eyed, and structurally straight. The blacks
couldn't find themselves in Glamour and neither could the disabled." Id. at col. 2.
374. One writer notes that "[i]n the 1960's there was a political and legal revolution because a
significant minority of the population had to sit at the back of the bus. Today, it is realized that a
significant minority cannot even get on the bus." Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 850.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. VII:215
SURVEY OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS
most prominent and aggressive activist groups in the country. 37s Legislators,
however, have demonstrated only superficial concern about the access prob-
lems of the handicapped. The federal government and all of the states have
enacted architectural barriers statutes which require that certain buildings be
constructed to provide access to disabled persons and that some existing build-
ings be similarly modified. 37 6 Many states have amended their civil rights laws
to prohibit discrimination against disabled persons. 377 These statutes appear to
be very significant, but the annotated codes contain little evidence that they are
enforced. In some instances, this means that enforcement occurs through ad-
ministrative rather than judicial action. In others, the state commissions are not
interested in enforcing the rights of disabled persons. 378 Shortly after the Ar-
chitectural Barriers Law was passed in California, a state official in Los
Angeles decided that the term "facilities" did not include sidewalks around
state office buildings. Therefore, the statute did not require construction of
ramps to accommodate wheel chairs. This interpretation denies many persons
access to government services. 379 Added to governmental apathy is a general
reluctance among the proprietors affected to comply with the law. Some plead
ignorance of the law; others claim that compliance would be unreasonably ex-
pensive.380
Beginning in 1972 many lawsuits were filed by disabled persons who had
been denied access to various public places in violation of law. The first deci-
sions involved access to courthouses. 381 In one of these, an Ohio court issued a
consent decree ordering modification of a courthouse to give a city councilman
access to his own office, located in a building which had no elevators. 382 The
State of California, on behalf of an official in the State Rehabilitation Depart-
ment who was confined to a wheelchair, filed a lawsuit against a restaurant for
violation of the Architectural Barriers Law.383 The primary violation alleged
was that the restroom was so small that the plaintiff was unable to close the
door before urinating. The court ordered renovation of the restaurant to comply
375. During the first third of 1978, HEW received 377 complaints of discrimination against dis-
abled persons brought under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. This number far ex-
ceeded the total of race and sex discrimination complaints brought during that period. N.Y. Times.
June 18, 1978, § A, at 16, col. 1.
376. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4593 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-2547 (Supp.
1977). See Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 852, 853.
377. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-34 (West Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE § 6-1502 (1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A (Vest 1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4591 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 11 (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (3) (Supp. 1978); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 651.070 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354A-I (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West
1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-2(a) tMcKinney Supp.
1972-1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Page Supp. 1977); WIs. STAT. § 942.04(a) (1975).
378. Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically
Disabled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501, 1506-07 (1973); Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 855.
379. Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 855.
380. Id. at 856.
381. Id. at 859.
382. Friedman v. County of Cuyahoga, No. 895961 (Cuyahoga, Ohio, 1972). cited in Achten-
berg, supra note 324, at 859.
383. People v. Smuggler's Inn, Associated Hosts. Inc., No. 251428 (Sacramento County Super.
Ct., March 1, 1975), cited in Achtenberg, supra note 324. at 857.
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with statutory standards.38 4 A case is now pending against San Francisco State
University regarding construction of a student union which is only partly ac-
cessible to handicapped students. Since the lawsuit was filed in 1975, there has
been no work done on the partially completed building, and a loan which the
university obtained from HUD has been cancelled a.3 8
There have been few cases involving disabled persons which deal with
traditional denials of access. One example of this type of case was a suit
brought in California by a young man confined to a wheelchair who was re-
fused admission to a theater. 386 The court held that the act in question consti-
tuted invidious discrimination under the California civil rights law and awarded
damages to the plaintiff despite the absence of specific coverage of disabled
persons. 3 87
Most current litigation relating to the access rights of the disabled involves
the architectural barriers laws. One problem area is mass transit. Providing
access to public transport facilities for disabled persons is difficult because of
the extensive structural changes which must be made in buses and subway
systems. Although radical steps have been taken in a few places, the buses and
subways in most cities remain unchanged. A Washington state judge recently
held that disabled persons have no right of access to mass transit facilities
under either the state anti-discrimination law or the Constitution.3 8 1 Public
transport is particularly important to the handicapped because of the expense
of specially designed, private cars and vans. Without easy access to transport,
the obstacles to employment, education, and recreational activities may be in-
surmountable. 389 The difficulties faced by a mobility-impaired person in enforc-
ing his or her own rights suggest a particular need for attention to this issue on
the part of state commissions.
6. Marital Status
Only nine states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination on
the basis of marital status in their public accommodations provisions.39 0 Others
384. See note 382 supra.
385. Disabled Student Union v. Bd. of Trustees, Civil No. 692-231 (S.F. Cal. Super. Ct., July
1, 1975), cited in Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 863.
386. Marsh v. Edwards Theater, Circuit No. C55,376 (L.A. County Super. Ct., June 16, 1975),
cited in Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 863.
387. Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 863. The Unruh Civil Rights Act was first held to prohibit
discrimination against classifications other than those specifically mentioned in the Act in In re
Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
388. Martin v. Seattle King County Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, No. 795,806 (King County,
Wash. Super. Ct., filed April 25, 1975). See Bohike v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp.
Dist., Memorandum and Minute Order No. 73362 (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct,. May 9, 1975).
Both cases are cited in Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 867.
389. Achtenberg, supra note 324, at 866.
390. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West Supp.
1978); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4503 (1974); D.C. CODE § 6-2241(a) (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, § 11 (Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32.302 (Supp. 1978-1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:8(IV) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.670 (1977).
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include marital status in their credit discrimination laws. 391 The primary reason
for prohibiting discrimination based on marital status is to stop banks, credit
institutions, and insurance companies from dealing with single and married per-
sons on different terms. The inclusion of marital status is, however, relatively
recent, and there have been few complaints filed and little or no court action
on this subject.
7. Age
Age discrimination is very common in employment, but is rare in places of
public accommodations. The civil rights statutes of seven states prohibit age
discrimination, 392 but it is unlikely that the legislatures intended this classifica-
tion to be invoked under the public accommodations sections of the laws. Pro-
hibition of age discrimination may, however, be invoked by persons denied cred-
it. This application would be possible only under those civil rights laws which
cover both age discrimination and credit institutions, and under those credit
laws which cover age discrimination. 393
8. Sexual Orientation
Refusal of service to homosexuals in bars, restaurants, hotels, cabarets,
and discotheques is common practice. Perhaps in retaliation, some gay bars
discourage the patronage of heterosexuals. Until recently, many municipal or-
dinances required certain establishments to deny access to gay people. 394 A
regulation of the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, which was
repealed in 1971, forbade the congregation of gay people in discotheques and
cabarets. 395 Other laws not specifically directed against homosexuals are en-
forced in a discriminatory manner. 396
Although during the past decade demands for gay rights have become more
strident,397 and although homosexuality has become increasingly acceptable,
neither Congress nor any state legislature has passed a statute prohibiting dis-
crimination against homosexuals. Only the District of Columbia includes sexual
preference as a prohibited classification in its public accommodations law.398 A
bill is presently pending in the House of Representatives which would amend
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination based on "affectional or
391. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4596 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (Supp.
1977); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-306 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021(B)
(Page Supp. 1977).
392. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6. § 4503
(1974); D.C. CODE § 6-2241(a) (Supp. 1978); MICH. COap. LAWS ANN. § 37.2302 (WIest Supp.
1978-1979); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-306(2)(a) (Supp. 1977): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:8(IV) (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(0(1) (Supp. 1977).
393. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4596 (Supp. 1978).
394. E. BOGGAN, M. HAFT, C. LiSTER, & J. Rupp, THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE 95-96 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE).
395. Id.
396. 1 SEX. L. RPrR. 36 (1975).
397. In the summer of 1978 there was a gay rights rally in San Francisco attended by over
250,000 people, the largest ever held.
398. D.C. CODE § 6-2241(a) (Supp. 1978).
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sexual preference. ' 399 Similar amendments have been proposed in Massachu-
setts and Oregon. 40 0 Another was recently defeated in Maine. 40 '
Despite the noncoverage of sexual orientation in the state discrimination
laws, a person discriminated against on that basis might initiate a lawsuit based
on the theory that the public accommodations laws impliedly protect homosex-
uals. It may be argued either that sex preference is covered by prohibition of
sex discrimination, or that the public accommodations laws prohibit all arbi-
trary discrimination. 40 2
During the civil rights movement of the 1960's laws protecting the rights of
blacks were enacted first in city councils and later by state legislatures.4 03 The
gay rights movement may be at an earlier stage in the same developmental
course. As of August, 1978, thirty-four cities and counties had gay rights ordi-
nances. 40 4 The coverage of these laws varies greatly. The most comprehensive
include those of the Discrict of Columbia, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Tucson,
Arizona, San Francisco, California, and Howard County, Maryland. 4 05 The
progress of the gay rights movement is slowed by another movement, which
opposes access to public places, jobs, and housing for homosexuals. The anti-
gay groups view the issue as one of morality rather than civil rights. 40 6 Their
efforts have led to the repeal by referendum of five gay rights ordinances. 407
Discrimination against homosexuals is often very subtle. Therefore, en-
forcement of existing civil rights ordinances which proscribe discrimination
based on sexual preference proves difficult. There have been relatively few
lawsuits based on these ordinances. This is because less formal enforcement
mechanisms have been found effective. In the District of Columbia, for exam-
ple, it is now generally recognized that discrimination against homosexuals is
illegal. 40 8 The law operates as a deterrent, and those cases which do arise are
resolved by conciliation. 40 9 Gay people who complain of discrimination to the
Human Rights Commission are first advised to take a copy of the law to the
offending proprietor, and to explain their intention to have it enforced.4 10 In
nearly every case this tactic has been effective. 411
After the Washington, D.C. ordinance was passed, members of the gay
community organized two dance-ins at establishments which would not permit
399. H. R. 2998 is discussed in 3 SEX. L. RPTR. 32 (1977).
400. 3 SEX. L. RPTR. 33 (1977).
401. Id.
402. 2 SEX. L. RPTR. 4-5 (1976); RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE, supra note 394, at 97.
403. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
404. Interview with a member of the Gay Activist Alliance of the District of Columbia, August
17, 1978.
405. Interview with Commissioner Frank Kameny, District of Columbia Commission on
Human Rights, August 17, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Kameny Interview].
406. N.Y. Times, April 27, 1978, § A, at 20, col. 2.
407. These include Boulder, Colorado, Dade County, Florida, St. Paul, Minnesota, Wichita,
Kansas, and Eugene, Oregon. Kameny Interview, supra note 405.
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gay people to dance together. In one case an investigator from the Human
Rights Commission was present to monitor any discriminatory action. In the
other case the management called the police, but the dispute was resolved
without court action. 41 2 A complaint was filed against a restaurant in the Dis-
trict of Columbia which permitted simple displays of affection between
heterosexual couples but not between homosexual couples. 4 13 The case never
went to court, but was resolved through conciliation.
A city ordinance is not an automatic guarantee that gay people will no
longer face discrimination. In Bloomington, Indiana, for example, the ordinance
was interpreted by the state's Human Rights Commission not to require that a
discotheque allow persons of the same sex to dance together.41 4 The same
commission claimed not to have jurisdiction to hear a complaint that a landlord
barred two people of the same sex from sharing an apartment. 41s The reasoning
in both cases was that no discrimination based on sexual orientation had been
alleged. 416
9. Other Innovative Coverage
Exclusion based on personal appearance is a common practice in restau-
rants and places of entertainment which impose dress requirements. Before the
Washington, D.C. statute was amended to include personal appearance, a
woman filed suit challenging the right of a restaurant to eject her because she
was not wearing shoes. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia found
that she had no statutory right of access and found the establishment of dress
codes by restaurants to be permissible. 41 7 It is not clear whether a different
result would have been dictated by the new law.
Discrimination based on family responsibilities is prohibited under the
statutes of Alaska and Washington, D.C. The former uses broader language,
barring denial of access based on "changes in marital status, pregnancy, or
parenthood. ' 418 Thus it protects both divorced and married persons. These
provisions could be used to challenge denial of a loan to a person with alimony
obligations, or to challenge exclusion of parents accompanied by their children
from restaurants, hotels, or places of entertainment.
Discrimination based on "matriculation" was included in the District of
Columbia public accommodations statute to prohibit landlords from excluding
students based on their student status. 41 9 The provision was enacted in re-
sponse to a relatively short-lived problem of the late 1960's and early 1970's. 420
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. 3 SEx. L. RPTR. 21 (1977).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Feldt v. Marriott Corp., 322 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1974). See Reiglcr v. Holiday Skating Rink,
393 Mich. 607, 227 N.W.2d 759 (1975) (denial of access due to hair length not violative of state
law).
418. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (1974 & Supp. 1977). See Hotel Employees Local 879 v.
Thomas, 551 P.2d 942 (1976).
419. Kameny Interview, supra note 405.
420. Id.
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The Montana public accommodations law prohibits state officials from
considering "political ideas" in considering applicants for state funding. 42 This
section also bars the state from giving financial assistance to any organization
which engages in discriminatory practices. 422
The Massachusetts public accommodations statute prohibits discrimination
on the basis of "class. ' 423 The potential implications of this provision are pro-
found, but it is difficult to determine what the drafters intended by the inclu-
sion of the classification.
In the District of Columbia the public accommodations provision prohibit-
ing discrimination based on place of residence or business 424 could be used to
challenge denial of a loan or an insurance policy, or refusal of service by busi-
nesses which deliver goods or services to homes or offices. This provision
might also be invoked in actions challenging equal distribution of sewer, trans-
port, or other state services to particular neighborhoods. In general, the Dis-
trict of Columbia public accommodations law offers broader protection than
does any other. It exempts only those acts prohibited by the statute which may
be justified by business necessity. 425
F. Remedies and Enforcement Under the State Statutes
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia now have public accom-
modations statutes, compared with thirty-one states and the District of Co-
lumbia at the time of the passage of Title 11.426 Each statute creates some en-
forcement mechanism which provides for administrative, civil, and/or criminal
penalties. States with comprehensive civil rights acts usually have human or civ-
il rights commissions which handle complaints in the areas of housing, employ-
ment, and education, as well as in the area of public accommodations. Thirty-
two states and the District of Columbia currently have agencies to rule upon
public accommodations complaints and enforce remedial orders. This is more
than double the number that had such agencies in 1964.427 Other states rely
primarily on judicial remedies to enforce their public accommodations statutes.
These states may still have advisory agencies which distribute information on
the public's rights and obligations under the civil rights laws and informally
resolve disputes.
421. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 64.324 (Supp. 1977).
422. Id.
423. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West Supp. 1978-1979).
424. D. C. CODE § 6-2241(a) (Supp. 1978).
425. Id.
426. For a summary of state anti-discrimination laws prior to 1965, see Caldwell, State Public
Accommodations Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforcement Programs, 40 WASH. L. REv. 841
(1965). This figure does not include those states which guarantee equal access solely to the handi-
capped.
427. Sixteen states had agencies empowered to enforce public accommodations statutes in 1964.
Id. at 868 & Appendix.
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1. Administrative Agencies
a. Advisory Agencies
Some states without public accommodations laws have created agencies
with advisory and educational functions whose goals may. be as amorphous as
promoting "understanding, respect and good will among all citizens." 42 8 These
agencies, lacking statutory foundation and absent staffs with specific, albeit in-
formal, duties, cannot hope to function effectively.
Some states leave enforcement of their public accommodation statutes in
the hands of the state attorney general or the aggrieved party, but may also
have advisory agencies which serve other functions. Both California and Il-
linois have agencies lacking regulatory powers. However, the agencies in these
two states exemplify very different approaches to the role of the advisory
agency. The California statute authorizes the creation by ordinance of human
rights commissions in any city or county.429 California has substituted more
casual, local control for centralized authority, thus permitting a greater degree
of experimentation, flexibility, and diversity than is possible under a more uni-
fied and bureaucratized commission. This goal has been achieved by the San
Francisco Human Rights Commission (SFHRC). While the SFHRC has no en-
forcement powers, it has actively lobbied for more comprehensive city ordi-
nances and has established an active mediation program. Its Social Programs
Committee has become increasingly involved in a number of accommodations-
related projects, such as advocating multilingual phone service and the im-
plementation of a program of ramp construction for the city's handicapped. 430
Furthermore, the San Francisco ordinance has expanded its coverage to pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, a more progressive
stance than that of most state statutes. 431 Most of the duties undertaken by the
SFHRC--organizing public meetings, negotiating with local employers, advising
tenants' associations-are directed toward publicizing and effectuating the indi-
vidual rights of San Francisco residents.
The Illinois Commission on Human Relations, on the other hand, focuses
on providing community services rather than on protecting individual freedoms,
by assisting communities in planning day care centers, youth job programs, citi-
zens' crime prevention committees, family workshops, and public housing pro-
jects. 432 The state commission also supervises grass-roots agencies which are
similarly oriented toward providing social services. 433 In dealing with individual
complaints, the commission acts only as an intake and conciliation center. If
428. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-391(3) (Supp. 1977). The Tennessee Commission for Human Dc-
velopment and the Florida Commission on Human Relations, although without enforcement pow-
ers, do receive and conciliate complaints on a systematic basis. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-22-1
(1971); [1975-1976] FLORIDA COMM'N ON HUMAN REL. ANN. REP.
429. CAL. CIv. CODE § 50262 (West Supp. 1978).
430. [1977] HUMAN RIGHTS COh&'N OF SAN FRANCISCO ANN. REP. 39-42.
431. San Francisco, Calif., AD. CODE § 12A.2 (amended 1974).
432. [1975-1976] ILL. COMM'N ON HUMAN REL. BIENNIAL REP. 8-24.
433. Id. at 26.
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conciliation fails, the complainant is referred to the state attorney general. 434
All agencies, advisory and regulatory, have certain educational and advi-
sory responsibilities: to inform the public of its rights and the business commu-
nity of its duties; to establish councils to study the problem of discrimination
and formulate affirmative action plans; to develop policies and procedures; and
to advise the legislature. 435 Agencies also serve as information centers, pub-
licizing the remedies available under the law and responding to specific in-
quiries. Most commissions publish pamphlets for wide distribution and maintain
public information switchboards. States with substantial funding may also main-
tain a public relations branch which exploits the educational potential of the
media. New York, for example, produces a bimonthly television show and
sponsors a Spanish-language radio program. 436 Kansas, New Mexico, and New
Hampshire require the posting of notices which identify the premises as ones
covered by the state civil rights laws and which briefly describe the scope of
protection. 437 These blanket posting requirements permit agencies to advertise
rights and remedies in a manner more in keeping with their smaller budgets. If
an agency is to competently perform its anti-discrimination functions, it must
develop some program of public education, designed to heighten citizens'
awareness of their rights and encourage enforcement activity by the public.
b. Regulatory Agencies
One of the most sweeping changes in the public accommodations area
since 1964 is the increased number of agencies which have been granted regu-
latory and quasi-judicial authority in addition to their educational and advisory
responsibilities. Regulatory civil rights commissions adhere to a classic pro-
cedural pattern based on each state's administrative procedure act: complaint,
investigation, persuasion and conciliation, hearing, and judicial review. Vari-
ations in this procedural pattern are slight.
(i) The Complaint
Administrative proceedings are set in motion by the filing of a complaint,
usually by an aggrieved party. In all states, commissions are also authorized to
file complaints and usually do so at the discretion of an investigator. 438 The
commissions' complaint-initiation prerogative is infrequently utilized, in part
due to the tremendous backlogs of individual complaints, 439 but it is a poten-
434. Id. at 7-8.
435. E.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 294, 295 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1977).
436. [1975] N.Y. STATE Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 39-40.
437. KAN. STAT. § 44-1012 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:11 (Supp. 1977); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 4-33-13 (1974). The District of Columbia also has a blanket posting requirement,
D.C. CODE § 6-2261 (Supp. 1978), and the Connecticut commission may require the posting of
notices, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-35(b) (1958).
438. However, Maryland requires the approval of a majority of the commissioners before the
Commission will initiate proceedings. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 12(b) (1972).
439. Most agencies report a considerably higher number of docketed complaints than closed
complaints each year. Often as many as one-third of filed complaints remain open and unresolved a
year later. See [1975-19761 MINN. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS BIENNIAL REP. 4; [1975-19761 Mo.
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tially powerful weapon in fighting discrimination. Individual complaints do not
necessarily reflect the nature and extent of discrimination within a jurisdiction.
Victims of discrimination are often either reluctant to complain or unaware of
available recourse. This is especially true in public accommodations cases,
since an offense may be isolated and the complaint process relatively complex.
Additionally, many practices, such as subtly selective admissions policies and
discriminatory advertising are not obvious to the immediate victim. The
agency, not the individual aggreived party, has the data and resources to detect
patterns of discrimination. While an individual may think he or she has been
refused entrance because the establishment is already filled, an agency could
more readily determine whether the denial is valid or part of a discriminatory
scheme. Charges of public accommodations discrimination are often more sus-
ceptible of group protection and proof than other civil rights violations. Com-
plicated questions of job requirements, limited resources or positions, scarce
housing stock, and academic qualifications, which may require individual reso-
lution, are not at issue in public accommodations cases. As alternatives to
agency initiation, agencies might accept complaints on behalf of a class or from
organizations filing on behalf of their members. Only a few state statutes now
authorize these practices, 440 which might achieve the same broad-range effects
as agency initiation but at lower cost to the agency.
Before the available procedures are invoked, a complaint must be made in
writing and verified. Filing deadlines for verified complaints vary from ten days
to one year after the alleged discriminatory act occurred. 4 ' Short filing periods
deny unsuspecting complainants access to agency protection, and verification
requirements may deter parties from following through with complaints. Infor-
mal complaint procedures can resolve many grievances which otherwise would
never be placed on an agency's docket and can warn proprietors of their obli-
gations to the public. In Michigan, for example, a phone call may trigger an
investigation or a preliminary conciliation attempt, potentially rectifying the
problem without invoking official procedure."42
COMM'N ON HUMAN RIrrs ANN. REP. 13; [1976] VASH. STATE HUMAN RIGHTS CosiCt*N ANN.
REP. 31. On the other hand, some states are making a concerted and successful effort to diminish
their case backlog. See [1976] KAN. COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS REP. OF PROGRESS 8-15; [1975-1976]
MICH. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 23. These latter figures may reflect more perfunctory dis-
missals or stricter probable cause requirements rather than more efficient complaint processing
methods.
440. Rhode Island will accept complaints from interested organizations. R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-24-4 (1969) and New Jersey has accepted complaints from the National Organization for Wom-
en. See Nat'l Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318
A.2d 33, aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974). Minnesota and Pennsylvania take jurisdiction over
class actions. See Richardson v. School Bd. of I.S.D. No. 271, 297 Minn. 91,210 N.W.2d 911 (1973);
Pa. Human Rel. Comm'n v. Freeport Area School Dist., 467 Pa. 522, 359 A.2d 724 (1976).
441. Nebraska has the strictest time limitation on complaint filing, one of 10 days. NEB. REv.
STAT. § 20-141(6) (1977). The New York statute of limitations is one year. N.Y. EXEC. LAw §
297.5 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977).
442. [1975-1976] MICH. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 34-5.
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(ii) Investigation
The scope of an agency investigation is limited more by the investigator's
available time and resources than by any statutory limitation. 443 After filing a
complaint, an investigating officer may interview the parties or other persons
who might be connected with the case, take depositions, order interrogatories,
and subpoena documents. An agency's regulations may not authorize orders
for depositions and subpoenas of persons not parties to the action, but an ad-
verse inference may be made against parties failing to voluntarily comply with
a request. 444 The interview may constitute a respondent's first notification that
a complaint has been filed against him or her. Although most agencies require
that a copy of the complaint be served on the respondent as soon as it is filed,
some do not provide for notice prior to the hearing stage. 44S In the absence of
a hearing, the respondent may never discover that a complaint has been filed
against him or her.
Certain commissions do not hesitate to investigate complaints that extend
beyond their jurisdiction. New Hampshire regularly investigates and conciliates
credit complaints, despite the absence of a state equal credit statute. 446 Other
agencies screen complaints before any investigation begins.4 47 Agencies which
receive relatively large numbers of complaints may be forced to refine their
complaint processing methods to separate the more meritorious claims from
complaints that are obviously beyond their enforcement powers.
(iii) Conciliation and Persuasion
Conciliation, an attempt by an investigator to negotiate with the respon-
dent for an adjustment of a grievance, is the next phase. Its importance is
evidenced by the number of complaints settled in this way. Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Ohio annually resolve 50% of their public accommodations com-
plaints in this manner; Missouri and Alaska settle 40%, Minnesota over 33%,
443. The scope of an agency investigation is never delineated and references to the process are
vague. See e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297.2 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977). However, the confidential-
ity provisions surrounding the conciliation stage will place limits on the evidence admissible at the
hearing stage. See text accompanying notes 453-56 infra.
444. W. Va. Ad. Reg. 4.02(e) (1975).
445. E.g., District of Columbia, Minnesota, and New York require that notice be given to the
respondent upon the filing of a complaint. D.C. CODE § 6-2289 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. §
363.06(1) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297.2 (McKinney 1972). The Massachusetts statute does
not mention notice until the hearing stage. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West Supp.
1978-1979).
446. See Letter to the authors from Berel Firestone, Executive Director, New Hampshire
Commission for Human Rights, October 5, 1977. The practice, however, has not always been
upheld by the courts, especially when there is a conflict of agency jurisdiction. See Bd. of Higher
Educ. of City of New York v. Carter, 26 Misc. 2d 1989, 213 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1961), modyfed, 16
A.D.2d 443, 228 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1962), modified, 14 N.Y.2d 138, 250 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1964).
447. New York and New Jersey screen complaints before investigation or before the complaint
is formally filed. See [1975] N.Y. STATE Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 47 (28 public ac-
commodations complaints were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); [1976] N.J. Div. ON CIv.
RIGHTS ANN. REP. 1. Minnesota makes no distinction between the screening and investigation
stages. See [1975-1976] MINN. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS BIENNIAL REP. 9.
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and Connecticut and Indiana about 25%. 448
Conciliation is usually characterized as a discrete stage, 449 which does not
begin until after an investigation and a "probable cause" determination have
been made.450 Nonetheless, conciliation attempts commonly begin during inves-
tigation. Settlements are frequently arrived at before a determination of prob-
able cause can be made, often in situations where probable cause could not be
found. 451 Resolution is usually formalized in a signed agreement, which often
provides for a follow-up investigation to assure compliance. 4 -52 Such an agree-
ment is enforceable as a commission order. Any breach of the agreement could
subject the violator to criminal penalties, 453 despite the fact that a similar find-
ing might not have been reached by a hearing examiner.
The merging of conciliation and investigation becomes relevant later in the
process, after negotiations have failed and the evidence gathered during negoti-
ations is introduced at the hearing. A general rule is that all information ob-
tained during conciliation is confidential and may not be submitted as evidence
at a hearing. 454 Breaches of confidence sometimes carry criminal penalties
more severe than those imposed for committing a discriminatory act.4ss This
guarantee of privacy probably makes respondents more willing to negotiate and
creates an atmosphere conducive to settlement. Faced with the threat of ad-
verse publicity, respondents prefer to proceed with a hearing to preserve a
chance of vindication. The State of Washington, however, dropped its confi-
dentiality provision in 1957. Nonetheless, the Washington State Human Rights
448. These figures represent the conciliation and adjustment rate after the complaints which
were screened out, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or withdrawn by the complainant have been
eliminated. See Letter to the authors from Sharyn Roberts, Alaska Human Rights Commission, No-
vember 8, 1977; [1976] CONN. COMM'S ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ANN. REP. 8 [1976-
1977] IND. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 12; [1975-19761 MICH. Civ. RIGHTS COt'N ANN. REP.
24; [1976] MINN. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS BIENNIAL REP. 9; [1975-19761 Mo. Co.tICN ON HUMAN
RIGHTS ANN. REP. 17; [1975-1976] OHIO Civ. RIHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 18; (1975-19761 PA.
HUMAN REL. COMM'N ANN. REP. 20.
449. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
450. The New York agency makes a probable cause determination before conciliation begins.
All complaints where probable cause is found are officially resolved, either through negotiation or a
public hearing. Of the 57 public accommodations complaints for which probable cause was found,
23 were conciliated and 34 ordered for hearings. [1975] N.Y. Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP.
47.
451. A number of agencies have a "predetermination settlement" stage during the investigation
whereby the parties may come to an informal agreement before a determination as to probable
cause is made. See [1976-1977] COLO. Civ. RIGHTS COMMN' ANN. REP. 5; [1976-1977] IND. Civ.
RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 9. Complaints listed as "satisfactorily adjusted may also include some
cases resolved before a cause determination was made." See [1975-19761 MINN. DEPT OF HUMtAN
RIGHrs BIENNIAL REP. 3. See also note 446 supra.
452. E.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(3)(a) (McKinney 1972).
453. The conciliation agreement will usually take the form of a commission order which is
judicially enforceable. See, e.g. KY. REv. STAT. § 344.200(4)(5) (1973): N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
297.3(a)(b) (McKinney 1972); W. Va. Ad. Reg. 4.03 (1975). Eight states impose criminal penalties
for the violation of a commission order. See note 480 infra.
454. All states but Washington prohibit disclosure of what transpires during conciliation. See.
e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(3)(a) (McKinney 1972).
455. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (Supp. 1977).
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Commission continues to report a comparatively high rate of complaint adjust-
ment. 456 The confidentiality policy seriously limits the evidence admissible at
the hearing stage. It, in effect, assures that all information volunteered by the
respondent is protected from disclosure and that only information obtained di-
rectly by the efforts of investigators is admissible.
Conciliation is a swifter, simpler approach to resolving differences than a
hearing. But a hearing is often more attractive to the typically under-staffed
and overworked agency. Conciliation avoids the problems associated with liti-
gation, and is particularly appropriate to public accommodations controversies.
The greatest danger of conciliation is that the complainant may find his or
her rights bargained away during negotiations. In public accommodations cases,
on the other hand, both parties may be as eager for a quick resolution as is the
agency. Respondents typically cooperate to avoid adverse publicity and the
harm to business that the exposure accompanying a hearing may cause. Open-
ing the facility to the complainant may be less disruptive to the respondent's
operations than testifying at a hearing. Providing access to an accommodation is
also an easier concession to make than those requested in other types of civil
rights proceedings, such as the promise of a job, a promotion along with an
award of back pay, or of an apartment in a building with no vacancies. Fur-
thermore, the remedy sought by the complainant is an order for compliance
with the statute. This amounts to access to the establishment plus minor, if
any, monetary damages. Since the conciliation agreement often takes the form
of an order, this remedy leaves the complainant well protected. Even when a
conciliation agreement does not carry the force of an order, noncompliance
triggers renewed investigations and public hearings.
(iv) Hearing
As agencies begin to require stricter and more elaborate procedural
safeguards, the hearing loses its informal character and becomes indistinguish-
able from a trial. The right to counsel, the right to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses, notice requirements, testimony under oath, submission of
briefs, and transcriptions of the proceedings have been incorporated into the
agency proceedings of all states. The parties may amend complaints and an-
swers, present oral arguments, raise objections to the introduction of evidence,
and request continuances. Generally, the hearing is public. All agencies have
the authority to subpoena documents and witnesses, but many require that the
requesting party bear the costs of service, transportation, and the production of
documents.45 7 Usually the strict rules of evidence do not apply, and the hear-
ing examiner may take account of all reliable, probative, and substantial evi-
dence, statistical or otherwise, which tends to prove the existence of a dis-
criminatory pattern or act. 458 Only the Kansas statute requires that the hearing
456. 1957 WASH. LAWS ch. 37, § 17; [1976] WASH. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ANN, REI'.
31.
457. E.g., Neb. Equal Opportunity Comm'n Rules and Regs. 5-(2). Contra, N.J. Div. on Civ.
Rights Rules of Practice and Procedure 13:4-9.2(b) (1975).
458. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n Rules and Regs. CR 13.04(b) (1971).
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panel be bound by the strict rules of evidence, 459 although a few states have
incorporated this requirement into their rules and regulations. 460 Some states
provide for intra-agency appeals or reconsideration. New York maintains a
separate appellate board within the agency. 46' But the more typical pattern is
to permit the agency to review its determination before the final order has been
announced, whenever new evidence or the "interests of justice" so require.462
The hearing is an unpopular mode of resolution generally, and for public
accommodations complaints in particular. The costs in time, resources, and in-
convenience and the risk of failure simply outweigh the rewards of public
vindication or monetary compensation. Although hearings are less bound up in
burdensome procedure than are trials, certain standards of proof, rules of evi-
dence, and discovery provisions must be observed. Establishing actual dis-
crimination is difficult, especially for the lone complainant facing a corporate
respondent represented by counsel. A complaint which might have been favor-
ably settled by conciliation may be dismissed at a hearing. The agency also
suffers when the complainant is defeated at the very visible hearing stage. Not
only does a hearing represent a considerable commitment of time and resources
but a victory for the respondent may undermine an agency's credibility and
public image. Perhaps as a consequence of stricter procedures and the pressure
of agency workloads, a very small proportion of complaints reach the hearing
stage and few hearings involve public accommodations issues. In New York in
1975, an unusually high percentage of public accommodations complaints filed,
34 out of 189, ended in hearings. 463 Many states have held no public accommo-
dations hearings in recent years. 464 Even states in which relatively high num-
bers of complaints are registered hold very few hearings. 46s
459. KAN. STAT. § 44-1005 (1973).
460. Mich. Dep't of Civ. Rights and Procedures 8 (1975); Neb. Equal Opportunity Comm'n
Rules and Regs. 3-4(4)(b); W. Va, Ad. Reg. 7.19 (1975).
461. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977).
462. See KAN. STAT. § 44-1010 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.255 (1962): Ind. Civ.
Rights Comm'n Rules and Regs. 11.2; Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n Rules and Regs. CR-21 (1971): W.
Va. Ad. Reg. 7.25 (1975).
463. [1975] N.Y. ST. Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 47.
464. Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and Washington have held few or no
hearings in the last two or three years. Letter to the authors from Sharyn Roberts. Alaska Human
Rights Commission, November 8, 1977; [1976] CONN. COMI°N ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPOR-
TUNTIES ANN. REP. 9-11; [1976] IOWA Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 11-13: 119761 KAN. CIV.
RIGHTS COMM'N REP. ON PROGRESS 19-20; Letter to the authors from May N. Holmes. Maryland
Commission on Human Relations, January 30, 1978; [1975-19761 Mo. CoM'N o.% HImAN RIGHTS
ANN. REP. 17; [1975-1976] OHIO Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 3: Letter to the authors from
Morton Tytler, Attorney for the Washington State Commission on Human Rights. October 31. 1977.
465. Pennsylvania held two public accommodations hearings in the 1975-1976 fiscal year.
[1975-1976] PA. HUMAN REL. COMM'N ANN. REP. 13; Minnesota held two in the past two years,
[1975-1976] MINN. DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHrs BIENNIAL REP. 9; New Jersey held six hearings in
the fiscal year 1977, Letter to the authors from Michael Prime. New Jersey Division on Civil Rights.
Department of Law and Public Safety, October 3. 1977; West Virginia held two. [1975-19761 W. VA.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 7-11. Other states do not break down their complaint statis-
tics to indicate which issues were resolved through hearings, but since few hearings are held it is
unlikely that many, if any, concern public accommodations. See (19761 S.D. Div. OF HUMtAN
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The Expedited Resolution Process (ERP), pioneered by the State of Wash-
ington 466 and recently adopted by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 467
offers a possible solution to the congestion and bureaucratic morass confront-
ing aggrieved parties and agencies. ERP represents a compromise between
conciliation and a formalized hearing. Shortly after a complaint is filed the
parties and their witnesses are invited to a round table discussion to present
their views. The discussion is moderated by a senior investigating officer who
encourages the parties to settle early, before they become too firmly en-
trenched in their respective positions. 468 ERP provides the parties with a
forum, but one without the trappings and complications of a hearing. Even
when the conference is not successful, it is an effective means of gathering
evidence, often acting as a substitute for a more time-consuming field investiga-
tion. In individual cases which involve relatively uncomplicated fact patterns,
ERP may telescope investigation, conciliation, and hearing into one stage, thus
enabling an investigator to handle twice as many cases as he or she did under
the traditional system. 469
(v) Agency Remedies
The standard agency remedy is an order to cease and desist the dis-
criminatory practice and to admit the complainant to the accommodation in
question. The order generally requires either that the respondent report back to
the agency on his manner of compliance, or that the agency itself monitor the
respondent to prevent continued or new violations. 470 States without blanket
posting requirements often order accommodations found to be in violation of
the law to post a notice stating that the establishment is required to comply
with the state civil rights laws. 471 Often agencies have the express power to
award compensatory damages. 472 Montana and Kentucky allow damages for
RIGHTS ANN. REP. 1 (11 hearings); [1976-19771 IND. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 16 (31 hear-
ings); [1975-1976] N.M. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 9 (17 hearings).
466. [1976] WASH. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 28.
467. [1976-1977] COLO. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 11.
468. [1976] WASH. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 28.
469. Id.
470. All agencies require either that the respondent report back on compliance or that the
agency perform a follow-up check on compliance. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297.4(c)(v) (McKinney 1972
& Supp. 1972-1977) requires a report on compliance from the respondent. Ky. REV. STAT. §
344.200(5) (1977) provides that the Commission will investigate compliance after a conciliation
agreement has been issued.
471. E.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1-6(k)(1) (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-42 (Supp.
1977).
472. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-36 (West Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE § 6-2293(a)(4) (Supp.
1978); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-6(k)(1) (1976); KAN. STAT. 44-1042 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. §
344.230(3)(h) (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2605(2)(i) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. §
363.071(2) (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-309(b) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
4-33-10(E) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297.4(c)(iii) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1977). The
West Virginia agency has been judicially granted authority to award compensatory damages. State
Human Rts. Comm. v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77 (1975). The Maryland court took an opposite position
in Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974). Most statutes authorize
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humiliation and embarrassment. 473 The commissions in the District of Colum-
bia, Connecticut, Kentucky, and Michigan award attorney's fees to successful
complainants on a discretionary basis. 474 Only the Minnesota statute authorizes
the commission to award punitive damages. 47" Monetary awards are rarely
granted for public accommodations cases which do not reach the hearing stage,
but conciliation settlements can, and sometimes do, include such compensa-
tion.47
6
In addition to orders and damage awards, agencies in seven states and the
District of Columbia require violators to appear before the appropriate state
licensing board to defend their rights to be licensed. 47 7 Such a remedy is par-
ticularly suited to violations of public accommodations statutes committed by
hotels and restaurants which depend upon state liquor licenses to attract pa-
trons. A revocation threatens more severe monetary loss than any award of
damages. Referrals to licensing boards may be permitted even when the ac-
commodation falls outside the statute. A state may revoke the liquor license of
a private club on the theory that although the state cannot prevent the club
from persisting in practices, it may use its licensing authority to discourage
such behavior.478
(vi) Judicial Review and Enforcement
All agencies provide some form of judicial review to promote enforcement
of agency orders. The Oklahoma statute specifies that an administrative order
is not law until it has been enforced in a judicial proceeding.4 79 Ten jurisdic-
tions make non-compliance with an order a per se discriminatory act.480 Vio-
lations are treated as willful obstructions of the commission's function and
thus subject the offender to criminal or civil liability. The majority of state
statutes follow a more moderate course. They give legal force to a commission
order when an enforcement proceeding is not brought within a specified time,
the agency, along with the power to issue cease and desist orders, to take "such affirmative action
as... will effectuate the purpose of [the] act." E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-17 (Wcst 1976). Such
clauses may permit the agency to award damages but they have been the subject of little judicial
interpretation.
473. Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.230(3)(h) (1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-309(b) (Supp. 1977).
474. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-36 (West Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE § 6-2293(a)(5) (Supp.
1978); Ky. REv. STAT. § 344.230(3) (1977); MICH. Co~tp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2605(2)(j) (Supp. 1977).
475. MINN. STAT. § 363.071(2) (Supp. 1977).
476. [1976] CONN. COMMI'N ON HUMAN RIGHTs AND OPPORTUNITIES ANN. REP. 9.
477. D.C. CODE § 6-2297 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-6(k)(i) (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, § 1IC (Supp. 1977); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2605(3) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. §
363.071(4) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(4) (McKinney 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43. § 959
(Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
478. B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 of Brunswick v. Ingraham, Me., 297 A.2d 607, stay granted. 410
U.S. 903, appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 924 (1972).
479. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1505(e) (1971).
480. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.270 (1974); D.C. CODE § 6-2274 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 44-1013
(1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.290 (1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 314.080 (Vernon Supp. 1978). NEB.
REV. STAT. § 20-143 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:12 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-26
(West 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.310 (1962); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-14 (1971).
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but impose no penalty on the respondent who awaits a proceeding to enforce
compliance. 48,
Judicial review of an agency finding may assume one of two procedural
postures: a trial de novo or, more commonly, limited review. The New Mexico
statute, for example, instructs the trial court, on appeal from an agency deter-
mination, to relitigate all issues, consider new objections, and permit either
party to request a jury.482 Other statutes require the court to accept the com-
mission's finding of fact and to refuse consideration of objections not raised
during the hearing. The agency decision will not be overturned unless the
court finds that the agency acted beyond the scope of its authority or in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. 48 3 In states where the administrative remedy is
exclusive, requiring a trial de novo may be a more just policy because it com-
pensates for whatever investigatory or evidentiary abuses occurred at the hear-
ing and eliminates possible bias on the part of the commissioners on the hear-
ing panel.
In twelve states the administrative remedy is exclusive and exhaustion of
administrative procedures is required before judicial review becomes avail-
able. 484 Minnesota and Maine have partial exhaustion doctrines, which permit
an aggrieved party to bring a civil suit only after the complaint has been dis-
missed by the commission. 48- Despite the lack of explicit language, all statutes
requiring exhaustion may be subject to a similar interpretation. If the agency
considers the dismissal of a complaint to be a final order, such a dismissal
would be reviewable by the court. 486
Six states require election of remedies; filing a complaint with the state
agency bars the initiation of a civil or criminal suit and vice versa. 487 The stat-
ute of the District of Columbia bars court action only after the commission has
made a final determination. 488 The agency's dismissal of a complaint may
constitute its final determination. Hence, complainants should be wary of filing
481. E.g., New York makes violation of a commission order a separate offense but specifies no
additional penalties in the event of a violation. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.8 (McKinney 1972).
482. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-12 (1974). Delaware, Kansas, and Michigan also authorize de
novo appeals. People's Comm. Hosp. Auth. v. Wayne Circuit Ct., 36 Mich. App. 537, 193 N.W.2d
900 (1971); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4513 (1974); KAN. STAT. § 44-1011 (1973).
483. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-142(3)(b) (1977). Other statutes authorize a somewhat less narrow
standard of review but require that the agency's findings of fact be conclusive if supported by
sufficient evidence in the record. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 298 (McKinney 1972); OHIo REv. CoDE
ANN. § 4112.06(E) (Page 1973).
484. Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and the State of Washington make no provisions for civil and criminal
penalties. Delaware permits a criminal suit only upon the approval of the commissioners, DEL.
CODE. tit. 6, § 4514 (1974).
485. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4622 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. § 363.14(l) (Supp. 1977).
486. The Nebraska statute allows review of "any agency order or decision," which would in-
clude a dismissal. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-142(1) (1977).
487. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-701 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.270 (1977); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 297.9 (McKinney 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27 (West 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-13 (Supp. 1977).
488. D.C. CODE § 6-2296(a) (Supp. 1978).
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a complaint with the agency lest they lose the right to initiate a civil suit.
Neither exhaustion nor election is required in Arizona, Montana, Oregon,
Idaho, Michigan, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Connecticut, Alaska, and Ver-
mont.48 9 Thus, civil actions may be brought before or after administrative pro-
ceedings. Because courts are often authorized to award greater damages than
are agencies, a successful complainant might institute a civil suit to gain a rem-
edy in excess of the commission's award. Whether a party may use the com-
mission ruling as evidence in a state court proceeding is an unresolved ques-
tion. There is no question, however, that attempts to subpoena information
gathered during an investigation are barred by the confidentiality provisions
found in most civil rights statutes. 490
c. Access and Jurisdiction
After more than a decade of expanding administrative jurisdiction, that has
widened the scope of protected classes, of covered accommodations, and of
agency enforcement powers, there are currently signs of slowdown and even
retrenchment. Less administrative energy is devoted to enforcement of public
accommodations statutes than to other civil rights legislation. Hawaii and
Virginia have fair housing and employment laws but no public accommodations
statutes. 491 A few states have agencies which handle only employment dis-
crimination complaints and enforce their public accommodations statutes ex-
clusively through judicial remedies. 492 Others provide agency enforcement of
public accommodations complaints but have more elaborate procedures and
remedies for housing and employment complaints. 493
Such differences do not necessarily indicate a lack of concern for discrimi-
nation in public accommodations. Certain procedures and remedies, such as
temporary restraining orders and broad discovery, have little relevance to ac-
commodations issues. Furthermore, agency involvement in housing and
employment is understandably greater. Public accommodations complaints ac-
count for fewer than 5% of total complaints filed, while housing complaints
account for 5% to 15%, and employment complaints for 75% to 90%.494 Even
489. The Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Oregon, and Vermont statutes offer multiple
remedies and make no mention of an exhaustion or election requirement. Other state statutes ex-
pressly allow dual suits. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 1971); MIcH. Comp. LAws
ANN. § 37.2705 (1970); MorNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-329 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 651.120 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06(B) (Page 1973).
490. In addition to the confidentiality provisions surrounding the conciliation process, see text
accompanying notes 453-56 supra. Statutes usually prohibit public disclosure of all information
concerning the processing and resolution of a complaint. See, e.g., IoWA CoDE ANN. § 601A.14.4
(West 1975); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297.8 (McKinney 1972).
491. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-7 to 378-10 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 36-86 to 36-88 (Supp.
1975).
492. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1414 to 1426 (West 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48. §§ 852 to 855
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
493. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 118.010 to 118.120 with §§ 651.050 to 651.120 (1977). See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-36a (West Supp. 1978).
494. See [1977] ALASKA COMM'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 47; [1976-1977] COLO. CIv.
RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 4; [1976-1977] IND. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 12; [1975-1976]
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when public accommodations complaints are handled within the same agency
and by the same process as are housing and employment complaints, the agen-
cy's jurisdiction in accommodations disputes is often narrower in terms of clas-
ses protected and scope of enforcement. Most agencies are expressly au-
thorized to award monetary damages in the form of back pay for employment
violations. However, the authority to award damages for public accommoda-
tions violations is frequently ambiguous, and has rarely been clarified by the
courts. 495 Certain groups, such as the aged and women, are usually protected
by state employment statutes, but may not be protected by public accommoda-
tions laws. 496 In some states, the access rights of the handicapped are pro-
tected by a separate statutory provision. Although criminal or civil remedies
are available to protect the handicapped, the agencies are not authorized to
accept and process such complaints. 497 No such distinction is made in the area
of employment.
Nor have agencies been granted all the jurisdiction they could constitution-
ally command. Only the New York Division of Human Rights is authorized to
take jurisdiction over complaints against out-of-state corporations doing busi-
ness within the state. 498 Such expanded jurisdiction could have considerable
impact on public accommodations enforcement by, for example, prohibiting
discriminatory advertising by foreign resorts and discriminatory practices by
businesses owned by outside investors.
Two recent decisions, one in Kansas and the other in Michigan, portend
further narrowing of agency powers in the area of public accommodations. In
Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard,499 the Kansas Supreme Court
held the state commission's coverage of prisons, jails, and schools under the
public accommodations law invalid. The decision decreased the agency's public
accommodations complaint load by 75%.500 The Michigan Human Rights
Commission narrowed its own jurisdiction and stopped accepting sex-based ac-
commodations complaints in 1975, when it interpreted the Michigan sex dis-
crimination statute as a penal law. Consequently, sixty-six complaints were
closed by the agency, and the complainants were advised to seek state or local
IOWA Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 7; [1976] KAN. COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS REP. ON PROG-
REss 8; [1975-1976] MICH. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 24; [1975-1976] MINN. DEP'T OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BIENNIAL REP. 9; [1975] N.Y. STATE Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 43;
[1975-1976] OHIO. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 3; [1975-1976] PA. HUMAN REL. COMM'N
ANN. REP. 20; [1976] WASH. STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 31; [1976-1977] W. VA.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 23-24.
495. See note 472 supra.
496. In Arizona, sex discrimination is prohibited in employment but not in public accommoda-
tions. Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (Supp. 1977-1978) with id. § 41-1442 (1974); compare
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1451 (1974) with id. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1978).
497. In Arizona, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, denials of access to the bandi-
capped result in criminal penalties. The state agencies have no jurisdiction over these complaints.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 24-411 (1971); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-127, 20-129 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 167:42-a (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-9.1-3 (1969).
498. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 298-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1977).
499. 218 Kan. 248, 544 P.2d 791 (1975).
500. [1976] KAN. COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS REP. ON PROGRESS 11.
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criminal prosecution. 01 Although at present infrequent, such occurrences may
signal further limitations on the victim's access to civil rights agencies, which
provide a simple, inexpensive remedy.
2. Judicial Remedies
Public accommodations statutes are largely enforced by state civil rights
agencies. Few cases reach the courts, even in those states lacking agencies.
Although rarely used, civil and criminal remedies are widely available.
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia offer judicial, as well as ad-
ministrative, relief for public accommodations violations, and twelve states
offer administrative, civil, and criminal remedies.502
Civil remedies are available in twenty-three states and the District of Col-
umbia. In California and Utah civil relief is the exclusive remedy. 50 3 In addition
to injunctive relief, successful plaintiffs usually will be awarded compensa-
tory damages and, less often, attorney's fees.504 Punitive or exemplary damages
are authorized by statute in Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon.sOs Many states set
minimum and maximum damage limitations. These accommodate situations
where out-of-pocket costs are nonexistent or difficult to establish, and preclude
excessive jury awards.
Criminal penalties-fines and/or imprisonment-are the sole mode of en-
forcement in North Dakota and Vyoming, 50 6 although eighteen states authorize
501. [1975-1976] MICH. Civ. RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 18-19.
502. The following states offer administrative, criminal, and civil enforcement: CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-34-502, 24-34-703 (1973 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35. 53-36 (West
Supp. 1978) (A civil suit was authorized by Ross v. Schade. 7 Conn. Supp. 443 (1939)); IDAHO
CODE §§ 18-7303, 67-5906, 67-5911 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE §§ 2-9-1-6(k)(I), 35-46-2-1 (Supp.
1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 and ch. 151B, § 5 (West Supp. 1978-1979); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 5, H8 4612, 4613(2)(B)(7) (1973 and Supp. 1977); MICH. Cotp. LAws ANN. §§
27.2605, 750.147 (West Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. STAT. §§ 363.14, 363.071(2), 609.03 (Supp. 1977);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-309, 64-329 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 651.080. 651.090,
651.110 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-6, 10:1-7, 10:5-17 (West 1976 & Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §§ 297.4(c), 297.9, 299 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1977).
The following states authorize administrative and civil remedies: ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.130,
22.10.020 (Supp. 1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1471, 41-1472 (1974); D.C. CODE §§ 6-2294,
6-2296(a) (Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 344.230, 344.450 (1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.680,
659.060 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 959, 962 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979); W. VA. CODE §§
5-11-10, 5-11-13 (Supp. 1977).
The following states offer criminal and administrative remedies: DEL. COOE tit. 6, §§ 4506(0,
4515 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.05(G), 4112.99 (Page Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, §§ 1453, 1464 (1974).
503. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-4(c) (1953 & Supp.
1977).
504. A Nebraska statute authorizes an award of attorney's fees on appeal from an agency rul-
ing. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-142(6) (1977).
505. IDAHO CODE § 67-5911 (Supp. 1977); NEv REV. STAT. § 651.090c) (1977); Oa. REV.
STAT. § 30.680 (1977). California, Maine, and Michigan have treble damages provisions. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 52(a) OVest Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4613.2.B(6) (Supp. 1977); MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.147 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
506. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1976); Wyo. STAT. § 6-83.2 (Supp. 1975). Wisconsin and
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criminal penalties in addition, or as an alternative, to civil or administrative
enforcement. Fines vary from $100 to $1000 and sentences range from thirty
days to one year. In Utah and Illinois, the state attorney general may enjoin a
violation as a public nuisance, in lieu of fines or imprisonment-S 7 Eight states
impose criminal penalties for willful violations of agency orders. 50 However, as
the dearth of case law demonstrates, states are hesitant to bring criminal suits.
This reluctance is exemplified by the Delaware statute which requires the ap-
proval of a majority of the Human Rights Commissioners before criminal pro-
ceedings may be instituted. 50 9
Absent agency enforcement, civil and criminal remedies afford inadequate
protection of the right of access. The expense of a civil suit discourages most
victims from litigating. Criminal remedies have even less utility, for then en-
forcement is taken entirely out of the hands of the individual. Furthermore, in
criminal prosecutions the procedural safeguards are more stringent, the prob-
lems of proof more difficult, and courts are more reluctant to impose criminal
penalties, especially prison terms than to impose civil remedies. Courts may
also construe the pertinent statutes strictly, as is traditional in criminal law.
Criminal and civil penalties are not without merit, of course, but their primary
value is for cases involving particularly egregious offenses. A criminal prosecu-
tion has significant symbolic value: it serves as evidence that the state will, if




Title II represented the first federal attempt to deal with the problems of
equal access since the post-Civil War era. At the time of its passage it was a
sweeping piece of legislation, regulating private and social behavior to a greater
extent than any prior federal law. Title II, however, covers a relatively narrow
range of accommodations, prohibits only discrimination based on race, color,
religion, and national origin, and offers severely limited remedies. The impact
of Title II has been dissipated by other federal legislation, particularly the rein-
terpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. More accommodations are covered
and more classes protected under the 1866 Act, and claims of damages are
available to supplement Title II's injunctive relief. The recent passage of the
Attorneys' Fees Act, which permits courts to award attorneys' fees in claims
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and other reconstruction statutes,
has equalized the prior differences which existed between those laws and Title
11.510
Illinois permit civil and criminal actions, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-3(a), (b) (1973); Wis. STAT.
§ 942.04(1,6) (1975). See note 502 supra for other criminal statutes.
507. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 13-3(c) (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-4 (Supp. 1977).
508. See text accompanying note 480 supra.
509. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 4515 (1974).
510. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
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Certain procedural advantages do remain which might recommend a Title
II suit over others. The abstention doctrine, frequently invoked by the federal
courts to refuse jurisdiction while a state action is pending,sH or to permit the
suspension of a federal suit if a state action is filed in the interim,s"? affects
suits brought under sections 1981, 1982, and 1983. Title II, however, contains
independent and explicit procedural requirements which limit the delays which
can occur in state proceedings and to waive the requirement that the Attorney
General proceed in state court.s 13 Furthermore, Title II permits removal to fed-
eral court of state criminal proceedings involving Title II defenses. Title II's
coverage is also clear. While it may be difficult to establish the applicability of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the accommodation in question, this is not
necessary if suit is brought under Title II. Although other federal laws are more
expansive in their language than Title II, such laws are susceptible of divergent
interpretations because of this expansiveness.
The greatest advantage of Title II now may be its mere existence, the fact
that it was passed. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted before the change
in judicial consciousness that led to the revitalization of the more conservative
1866 Act in Jones v. Alfred Mayer, hzc.S14 The 1964 Act, and Title II in par-
ticular, may have acted as a catalyst to revive interest in civil rights issues and
inspire a search for even broader coverage once its own constitutionality had
been established. Although the current interpretations of sections 1981 and 1982
exceed the boundaries of Title II, the very breadth of the Reconstruction stat-
utes implies that they could be contracted as they have been expanded. Such a
retreat has occurred to some extent with the state action doctrine.S's Title II
provides a floor for other public accommodations legislation, a solid, if mini-
mal, level of protection.
Nonetheless, federal law cannot reach certain private acts of discrimination
as easily as state law can. State legislatures are not hindered by the constraints
of federalism, constitutional or political, imposed on Title II. No interstate
commerce barrier impinges on state regulation. The state may prohibit dis-
crimination in all establishments until a constitutionally-based privacy interest
surfaces. Federal law offers protection largely to victims of racial and ethnic
discrimination, the groups which are afforded the strongest constitutional pro-
tection. State legislatures, with their unity of geographic interest, may agree to
protect groups which have historically been victims of discrimination within the
state borders or may succumb to the political pressures applied by local ac-
tivists. State laws can be tailored to meet local needs and demands. For these
reasons, state legislation is better suited to the task of enforcing antidiscrimina-
tion policies.
Most states have transcended the protections afforded by federal law by
prohibiting discrimination in virtually all business establishments and protecting
511. Younger v. Harris, 410 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v..Pursue, 420 U.S. 69 (1975).
512. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
513. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
514. See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
515. See text accompanying notes 109-20 supra.
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not only the groups mentioned in Title II but also women, the aged, and the
disabled. A few states have expanded the concept of protected classes and
have barred discrimination on grounds of marital status, personal appearance,
and sexual preference. These states may now serve as a model for the expan-
sion of federal coverage, although federal legislation once served that function
for the states. The District of Columbia statute offers an excellent example of
innovative civil rights legislation.5 16
Furthermore, the scope of state remedies and the effectiveness of state
enforcement frequently go beyond the limited civil remedy provisions of fed-
eral law. Now that public accommodations issues are out of the spotlight, the
cases have moved out of the courts. The responsibility for shoring up and
maintaining the advances made in guaranteeing access to public accommoda-
tions has devolved upon state civil rights agencies. The observation that infor-
mal methods of resolution are the most appropriate for public accommodations
grievances is supported by the large number of enforcement agencies which
have been established, and the few public accommodations cases which reach
either state or federal courtrooms. Ideally, an agency can provide more expe-
dient and less expensive procedures for protecting the right of equal access.
The fact that the number of accommodations complaints is fewer than other
types of discrimination complaints, 517 and that many charges are withdrawn by
complainants before resolution, may indicate that agency procedures have not
fulfilled their promise of efficiency. Complaint backlogs cause delays of several
months, and the increasingly formalized requirements of the administrative hear-
ing discourage many victims of discrimination from pursuing their claims. A
greater reliance on informal means of resolution-conciliation, negotiation and
the Expedited Resolution Process 51 -- and on class actions and group com-
plaints might make an agency more responsive to the needs of victims of dis-
crimination.
Once a state has passed a comprehensive public accommodations act, the
presence of an active and efficient agency is the best single indicator of a
state's commitment to its public accommodations legislation. Although accom-
modations complaints make up a small percentage of the total complaints filed,
and agency attention is focused largely on employment and housing complaints,
new areas of concern, such as credit discrimination and affirmative protection
for the handicapped, are receiving attention by legislatures and agencies. The
active agency also successfully settles and conciliates complaints prior to the
hearing stage. It also explores and pushes the boundaries of its public accom-
modations laws to bring more establishments under its coverage, and investi-
gates and challenges subtle exclusionary patterns and practices. The availability
of a broad range of remedies--civil, criminal, and administrative-is a further
sign that a state's interest in enforcing its public accommodation laws is
genuine. By offering the maximum number of options to its citizens and back-
516. See Appendix D infra.
517. See text accompanying notes 491-94 supra.
518. See text accompanying notes 466-69 supra.
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ing up those choices with meaningful remedies, a state at least creates a climate
which encourages victims of discrimination to exercise their rights of equal
access.
The right of equal access is widely accepted and guaranteed in theory. It
now remains to implement that theory in practice and eradicate swiftly and
surely all remnants of this form of discrimination.
LISA GABRIELLE LERMAN*
ANNETTE K. SANDERSON
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
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TitlelI L X X X e
Alabama N
Alaska L X X X X X X Xc X X X X
Arizona Q X X X X c
Arkansas N
California G X X X X X X c
Colorado Q X X X X X X X c X X X XX
Connecticut G X X X X X c e
Delaware G X X X X X e




Idaho Q X XXXX X X Xe c
Illinois Q X X X X X X c X X X X X
Indiana G X X X X X
Iowa G X X X X X c e c
Kansas Q X X X X X c X X X X c c
Kentucky X X X X X X e c
Louisiana N c
Maine Q X X X X X c X X X X X X
Maryland L X X X X c X e e
Key to Appendixes A and B
X: included in the public accommodations law
c: included in the credit statute, the credit provision of the civil rights law, or the housing credit law
e: exempted from the public accommodations law
L: long specific list Types of Definitions of Public Accommodations
G: general language
N.B.: A general definition is assumed to cover restaurants, lodgings, places of entertainment,
transport facilities, retail stores, and state facilities. The absence of an "X" does not mean
that the place listed is not covered, but only that it is not specifically listed.
Q: long qualified list
N: no public accommodations law
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APPENDIX A (continued)
PLACES COVERED UNDER THE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND CREDIT LAWS
00E 2-
00





o - o o o d Q E'. ' U
7,~ ca ci 0; 0 
Massachusetts Q X X X X X X c X X X X X e
Michigan G X X X X X X c e e
Minnesota G X X X X X X Xc C
Mississippi N
Missouri Q X X X X c X e e
Montana Q X X X X X X C X X X X X e
Nebraska Q X X X X X e e
Nevada Q X X X c X X e
New Hampshire L X X X X X X X e
New Jersey Q X X X X X X cX X e C
New Mexico G X X X X X c e e
New York Q X X X X X X C cX X X X X X e c e
North Carolina N c
North Dakota G X X X X X X
Ohio Q X X X X X X c X X
Oklahoma G X X X X X e e e
Oregon G X X X X X e
Pennsylvania Q X X X X X X C X X X X X X c e
Rhode Island Q X X X X X X c X X X X X X C
South Carolina N
South Dakota G X X X X X Xc X
Tennessee N c
Texas N c
Utah G X X X X X e C
Vermont Q X X X X X C
Virginia N C
West Virginia G X X X X X C¢ X e
Washington Q X X X X X X c X X X X ¢ €
Wisconsin Q X X X X C X X X X e e
Wyoming G X X X X X
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C) 0 0 a
U - o U =.= ) .'
0 C~ Cd 0 C1 )
u .= g ." u "S ". E c '
Title II X X X X
Alabama
Alaska Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc
Arizona X X X X X
Arkansas
California X X X X X X c
Colorado Xc Xc Xc Xc c Xc Xc c
Connecticut Xc Xc Xc Xc c Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc
Delaware X X X X X X X
District ofColumbia X X X X X X X X X
Florida c c
Georgia c c c c c
Hawaii c
Idaho X X X X X
Illinois Xc Xc Xc Xc X Xc c c X X
Indiana X X X X X X X X
Iowa Xc Xc X Xc Xc Xc c Xc X c c
Kansas Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc X
Kentucky Xc Xc Xc Xc c c
Louisiana c c c c c c
Maine Xc Xc Xc X X Xc c X X c
Maryland Xc Xc Xc c Xc c Xc Xc Xc
Key to Appendixes A and B
X: included in the public accommodations law
c: included in the credit statute, the credit provision ofthe civil rights law, or the housing credit law
e: exempted from the public accommodations law
Types of Definitions of Public Accommodations
L: long specific list
G: general language
N.B.: A general definition is assumed to cover restaurants, lodgings, places of entertainment,
transport facilities, retail stores, and state facilities. The absence of an "X" does not mean
that the place listed is not covered, but only that it is not specifically listed.
Q: long qualified list
N: no public accommodations law
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APPENDIX B (continued)
CLASSIFICATIONS COVERED UNDER THE STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
AND CREDIT LAWS
0






Massachusetts X X X X X Xc c X c
Michigan Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc c c X
Minnesota Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc c Xc XC
Mississippi
Missouri Xc Xc Xc X Xc X
Montana Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc c Xc Xc Xc
Nebraska X X X X X X X
Nevada X X X X c c X
New Hampshire X X X X X X X X X
New Jersey Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc X
New Mexico Xc Xc XC Xc Xc XC c XC X
New York XC Xc Xc X Xc XC Xc Xc
North Carolina C
North Dakota X X X X X
Ohio Xc Xc XC Xc Xc Xc c Xc Xc c
Oklahoma X X X X c c
Oregon X X X X X X
Pennsylvania X X X X X X X
Rhode Island X X X X X C c X
South Carolina
South Dakota Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc Xc
Tennessee c c
Texas c
Utah X X X X X X
Vermont X X X X c c
Virginia c c
West Virginia Xc Xc XC Xc Xc Xc XC X
Washington XC Xc X Xc c c
Wisconsin X X X X X Xc C XC
Wyoming X X X X
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It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia, in enacting this chapter,
to secure an end in the District of Columbia, to discrimination for any reason other than
that of individual merit, including, but not limited to discrimination by reason of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual
orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical handicap,
source of income, and place of residence or business.
§ 6-2202. Definitions.
The following words and terms when used in this chapter have the following mean-
ings:
(a) "Administrative Procedure Act" means the "District of Columbia Administra-
tive Procedure Act," (D.C. Code, sec. 1-1501 et seq.);
(b) "Age" means eighteen (18) years of age or older except that, in a case of em-
ployment, age shall be defined as eighteen (18) to sixty-five (65) years of age, unless
otherwise prohibited by law;
(1) "Family Responsibilities" means the state of being, or the potential to become,
a contributor to the support of a person or persons in a dependent relationship, irrespec-
tive of their number;
(m) "Hearing Tribunal" means members of the Commission, or one or more hear-
ing examiners, appointed by the Commission to conduct a hearing;
(p) "make public" means disclosure to the public or to the news media of any
personal or business data obtained during the course of an investigation of a complaint
filed under the provisions of this chapter, but not to include the publication of EEO-1,
EEO-2, or EEO-3 reports as required by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion, or any other data in the course of any administrative or judicial proceeding under
this chapter; or any judicial proceeding under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
[42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.] involving such information; nor shall it include access to such
data by staff or the Office of Human Rights, members of the Commission on Human
Rights, or parties to a proceeding, nor shall it include publication of aggregated data
from individual reports;
(q) "Marital status" means the state of being married, single, divorced, separated,
or widowed and the usual conditions associated therewith, including pregnancy or par-
enthood;
(r) "Matriculation" means the condition of being enrolled in a college, or univer-
sity; or in a business, nursing, professional, secretarial, technical or vocational school;
or in an adult education program;
(t) "Owner" means one of the following:
(1) any person, or any one of a number of persons in whom is vested all or any
part of the legal or equitable ownership, dominion, or title to any real property;
301
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(2) the committee, conservator, or any other legal guardian of a person who for
any reason is non sui juris, in whom is vested the legal or equitable ownership,
dominion or title to any real property; or
(3) a trustee, elected or appointed or required by law to execute a trust, other
than a trustee under a deed of trust to secure the payment of money; or one who,
as agent of, or fiduciary, or officer appointed by the court for the estate of the
person defined in paragraph (1) of this definition shall have charge, care or control
of any real property.
The term "owner" shall also include the lessee, the sublessee, assignee, managing
agent, or other person having the right of ownership or possession of, or the right to
sell, rent or lease, any real property;
(u) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, mutual company, joint stock
company, corporation, association, organization, unincorporated organization, labor
union, government agency, incorporated society, statutory or common law trust, estate,
executor, administrator, receiver, trustee, conservator, liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy,
committee, assignee, officer, employee, principal or agent, legal or personal representa-
tive, real estate broker or salesman or any agent or representative of any of the fore-
going;
(v) "Personal appearance" means the outward appearance of any person, irrespec-
tive of sex, with regard to bodily condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress,
and manner or style of personal grooming, including, but not limited to, hair style and
beards. It shall not relate, however, to the requirement of cleanliness, uniforms, or
prescribed standards, when uniformly applied for admittance to a public accommoda-
tion, or when uniformly applied to a class of employees, for a reasonable business pur-
pose; or when such bodily conditions or characteristics, style or manner of dress or
personal grooming presents a danger to the health, welfare or safety of any individual;
(w) "Physical handicap" means a bodily or mental disablement which may be the
result of injury, illness or congenital condition for which reasonable accommodation can
be made;
(x) "Place of public accommodation" means all places included in the meaning of
such terms as inns, taverns, road houses, hotels, motels, whether conducted for the
entertainment of transient guests or for the accommodation of those seeking health,
recreation or rest; restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for
consumption on the premises; buffets, saloons, barrooms, or any store, park or enclo-
sure where spirituous or malt liquors are sold; ice cream parlors, confectionaries, soda
fountains and all stores where ice cream, ice and fruit preparation or their derivatives,
or where beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the premises; wholesale
and retail stores, and establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind, includ-
ing, but not limited to the credit facilities thereof; banks, savings and loan associations,
establishments of mortgage bankers and brokers, all other financial institutions, and cred-
it information bureaus; insurance companies and establishments of insurance policy
brokers; dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, bath-houses, swimming pools, laundries and all
other cleaning establishments; barber shops, beauty parlors, theatres, motion picture
houses, airdromes, roof gardens, music halls, race courses, skating rinks, amusement
and recreation parks, trailer camps, resort camps, fairs, bowling alleys, golf courses,
gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiards and pool parlors; garages, all public con-
veyances operated on land or water or in the air, as well as the stations and terminals
thereof; travel or tour advisory services, agencies or bureaus; public halls and public
elevators of buildings and structures, occupied by two (2) or more tenants, or by the
owner and one (1) or more tenants. Such term shall not include any institution, club, or
place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private except, that any such
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institution, club or place of accommodation shall be subject to the provisions of section
6-2277;
(y) "Political affiliation" means the state of belonging to or endorsing any political
party;
(cc) "Sexual orientation" means male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality
and bisexuality, by preference or practice;
(dd) "Source of income" means the point, the cause, or the form of the origination,
or transmittal, of gains of property accruing to a person in a stated period of time;
including, but not limited to, money and property secured from any occupation, profes-
sion or activity, from any contract, agreement or settlement, from federal payments,
court-ordered payments, from payments received as gifts, bequests, annuities, life insur-
ance policies and compensation for illness or injury, except in a case where conflict of
interest may exist;
(if) "Unlawful discriminatory practice" means those discriminatory practices which
are so specified in subchapter II of this chapter.
§ 6-2203. Exceptions.
(a) Any practice which has a discriminatory effect and which would otherwise be
prohibited by this chapter shall not be deemed unlawful if it can be established that such
practice is not intentionally devised or operated to contravene the prohibitions of this
chapter and can be justified by business necessity. Under this chapter, a "business
necessity" exception is applicable only in each individual case where, it can be proved
by a respondent that, without such exception, such business cannot be conducted; a
"business necessity" exception cannot be justified by the factors of increased cost to
business, business efficiency, the comparative characteristics of one group as opposed
to another, the stereotyped characterization of one group as opposed to another, and the
preferences of co-workers, employers, customers or any other person.
(b) Nothing contained in the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to bar
any religious or political organization, or any organization operated for charitable or
educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection
with a religious or political organization, from limiting employment, or sales, or rental of
housing accommodations, or admission to or giving preference to persons of the same
religion or political persuasion as is calculated by such organization to promote the
religious or political principles for which it is established or maintained.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede any federal rule, regula-
tion or act.
§ 6-2204. Severability.
If any provision, or part thereof of this chapter or application thereof to any person
or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of the
provision, or part thereof, to other persons not similarly situated or to other circum-
stances is not to be affected thereby.
SUBCHAPTER II.-PROHIBITED ACTS OF DISCRIMINATION
PART A.-RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS
§ 6-2211. Equal opportunities.
Every individual shall have an equal opportunity to participate fully in the eco-
nomic, cultural and intellectual life of the District and to have an equal opportunity to
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participate in all aspects of life, including, but not limited to, in employment, in places
of public accommodation, resort or amusement, in educational institutions, in public ser-
vice, and in housing and commerical space accommodations.
PART D.-PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
§ 6-2241. Prohibitions.
(a) General. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the follow-
ing acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation,
family responsibilities, physical handicap, matriculation, political affiliation, source of
income, or place of residence or business, of any individual:
(1) to deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodations;
(2) to print, circulate, post, or mail, or otherwise cause, directly or indirectly,
to be published a statement, advertisement, or sign which indicates that the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
commodations of a place of public accommodation will be unlawfully refused, with-
held from or denied an individual; or that an individual's patronage of, or presence
at, a place of public accommodation is objectionable, unwelcome, unacceptable, or
undesirable.
(b) Subterfuge. It is further unlawful to do any of the above said acts for any rea-
son that would not have been asserted but for, wholly or partially, a discriminatory
reason based on the race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, per-
sonal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, physical handicap, matricu-
lation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of residence or business, of any
individual.
PART F.--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
§ 6-2261. Posting of notice.
Every person subject to this chapter shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous
location where business or activity is customarily conducted or negotiated, a notice
whose language and form has been prepared by the Office, setting forth excerpts from
or summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this chapter and information pertinent to
the filing of a complaint.
§ 6-2262. Records and reports.
(a) Every person subject to this chapter shall preserve any regularly kept business
records for a period of six (6) months from the date of the making of the record, or from
the date of the action which is the subject of the record, whichever is longer; such
records shall include, but not be limited to, application forms submitted by applicants,
sales and rental records, credit and reference reports, personnel records, any any other
records pertaining to the status of an individual's enjoyment of the rights and privileges
protected or granted under this chapter.
(b) Where a charge of discrimination has been filed against a person under this
chapter, the respondent shall preserve all records which may be relevant to the charge
or action, until a final disposition of the charge in accordance with subsection (c) of this
section.
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(c) All persons subject to this chapter shall furnish to the Office, at the time and in
the manner prescribed by the Office, such reports relating to information under their
control as the Office may require. The identities of persons and properties contained in
reports submitted to the Office under the provisions of this section shall not be made
public.
§ 6-2263. Affirmative action plans.
It shall not be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to carry out an
affirmative action plan that has been approved by the Office. An affirmative action plan
is any plan devised to effectuate remedial or corrective action in response to past dis-
criminatory practices prohibited under this chapter and may also include those plans
devised to provide preferential treatment for a class or classes of persons, which prefer-
ential treatment by class would otherwise be prohibited by this chapter and which plan
is not devised to contravene the intent of this chapter.
PART G.-OTHER PROHIBITED PRACTICES
§ 6-2271. Coercion or retaliation.
(a) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to coerce, threaten, retaliate
against, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of having aided or encouraged any other
person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected under this chapter.
(b) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to require, re-
quest, or suggest that a person retaliate against, interfere with, intimidate or discrimi-
nate against a person, because that person has opposed any practice made unlawful by
this chapter, or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted or partici-
pated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing authorized under this
chapter.
(c) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to cause or
coerce, or attempt to cause or coerce, directly or indirectly, any person to prevent any
person from complying with the provisions of this chapter.
§ 6-2272. Aiding or abetting.
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, invite,
compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under the provisions of this
chapter or to attempt to do so.
§ 6-2273. Conciliation agreements.
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for a party to a conciliation agree-
ment, made under the provisions of this chapter, to violate the terms of such agreement.
§ 6-2274. Resisting the Office or Commission.
(a) Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede or interfere with the Of-
fice or the Commission, or any of their representatives, in the performance of any duty
under the provisions of this chapter; or shall willfully violate an order of the Commis-
sion, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten (10)
days, or by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars (S300), or by both, except,
that filing a petition for review of an order, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter,
shall not be deemed to constitute such willful conduct, nor shall compliance with any
procedure regarding a subpoena in accord with section 1-237, be deemed to constitute
such willful conduct.
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(b) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for a person subject to this chap-
ter to fail to post notices, maintain records, file reports, as required by Part F of this
subchapter, or to supply documents and information requested by the Office in connec-
tion with a matter under investigation.
§ 6-2275. Falsifying documents and testimony.
It shall be unlawful to willfully falsify documents, records or reports, which are
required or subpoenaed pursuant to this chapter, or willfully to falsify testimony, or to
intimidate any witness or complainant; such violations shall be punishable by imprison-
ment for not more than ten (10) days, or by a fine of not more than three hundred
dollars ($300), or by both.
§ 6-2276. Arrest records.
It shall be an unlawful practice, punishable by a fine of not more than three
hundred dollars ($300) or imprisonment for not more than ten (10) days, or both, for any
person to require the production of any arrest record or any copy, extract, or statement
thereof, at the monetary expense of any individual to whom such record may relate.
Such "arrest records" shall contain only listings of convictions and forfeitures of collat-
era that have occurred within ten (10) years of the time at which such record is re-
quested.
§ 6-2277. District of Columbia licenses.
All permits, licenses, franchises, benefits, exemptions or advantages issued by or
on behalf of the Government of the District of Columbia, shall specifically require and be
conditioned upon full compliance with the provisions of this chapter; and shall further
specify that the failure or refusal to comply with any provision of this chapter shall be a
proper basis for revocation of such permit, license, franchise, benefit, exemption or
advantage.
§ 6-2278. Effects clause.
Any practice which has the effect or consequence of violating any of the provisions
of this chapter shall be deemed to be an unlawful discriminatory practice.
SUBCHAPTER III.-PROCEDURES
§ 6-2281. Authority of the Director and Commission.
(a) The activities of the Office and the Commission, under the provisions of this
chapter, shall be considered investigations or examinations of municipal matters, within
the meaning of section 1-237; and the Commission, the individual members thereof, and
the Director, shall possess the powers vested in the Council of the District of Columbia.
(b) The Office is hereby empowered to undertake its own investigations and public
hearings on any racial, religious, and ethnic group tensions, prejudice, intolerance,
bigotry and disorder; and on any form of, or reason for, discrimination, in accordance
with sections 6-2201 and 6-2211, against any person, group of persons, organization, or
corporations, whether practiced by private persons, associations, corporations, city offi-
cials or city agencies; for the purpose of making appropriate recommendations for ac-
tion, including legislation, against such discrimination.
(c) The Office and the Commission may make, issue, adopt, promulgate, amend
and rescind such rules and procedures as they deem necessary to effectuate and which
are not in conflict with, the provisions of this chapter. Such rules and procedures and
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amendments thereto, shall be adopted and promulgated in accordance with procedures
promulgated pursuant to the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act.
(d) In taking any action authorized or required by the provisions of this chapter,
the Commission may act through panels or a division of not less than three (3) of its
members, a majority of whom shall constitute a quorum.
(e) The Mayor shall recommend to the Council, any additional regulations.
(f) Investigations relating to the enforcement of provisions of this chapter shall be
given priority over all other duties and activities of the Office.
(g) The Mayor shall report annually to the Council as to the progress with regard to
the enforcement of this chapter, and any other activity related to the field of human
rights deemed valuable to the Council in the pursuit of its responsibilities.
§ 6-2282. Complaints filed with other District agencies.
Nothing in the provisions of this chapter is deemed to relieve any agency or author-
ity of the government of the District of its obligation to take immediate and independent
action regarding a matter filed with it, in accord with its jurisdiction, that also may be
the subject of a complaint filed with the Office.
§ 6-2283. Complaints against District agencies.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Mayor shall establish rules
of procedure for the investigation, conciliation and hearing of complaints filed against
District government agencies, officials and employees alleging violations of this chapter.
The final determination in such matters shall be made by the Mayor or his designee.
§ 6-2284. Filing of complaints
(a) Any person or organization, whether or not an aggrieved party, may file with
the Office a complaint of a violation of the provisions of this chapter, including a com-
plaint of general discrimination, unrelated to a specific person or instance. The com-
plaint shall state the name and address of the person alleged to have committed the
violation, hereinafter called the respondent, and shall set forth the substance thereof,
and such other information as may be required by the Office. The Director, sua sponte,
may investigate individual instances and patterns of conduct prohibited by the pro-
visions of this chapter and may initiate complaints in connection therewith. Any com-
plaint under this chapter shall be filed with the Office within one (1) year of the occur-
rence of the unlawful discriminatory practice, or the discovery thereof, except as may
be modified in accordance with section 6-2283.
(b) Complaints filed with the Office under the provisions of this chapter may be
voluntarily withdrawn at the request of the complainant at any time prior to the com-
pletion of the Office's investigation and findings as specified in seciton 6-2285, except
that the circumstances accompanying said withdrawal may be fully investigated by the
Office.
§ 6-2285. Investigation.
(a) After the filing of any complaint, the Office shall serve, within fifteen (15) days
of said filing, a copy thereof upon the respondent, and upon all persons it deems to be
necessary parties; and shall make prompt investigation in connection therewith.
(b) Within one hundred and twenty (120) days, after service of the complaint upon
all parties thereto, the Office shall determine whether, in accord with its own rules, it
has jurisdiction; and if so, whether there is probable cause to believe that the respon-
dent has engaged or is engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice.
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(c) If the Office finds, with respect to any respondent, that it lacks jurisdiction or
that probable cause does not exist the Director forthwith shall issue and cause to be
served on the appropriate parties, an order dismissing the allegations of the complaint.
§ 6-2286. Conciliation.
(a) If, in the judgment of the Office, the circumstances so warrant, it may, at any
time after the filing of the complaint, endeavor to eliminate such unlawful discriminatory
practice by conference, conciliation or persuasion.
(b) The terms of a conciliation agreement may require a respondent to refrain, in
the future, from committing specified discriminatory practices, and to take such affirma-
tive action as, in the judgment of the Office, will effectuate the purposes of this chapter;
and may include consent, by the respondent, to the entry in court of a consent decree,
embodying the terms of the conciliation agreement.
(c) Upon agreement of all parties to a complaint and upon notice to all parties
thereto, a conciliation agreement shall be deemed an order of the Commission, and shall
be enforceable as such. Except for the terms of the conciliation agreement, employees
of the Office shall not make public, without the written consent of the respondent,
information concerning conciliation efforts.
§ 6-2287. Injunctive relief.
If, at any time after a complaint has been filed, the Office believes that appropriate
civil action to preserve the status quo or to prevent irreparable harm appears advisable,
the Office shall certify the matter to the Corporation Counsel, who shall bring in the
name of the District of Columbia, any action necessary to preserve such status quo or
to prevent such harm, including the seeking of temporary restraining orders and prelimi-
nary injunctions. The appropriate parties shall be notified of such certification and the
complainant may initiate independently, or in cooperation with the Corporation Counsel,
appropriate civil action to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
§ 2289. Service of notice.
In all cases where the Office is required to effect service, it shall be accomplished
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested or by personal service and shall
otherwise be in accordance with rules of the Office regarding service and notice.
§ 6-2290. Notice of hearing.
In case of failure of conciliation efforts, or in advance of conciliation efforts, as
determined by the Office, and after a finding of probable cause, the Office shall cause to
be issued and served in the name of the Commission, a written notice, together with a
copy of the complaint, as the same may have been amended, requiring the respondent
to answer the charges of such complaint at a public hearing before one (1) or more
members of the Commission or before a hearing examiner, such hearing to be scheduled
not less than ten (10) days or not more than thirty (30) days after such service and at a
place to be specified in such notice. Notice shall be served by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service.
§ 6-2291. Hearing tribunal.
(a) After a complaint has been noticed for hearing, a hearing tribunal consisting of
three (3) members of the Commission, sitting as the Commission, shall be appointed to
make a determination upon such complaint. At the discretion of the Commission, one
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(1) or more hearing examiners may be delegated to hear and report back to the Commis-
sion, on any case or question before the Commission.
(b) A hearing examiner may be an employee of the District Government or may be
selected from a list of qualified hearing examiners prepared by the Commission. Com-
mission members may serve as hearing examiners. Hearing examiners shall be paid on a
per diem basis, while actually sitting and hearing a case: Provided, That funds are avail-
able for such purpose.
§ 6-2292. Conduct of hearing.
(a) The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with procedures promulgated pur-
suant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
(b) The case in support of the complaint shall be presented by an agent or attorney
of the Office.
(c) Any Commissioner or hearing examiner, who has participated in the investiga-
tion, conciliation or processing of a complaint, or has participated in any decision re-
lated to the merits of a complaint, may not sit with a hearing tribunal appointed to make
a determination upon such complaint.
(d) Efforts at conciliation by the Office or the parties, shall not be received in
evidence.
(e) If the respondent fails to answer the complaint, the hearing tribunal, or the
hearing examiner designated to conduct the hearing, may enter the default; and the
hearing shall proceed on the basis of the evidence in support of the complaint. Such
default may be set aside only for good cause shown, and upon equitable terms and
conditions.
§ 6-2293. Decision and order.
(a) If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission determines that a respon-
dent has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice or has otherwise violated the
provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall issue, and cause to be served upon
such respondent, a decision and order, accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions
of law, requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful discriminatory
practice, and to take such affirmative action, including but not limited to:
(1) the hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back
pay;
(2) the restoration to the membership in any respondent labor organization,
admission to or participation in a program, apprenticeship training program, on-the-
job training program or other occupational training or retraining program;
(3) the extension of full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges to all persons;
(4) the payment of compensatory damages to the person aggrieved by such
practice;
(5) the payment of reasonable attorney fees; and
(6) the payment of hearing costs, as, in the judgment of the Commission, will
effectuate the purposes of this chapter, and including a requirement for a report as
to the manner of compliance with such decision and order. With regard to compen-
satory damages and attorney's fees, the Commission shall develop guidelines which
shall be submitted to the Council for review prior to implementation.
(b) If, upon all the evidence, the Commission finds that a respondent has not en-
gaged in any unlawful discriminatory practice, the Commission shall issue and cause to
be served on the complainant, an order dismissing the complaint as to such respondent.
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(c) Whenever a case has been heard by one (1) or more hearing examiners who do
no' [sic] have the power to render a final order or decision, the Commissioners, assigned
to decide the case, shall serve upon the parties a proposed order or decision, including
findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a notice providing that each party ad-
versely affected may file exceptions and present arguments to the Commissioners, on a
date not less than ten (10) days from the date of service of the proposed order or
decision.
(d) Findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be supported by, and in accord-
ance, with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
§ 6-2294. Review.
Any person suffering a legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved by, an order
or decision of the Commission in a matter, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter is
entitled to a judicial review thereof, in accordance with section 1-1510, upon filing, in
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a written petition for such review.
§ 6-2295. General enforcement provision.
(a) The decision and order of the Commission shall be served on the respondent,
with notice that, if the Commission determines that the respondent has not, after thirty
(30) calendar days following service of its order, corrected the unlawful discriminatory
practice and complied with the order, the Commission will certify the matter to the
Corporation Counsel, and to such other agencies as may be appropriate for enforce-
ment.
(b) The Corporation Counsel shall institute in the name of the District, civil pro-
ceedings including the seeking of such restraining orders and temporary or permanent
injunctions, as are necessary to obtain complete compliance with the Commission's or-
ders. In the event that successful civil proceedings do not result in securing such com-
pliance, the Corporation Counsel shall institute criminal action.
(c) No enforcement action shall be instituted pending review as provided in section
6-2294.
(d) Nothing in this section shall to' [sic] deprive any person of rights in the criminal
justice process.
§ 6-2296. Enforcement by a private person.
(a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice
shall have a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages and such
other remedies as may be appropriate, unless such person has filed a complaint hereun-
der: Provided, That where the Office has dismissed such complaint on the grounds of
administrative convenience, or where the complainant has withdrawn a complaint, such
person shall maintain all rights to bring suit as if no complaint had been filed. No person
who maintains in a court of competent jurisdiction, any action based upon an act which
would be an unlawful discriminatory practice under this chapter may file the same com-
plaint with the Office.
(b) The court may grant such relief as it deems appropriate, including but not lim-
ited to, such relief as is provided in section 6-2293(a).
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§ 6-2297. District licenses.
(a) Whenever it appears that the holder of a permit, license, franchise, benefit, or
advantage, issued by any agency or authority of the government of the District is a
person against whom the Office has made a finding of probable cause pursuant to sec-
tion 6-2285, the Office, notwithstanding any other action it may take or may have taken
under the authority of the provision of this chapter, may refer to the proper agency or
authority the facts and identities of all persons involved in the complaint, for such ac-
tion as such agency or authority, in its judgment, considers appropriate, based upon the
facts thus disclosed to it.
(b) The Commission, upon a determination of a violation of any of the provisions of
this chapter by a holder of, or applicant for any permit, license, franchise, benefit,
exemption or advantage issued by or on behalf of the government of the District of
Columbia, and upon failure of the respondent to correct the unlawful discriminatory
practice and comply with its order, in accordance with section 6-2295(a), shall refer this
determination to the appropriate agency or authority. Such determination shall consti-
tute prima facie evidence that the respondent, with respect to the particular business in
which the violation was found is not operating in the public interest. Such agency or
authority shall, upon notification, issue to said holder or applicant an order to show
cause why such privileges related to that business should not be revoked, suspended,
denied or otherwise restricted.
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